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Introduction
This doctoral thesis studies the behavior of Treasury yields. I focus on three aspects of the
yield curve: (i) the link between bond yields and key macro quantities such as consumption
growth, (ii) the process of expectations formation about the short term interest rate which,
in most developed markets, is the main monetary policy instrument, and (iii) the behavior of
interest rate volatilities across different maturities. These research questions share a common
goal which is to provide guidance for designing macroeconomic models of the yield curve.
The economic theory has clear predictions about the joint behavior of macro quantities
and the yield curve. However, it has been hard to reconcile these predictions with the
observed dynamics of yields. Chapter 1: “Intertemporal Trade-off and the Yield Curve”
empirically evaluates and models the relationship between consumption growth and the
short term riskless interest rate, charaterized by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(EIS). Chapter 2: “Expecting the Fed” studies how investors form their expectations about
the short rate. In particular, it evaluates if and how investors’ expectations deviate from the
benchmark of full information rational expectations. Chapter 3: “Information in the term
structure of yield curve volatility” analyzes the dynamic features of yield volatilities and
undertakes their modeling. Chapters 2 and 3 are based on joint work with Anna Cieslak.
Understanding the relationship between the short term real rate and the consumption/output
growth is important for several reasons. First, the EIS is one of the most important
parameters in asset pricing and macroeconomics. In consumption-based models, the EIS
is a key determinant of the level and variation in the risk-free rate. Second, it determines
the magnitude of various policy effects such as the real effects of monetary policy. Despite the
importance of this relationship, the literature has not reached consensus on the value of the
EIS. On one hand, estimates from aggregate data suggest that the EIS is close to zero (Hall,
1988; Campbell, 2003; Fuhrer and Rudebusch, 2004). On the other hand, evidence from
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disaggregated data indicates that the EIS is likely to be above unity for households with
substantial asset holdings (Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio, 2003; Gruber, 2006). Micro
evidence is often used to motivate the EIS above unity in calibrations of asset pricing models
(Barro, 2009; Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron, 2012).
Chapter 1 provides two novel empirical results that help resolve the conflicting and incon-
clusive evidence on the magnitude of the EIS.
First, I propose a new measure of the ex-ante real interest rate that relies solely on asset
prices and avoids using realized inflation. Specifically, I show that the difference between the
three-month and ten-year nominal Treasury yield, which is the negative of the yield curve
slope, closely tracks the variation in the ex-ante short-term real rate. This measure has two
properties that are useful for the estimation of the EIS. It does not require any measure of
expected inflation thus avoiding short samples with direct measures of inflation expectations
or auxiliary assumptions on the time series dynamics of inflation such as linearity or rational
expectations.
Second, EIS estimates using aggregate consumption data are consistently negative and
statistically significant around -0.5. Similarly, replacing aggregate consumption by the
aggregate output data in the Euler equation yields negative estimates with magnitudes
between -0.5 and -1.2.
I show that the negatively signed estimates of the EIS arise naturally in a limited market par-
ticipation model. The key mechanism that changes the sign of the EIS operates through the
interaction of two types of households. A fraction of households, rule-of-thumb consumers,
do not participate in asset markets and consume their wage income every period (Campbell
and Mankiw, 1989; Mankiw, 2000). The remaining households, savers, have positive EIS
and own all the productive assets in the economy. Savers have two sources of income, wages
and dividends. Changes in the real interest rate directly influence only the consumption
and labor supply of savers. But the intertemporal choices of savers then have an impact on
the equilibrium real wage of rule-of-thumb consumers and thereby alter their consumption.
Changes in the real wage also lead to variation in profit margins of firms, affecting the
dividend income and the consumption of savers. The resulting effect of the real interest rate
shock on aggregate consumption is negative if the fraction of rule-of-thumb households is
sufficiently high and the labor supply is sufficiently inelastic.
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The negative relationship between consumption growth and ex-ante real interest rates has a
number of important implications for both asset pricing and monetary policy.
First, the negative value of the aggregate EIS helps explain why the yield curve behavior is
hard to reconcile with asset pricing models (Duffee, 2012a). Consumption-based models cal-
ibrated with a positive EIS imply a short-term real interest rate that is negatively correlated
with the real interest rate from the data (Cumby and Diba, 2007). Intuitively, changing the
sign of the EIS aligns the model-implied real rate with the ex-ante real rate from the data.
Second, persistent but mean-reverting variation in the real interest rate together with sizeable
estimates of the EIS imply a time-varying expected consumption growth rate. Using this
link, I extract the persistent component of aggregate consumption growth and study its
asset pricing implications. In line with the intuition of long-run risk models, the extracted
component has a high persistence, explains about 11% of the variation in consumption growth
and is positively related to the price-dividend ratio. In contrast to the calibration favored
by the long-run risk literature, the persistent component that is consistent with asset prices
is obtained with the negative value of the EIS.
The negative EIS also matters for models of monetary policy because the central bank reacts
to aggregate output. The aggregate Euler equation (IS curve) with a positive EIS is the core
of dynamic general equilibrium models used in the monetary policy analysis, e.g. New-
Keynesian models. The sign and magnitude of the aggregate EIS determine the real effect
of monetary policy. Therefore, the negative sign of the EIS changes key predictions of these
models. Most notably, it implies that an increase in the real interest rate is expansionary.
Chapter 2 focuses on how market participants form and update their expectations about
the short term interest rate. To directly disentangle the risk premium from short rate
expectations, we rely on comprehensive survey data containing the term structure of private
sector’s forecasts of the federal funds rate (FFR) as well as forecasts of longer maturity yields.
Separating short rate expectations from the risk premia in Treasury bonds is important for
policy makers and for understanding the economics of the yield curve. Such decomposition
provides insight about how markets perceive the future course of monetary policy, economic
activity, inflation and their associated risks. The results suggest that the view of frictionless
rational expectations deviates from the observed behavior of interest rates in significant
ways.
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First, while survey-based short rate expectations match almost one-to-one the contemporane-
ous behavior of short-term yields and fed fund futures, these expectations are poor predictors
of future short rates except at very short horizons (e.g. Rudebusch, 2002). Agents, faced
with a highly persistent process, fail in real time to appraise the mean reversion in the policy
rate that occurs at the business cycle frequency. As such, agents’ ex-post forecast errors
of the short rate are predictable with past information that captures the mean reversion
component. Our evidence suggests that this feature of short rate expectations pertains to
an environment with an active central bank that itself might adapt its policy rule over time,
and is less likely to characterize the data pre-Fed. In the last three decades, we find that
agents’ forecast errors about the short rate comove closely (with a negative sign) with the
errors they make when forecasting unemployment, and much less so inflation.
Second, we construct a measure of expectations frictions based on the difference between the
observed physical dynamics of the policy rate and the corresponding expectations reflected
in the yield curve. This variable reflects the idea that there is information in the time
series of monetary policy actions that is not fully impounded in the cross section of yields
in real time. We label this variable as MP⊥t . One interpretation is that the Fed is able to
deliver persistent surprises to the market. Accordingly, we show that MP⊥t picks up the
low-frequency movements in the measure of monetary policy surprises identified from high
frequency data (Kuttner, 2001), which the literature has documented to be unaffected by
the risk premium (Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008).
With the help of survey data for longer-maturity yields, we obtain a model-free decomposition
of excess bond returns into a risk premium and an ex-ante unexpected return component.
The unexpected return on a two-year bond moves in lockstep with the (negative of) FFR
forecast errors, and one quarter of its variation can be predicted ex-post by MP⊥t . The
effect of expectations frictions is the strongest at the short end of the maturity spectrum,
most influenced by monetary policy, and subsides for long-term bonds. We find that several
conditioning variables used to forecast realized bond returns, especially variables related
to the real activity, predict unexpected returns and are essentially uncorrelated with the
survey-implied risk premia. These variables feature a high degree of correlation with MP⊥t .
Chapter 3 studies the structure, economic content and pricing implications of the fluctuating
covariance matrix of interest rates. Using comprehensive data on transactions in the US
Treasury market, we explore the key drivers of volatility in government bonds. To this
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end, we decompose the stochastic covariance matrix of on-the-run yields into two volatility
components corresponding to yield factors with a short and long duration, respectively, and
an additional variable that captures the degree of comovement between the short and long
maturity segment of the yield curve. This decomposition delivers the following results.
First, we find a lead-lag relationship between yield volatility and market-wide liquidity. The
long-duration volatility component captures almost half of the variation in a broad measure
of the value of funding liquidity. That element of liquidity is visible in the on-/off-the-run
premium across bond maturities and reflects the tightness of financial conditions in asset
markets (Fontaine and Garcia, 2011). Typically, it also preempts an action of the monetary
authority. An increase in the long-duration volatility component predicts a decline in the
value of funding liquidity up to six months ahead with an R2 of nearly 50%. The short-
duration volatility, instead, dominates in explaining the transitory episodes of liquidity dry-
ups that do not necessarily trigger a monetary policy reaction (e.g. GM/Ford downgrade),
but reflect the amount of arbitrage capital available in the market (Hu, Pan, and Wang,
2013). Importantly, an increase in the short-end volatility component predicts that the
arbitrage capital will be scarce in the future.
Second, we explore the macroeconomic drivers of volatility in yields. A combination of
expectations and uncertainty about monetary policy, inflation and real activity accounts for
up to 30% of the variation in yield volatility. Short- and long-run volatility are related to
different macro variables. The long-end volatility shows a pronounced response to the real
activity measures such as the uncertainty about unemployment, and to expectations about
the path of monetary policy. Quite differently, the short-term volatility is most strongly
linked to the monetary policy uncertainty. Finally, the comovement term is associated with
the uncertainty about inflation, monetary policy and the real economy, showing that those
variables influence the extent of correlation between yields across maturities.
Third, we study how interest rate volatility is related to the risk compensation required by
investors for holding Treasury bonds. When short-duration volatility is high, as induced
by an increased monetary policy uncertainty, bond risk premia tend to rise. This effect is
statistically and economically strong for bonds with a two-year maturity, but it dissipates
quickly as the maturity increases.
The chapters follow the inverse chronological order. Appendices are collected at the end of
each chapter.
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Chapter 1
Intertemportal Trade-off and the
Yield Curve
I. Introduction
Intertemporal trade-off is one of the key concepts in asset pricing and macroeconomics.1
The trade-off is described by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) defined as the
change in expected consumption growth in response to a change in the real interest rate. The
EIS does not only have a large impact on the behavior of asset prices but it also determines
the magnitude of various policy effects. In consumption-based models, the willingness of
agents to shift consumption intertemporally is a key determinant of the level and variation
in yield on the risk-free asset.
Despite its importance, the literature has not yet settled on the value of the EIS. On one hand,
estimates from aggregate data suggest that the EIS is close to zero (Hall, 1988; Campbell,
2003; Fuhrer and Rudebusch, 2004). On the other hand, evidence from disaggregated data
indicates that the EIS is likely to be above unity for households with substantial asset
1This chapter is based on the research paper with the same title. This chapter was written while I was a
visiting scholar at the Finance Department of Stern School of Business, NYU whose hospitality is gratefully
acknowledged. I received helpful comments from Luca Benzoni, Itamar Drechsler, Greg Duffee, Douglas
Gale, Ralph Koijen, Anthony Lynch, Matteo Maggiori, Alexi Savov, Fabio Trojani, Stephen Wright, Liuren
Wu, participants of the Financial Economics Workshop at NYU, seminar participants at Birkbeck, Chicago
Fed, Fed Board, Stockholm School of Economics, and Bank of Canada. I am especially grateful to Anna
Cieslak and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh for numerous comments and discussions. This research project has been
carried out within the project on “New Methods in Theoretical and Empirical Asset Pricing” of the National
Centre of Competence in Research ”Financial Valuation and Risk Management” (NCCR FINRISK). The
NCCR FINRISK is a research instrument of the Swiss National Science Foundation.
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holdings (Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio, 2003; Gruber, 2006). Micro evidence is often
used to motivate the EIS above unity in calibrations of asset pricing models (Barro, 2009;
Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron, 2012).
This paper provides two novel empirical results that help resolve the conflicting and incon-
clusive evidence on the magnitude of the EIS.
First, I propose a new concept for measuring the ex-ante real interest rate that relies solely
on asset prices and avoids using realized inflation. Specifically, I show that the difference
between the three-month and ten-year nominal Treasury yield, which is the negative of
the yield curve slope, closely tracks the variation in the ex-ante short-term real rate. I
label this new measure of the ex-ante real rate as r˜t = −slopet. This measure has two
properties that are useful for the estimation of the EIS. It does not require any measure of
expected inflation thus avoiding short samples with direct measures of inflation expectations
or auxiliary assumptions on the time series dynamics of inflation such as linearity or rational
expectations. As a result, my measure is available for a long sample and has favorable
stationarity properties across different monetary policy regimes. Given that the nominal
Treasury yield curve data are available for long periods, using r˜t allows me to estimate the
EIS from the Euler equation using 135 years of data.
Second, EIS estimates using aggregate consumption data are consistently negative and
statistically significant around -0.5. Similarly, replacing aggregate consumption by the
aggregate output data in the Euler equation yields negative estimates with magnitudes
between -0.5 and -1.2. The results hold across sub-samples marked by different monetary
policies and institutional arrangements. Hence, the stability of these EIS estimates requires
a structural interpretation of the negative sign.
When is the yield curve slope a good measure of the real rate variation? Three restrictions on
statistical properties of inflation expectations, risk premia and the real rate need to hold so
that the slope of the nominal yield curve closely tracks the ex-ante real rate, all of which are
met with theoretical and empirical support. First, the Fisher effect holds in the long run, i.e.
the real interest rate is stationary and most of the variation in the long-term nominal yield
is due to changing inflation expectations. Second, inflation expectations can be described
by a single factor with a close-to-unit-root persistence. Third, the variation in risk premia
is small and less persistent than the variation of the real rate.
17
I show that the negative sign of the EIS arises naturally in a standard limited market
participation model. The key mechanism that changes the sign of the EIS operates through
the interaction of two types of households. A fraction of households, rule-of-thumb con-
sumers, do not participate in asset markets and consume their wage income every period
(Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Mankiw, 2000). The remaining households, savers, have
positive EIS and own all the productive assets in the economy. Savers have two sources of
income, wages and dividends. Changes in the real interest rate directly influence only the
consumption and labor supply of savers. But the intertemporal choices of savers then have
an impact on the equilibrium real wage of rule-of-thumb consumers and thereby alter their
consumption. Changes in the real wage also lead to the variation in profit margins of firms,
affecting the dividend income and the consumption of savers. The resulting effect of the
real interest rate shock on aggregate consumption is negative if the fraction of rule-of-thumb
households is sufficiently high and the labor supply is sufficiently inelastic. Standard values
for the structural parameters of the model that are consistent with micro evidence imply the
estimated value of the aggregate EIS.
The negative relationship between consumption growth and ex-ante real interest rates has a
number of important implications for both asset pricing and monetary policy.
First, the negative value of the aggregate EIS helps explain why the yield curve behavior is
hard to reconcile with asset pricing models (Duffee, 2012a). Consumption-based models cal-
ibrated with a positive EIS imply a short-term real interest rate that is negatively correlated
with the real interest rate from the data (Cumby and Diba, 2007).2 Intuitively, changing the
sign of the EIS aligns the model-implied real rate with the ex-ante real rate from the data.
Second, persistent but mean-reverting variation in the real interest rate together with sizeable
estimates of the EIS imply a time-varying expected consumption growth rate. Using this
link, I extract the persistent component of aggregate consumption growth and study its
asset pricing implications. In line with the intuition of long-run risk models, the extracted
component has a high persistence, explains about 11% of the variation in consumption growth
and is positively related to the price-dividend ratio. New and in contrast to the calibration
favored by the long-run risk literature, the persistent component that is consistent with asset
prices is obtained with the negative value of the EIS.
2Cumby and Diba (2007) compare the model-implied real rate to the ex-ante and ex-post real rate
obtaining similar results for both.
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The implications for consumption-based asset pricing can be summarized as follows. To
replicate the dynamics of asset prices one can either use the aggregate consumption data
together with a negative value of the EIS in the representative agent Epstein-Zin framework,
or one can use a positive value of the EIS close to unity and apply it only to the consumption
of households participating in asset markets along the lines of Malloy, Moskowitz, and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2009).
The negative EIS also matters for models of monetary policy because the central bank reacts
to aggregate output. The aggregate Euler equation (IS curve) with a positive EIS is the core
of dynamic general equilibrium models used in the monetary policy analysis, e.g. New-
Keynesian models. The sign and magnitude of the aggregate EIS determine the real effect
of monetary policy. Therefore, the negative sign of the EIS changes key predictions of these
models. Most notably, it implies that an increase in the real interest rate is expansionary.
I.A. Related literature
This paper is related to several areas in the finance and macro literature. First, numerous
papers study the empirical properties of the real interest rate (Mishkin, 1981; Fama and
Gibbons, 1982; Evans and Lewis, 1995; Ang, Bekaert, and Wei, 2007c). The overall message
of these papers is that statistical properties of the real rate change over time. Similarly,
the literature studying inflation documents that both the persistence and the volatility of
inflation in the US vary over time (Barsky, 1987; Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent, 2010).
Despite this unambiguous evidence most of the recent studies constructing the ex-ante real
interest rate assume linearity which leads to biased estimates. To avoid estimation issues,
this paper proposes a measure of the ex-ante real rate that does not require estimating a
statistical model for inflation.
Second, the empirical literature documents that the slope of the nominal yield curve predicts
real output growth (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Plosser and Rouwenhorst, 1994; Ang,
Piazzesi, and Wei, 2006) and consumption growth (Harvey, 1988). There is no consensus as
to the economic mechanism behind this predictability. One way to explain the predictive
power of the slope is monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992), but other studies argue
against this interpretation (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Plosser and Rouwenhorst, 1994).
For a recent discussion see Benati and Goodhart (2008). In addition to the predictability
of real output, Fama (1990) and Mishkin (1990) show that the slope predicts changes in
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inflation. I show that the slope tracks the variation in the ex-ante real rate and is unrelated
to expected inflation, hence the relationship between the slope and aggregate consump-
tion/output growth represents the intertemporal optimality condition that is consistent with
a structural rather than monetary policy interpretation. Unlike most of the papers studying
the predictive power of the slope, I study the sample 1875-2009 that includes a period in
which the Fed was not operational. This helps distinguish monetary policy from structural
interpretation.
Third, econometric studies estimating the EIS from aggregate data exploit the intertemporal
optimality condition for consumption (Hansen and Singleton, 1982; Hall, 1988) or output
(Fuhrer and Rudebusch, 2004; Bilbiie and Straub, 2012). Estimates of the EIS from aggregate
data have sizeable standard errors and are usually close to zero. A variety of explanations for
the low magnitude of the EIS estimates have been proposed: non-separability of non-durable
and durable consumption (Ogaki and Reinhart, 1998), limited stock market participation
(Guvenen, 2006), bounded rationality (Gabaix, 2012), or the structural break in the EIS
(Bilbiie and Straub, 2012). These studies provide arguments for why the EIS estimates are
biased toward zero but do not explain why the aggregate EIS is consistently negative. The
lack of accurate EIS estimates from aggregates has motivated the analysis of household-level
data. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002) show that the EIS
is close to unity for stockholders. Similarly, Gruber (2006) estimates the EIS to be larger
than one in a sample of households paying substantial capital income tax. My estimates
of the EIS from the aggregate data are negative which makes the discrepancy between the
micro and macro estimates of the EIS larger than previously documented. I argue that the
differences arise as a result of aggregation of heterogenous households. The model presented
in this paper is consistent with both the positive EIS for households participating in asset
markets and the negative aggregate EIS.
Fourth, the evidence on violation of the permanent income hypothesis has led to models
in which the consumption is generated by two types of consumers: forward-looking who
consume their permanent income and rule-of-thumb who do not optimize intertemporally
because they are excluded from asset markets (Campbell and Mankiw, 1989). Guvenen
(2006) introduces heterogeneity in the EIS combined with limited stock market participation
into a real business cycle model to replicate the empirical evidence on low (but positive) EIS
at the aggregate level. I use the limited participation combined with nominal rigidities to
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study the implications of the negative aggregate EIS for dynamics of short-term interest
rates.
Finally, asset pricing models usually represent the variation in the yield curve slope as a
time-varying risk premium. Wachter (2006), Rudebusch and Swanson (2012), Bansal and
Shaliastovich (2010) fall into this category. This paper provides an alternative interpretation
of the yield curve slope. I first show that the slope closely tracks the variation in the real
short-term interest rate. Then I use the estimated EIS to connect the variation in the
short-term real rate to expected consumption growth.
II. The main result
This section states the main result and all the details are postponed to subsequent sections.
I estimate the log-linearized version of the intertemporal optimality condition for aggregate
consumption Ct using annual data in the sample 1875-2009:
∆ct+1 = µ¯t + σr˜t + ǫt+1, (1.1)
where ∆ct+1 = log Ct+1 − log Ct, µ¯t collects constant terms and the time-varying second
moments, σ denotes the EIS, r˜t is the measure of the ex-ante real interest rate proposed
in this paper and ǫt+1 subsumes expectations errors. I argue that, to obtain unbiased EIS
estimates, the choice of instruments for the ex-post real rate rt+1 is of great importance. I
exclude realized inflation from the instrument set because, as I will argue below, its forecast
errors are predictable and the dynamics are non-linear. Instead, I use r˜t as an instrument
for rt+1.
Table I reports the estimates of σ across different sub-samples (estimation details are post-
poned to Section IV.A). The sub-samples are chosen so that they allow for an assessment
of the stability of the estimates in different macroeconomic/policy environments and for
comparison with the literature. Panel A reports the results for consumption and Panel B for
the real output. The most important finding across sample periods and output measures is
that the estimates are negative and statistically significantly different from zero.3 The full
3Note that Hansen and Singleton (1984, 1996) in some cases obtain negative but insignificant estimates of
the risk aversion parameter. Hall (1988) also estimates a negative value for σ using annual data in the sample
spanning 1924-1940 and 1950-1983. Similarly, Yogo (2004) reports negative albeit in most cases insignificant
estimates of EIS for a panel of developed countries. Using the US data on the long sample period (1891-
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sample estimate of aggregate EIS is -0.51. The estimates provided in both panels of Table
I counter the standard economic intuition which asserts that σ > 0, i.e. a positive shock to
the real interest rate induces agents to postpone today’s consumption to the next period.
In the subsequent sections, I elaborate on this result. Section III provides arguments for
why r˜t is an appropriate measure of the ex-ante real interest rate. Section IV discusses
the estimation details and econometric issues. Section II shows that the negative EIS
estimates can be replicated in a standard general equilibrium model with limited asset
market participation for plausible values of structural parameters. Section VI discusses
the key mechanism for obtaining the negative aggregate EIS and studies its implications for
term structure modeling. Section VII relates this paper’s results to long-run risk models.
1997), Campbell (2003) estimates a negative though insignificant EIS parameter. These studies interpret
negative estimates of EIS as implausible.
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Table I: Estimates of Euler equation for total consumption and aggregate output, 1875-2009
The table reports the results for the log-linearized Euler equation given by (1.1). The IV setup is implemented as a two-step GMM. Panel A reports
the results for consumption and Panel B for the real output. Each column corresponds to a different sample period. The first column shows the full
sample estimates, 1875-2009. The second column reports the results for 1875-1979, a period preceding the Great Moderation and Volcker chairmanship.
The third column displays the results for the post-war period 1947-2009. The fourth column reports the estimates for 1960-2009, which includes the
inflationary period and finally the fifth column reports the results for 1980-2009, a post-inflation/Great Moderation period. The last column in both panels
reports the estimates using the survey-based ex-ante real rate. Inflation expectations are obtained from the Livingston panel for the period 1960-2009.
The data are annual. The autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (bandwith=3, Bartlett kernel). The
overidentification test refers to Hansen’s J statistic which is asymptotically χ23 distributed. The “Weak identification test” in each panel reports the F-
statistic (Kleibergen-Paap). The critical values for the maximum relative bias are 16.85 for 5%, 10.27 for 10%, 6.71 for 20%, and 5.34 for 30%. The critical
values for the maximal size are 24.58 for 10%, 10.26 for 20%, and 8.31 for 25%. The critical values are computed using the procedure proposed by Stock and
Yogo (2002). The last row in each panel reports the Wald test p-values testing the equality of σ in the pre-Volcker (1875-1979) and post-Volcker periods
(1980-2009). The following variables are used as instruments: two lags of r˜t, lagged three-month nominal T-bill and twice lagged consumption/output
growth.
1875-2009 1875-1979 1947-2009 1960-2009 1980-2009 1960-2009 rsurvt
A. Consumption Euler equation
σ̂ -0.51 -0.63 -0.72 -0.45 -0.69 -0.38
Robust s.e. (0.20) (0.25) (0.28) (0.27) (0.24) (0.28)
Confidence interval (95%) [-0.91, -0.12] [-1.12, -0.14] [-1.27, -0.18] [-0.97, 0.07] [-1.17, -0.21] [-0.93, 0.18]
Overidentification test (p-val) 0.78 0.91 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.24
Weak identification test (F-stat) 20.78 22.10 15.26 19.43 14.94 4.73
Wald test (p-val): σ equal – – – – 0.82 –
B. Output Euler equation
σ̂ -0.51 -0.85 -1.14 -1.16 -1.08 -0.86
Robust s.e. (0.29) (0.41) (0.33) (0.33) (0.28) (0.34)
Confidence interval (95%) [-1.07, 0.04] [-1.65, -0.05] [-1.79, -0.49] [-1.81, -0.50] [-1.63, -0.53] [-1.53, -0.20]
Overidentification test (p-val) 0.60 0.69 0.23 0.60 0.73 0.42
Weak identification test (F-stat) 19.51 19.82 12.69 15.92 13.05 5.02
Wald test (p-val): σ equal – – – – 0.41 –
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III. Measuring the real interest rate
The ex-ante short term real interest rate rt is defined as rt = it−Etπt+1, where it is the short
term nominal yield and Etπt+1 represents the expected inflation one period ahead. While it
is observable, rt is not because the inflation expectations are not directly observable. There
are two common ways to obtain inflation expectations.
The first and most often used method is to obtain rt from the ex-post real rate it − πt+1 by
projecting it on the information set available at time t. Two key assumptions underlie this
approach: (i) the rational expectations (RE) which puts a structure on the inflation forecast
errors and (ii) the stability of the data-generating process for inflation, henceforth linearity
assumption. However, empirical evidence does not square with either of these assumptions.
As a consequence, measures of expected inflation based on realized inflation and linear
regressions lead to biased estimates. More details on these assumptions are provided in
Section III.B.
Second, the real rate rt can be constructed using inflation survey data. The attractive feature
of this approach is that a measure of rt is obtained without the use of assumptions (i) and
(ii). One concern related to the survey data is their accuracy. The empirical evidence
documents, however, that survey-based inflation forecasts outperform statistical methods
out-of-sample, often by a wide margin (Ang, Bekaert, and Wei, 2007a; Faust and Wright,
2012). Taken together, lack of accurate measures of the ex-ante real rate in long sample
periods can explain imprecise estimates of the EIS from aggregate data.
This paper proposes an alternative measure of rt denoted by r˜t that uses only the nominal
yield curve data. Specifically, I define r˜t = it − y(n)t with n large. Appendix IX.B provides
details on data used to obtain r˜t. Constructing r˜t by subtracting the long-term nominal
yield y
(n)
t from it is based on the idea that most of the variation in long-term nominal yield
is due to changing inflation expectations. In other words, I assume that the Fisher effect
holds in the long-run. By this assumption, the real rate is less persistent than inflation
expectations. This method has several advantages. First, r˜t relies neither on the RE or the
linearity assumption, both of which are necessary when extracting inflation expectations from
the realized inflation. That is to say, r˜t exploits the linear relationship between long-term
yields and inflation expectations rather than modeling changing persistence and stochastic
volatility of the inflation process. Second, given that the nominal Treasury yield curve data
are available for much longer periods than inflation surveys, r˜t allows to study the real rate
24
and its links to key macro variables over long periods. This is particularly important for the
identification of the EIS.
To check its validity, Figure 1.1 compares r˜t to the ex-ante real rate obtained from the
inflation survey denoted by rsurvt . Inflation expectations are from the Livingston survey, the
longest consistently available semi-annual inflation survey.4
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Figure 1.1: Survey-based ex-ante real interest rate and r˜t, 1955-2010
The figure plots the measure of the ex-ante real rate r˜t, which is computed as the difference between the
three-month Treasury bill yield and ten-year Treasury yield together with the survey-based real interest rate
rsurvt = it−Estπt+1, where it represents the three-month Treasury bill and Estπt+1 denotes the survey-based
measure of inflation expectations over the 12 months. The survey data are obtained from the Livingston
survey with the median response being a proxy for the expectations. Dashed blue vertical lines mark the
Volcker dis-inflation period October 1979 through October 1982 (M1 growth targeting period). The data
are semiannual. The sample period is June 1955 through December 2010.
The most important observation is that r˜t closely tracks the variation in r
surv
t with the
correlation ρ = 0.55. The only exception is a brief period at the beginning of 1980s, a period
4The Livingston survey is conducted in June and December every year. Participants are asked to forecast
the CPI level six and twelve months ahead. Survey results are usually collected several weeks before the
publication date. For a detailed discussion of issues related to the publication lag see Carlson (1977).
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marked by extremely high and volatile inflation and interest rates due to the monetary policy
experiment (Volcker disinflation).5 Excluding the 1979-1984 period increases the correlation
to 0.75. To formally show that r˜t is a valid instrument for the ex-ante real rate, I run the
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IV estimation of the ex-ante real rate, 1875-2009
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Figure 1.2: Instrumental variables estimation of the ex-ante real interest rate,
1875-2009
The figure compares two estimates of the ex-ante real rate, each obtained with a different set of instruments.
First, the ex-post real rate it − πt+1 (dashed red line) is regressed on the nominal short-term interest rate
it represented by the three-month nominal T-bill and the past inflation πt (blue line). Second instrument
set includes only r˜t (thick black line). The dashed red line represents the ex-post real rate. The data are
annual and un-smoothed. The sample period is 1875-2009.
following regression in the sample 1875-2009 (un-smoothed annual data):
it − πt+1 = α0︸︷︷︸
0.019 [3.17]
+ α1︸︷︷︸
1.056 [4.79]
r˜t + εt+1 R¯
2 = 0.15, (1.2)
5Designed to contain surging inflation, on October 6, 1979, the Fed formally announced a change in the
conduct of monetary policy with the focus on reserves targeting. As a consequence, this change induced
a large increase in the level and volatility of short-term nominal interest rates. In October 1982, the Fed
abandoned the formal M1 growth target.
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where the t-statistics reported in parentheses are Newey-West-adjusted with three lags. The
regression results show that r˜t is indeed a valid instrument. Moreover, the null that α1 = 1
cannot be rejected, indicating a one-to-one mapping between r˜t and the ex-post real rate.
Figure 1.2 plots the ex-ante real rate from the regression given by (1.2) together with the
ex-post real rate. The close match of r˜t with the survey-based real rate (Figure 1.1) together
with the regression results in (1.2) motivate the use of r˜t as a direct measure of the ex-
ante real interest rate variation. Appendix IX.F provides additional results and discussion
regarding the construction of r˜t.
III.A. When is slope a good measure of the ex-ante real rate?
The idea of constructing a proxy for the real rate variation from the nominal yield curve
builds on results in the earlier term structure literature (Fama, 1990; Mishkin, 1990). These
papers document that the variation in real interest rates is concentrated at the short end of
the yield curve and the slope is informative about the variation in the real rate. Cieslak and
Povala (2011) show that the slope is highly correlated with the short-term nominal interest
rate after extracting the long-term inflation expectations. Taken together, the empirical
evidence locates most of the variation in slope at the short end of the real yield curve.
Below, I discuss the conditions under which r˜t is an accurate measure of the variation in the
short term real rate rt. These assumptions impose weaker restrictions on the joint behavior
of inflation and real rate than the implicit assumptions in parametric VAR models.6
Assumption 1: The ex-ante real interest rate is mean-reverting. Therefore the variation
in long-term nominal yields due to the fluctuating real interest rate is negligible. The
theoretical support for this assumption comes from the fact that in consumption-based
models, the real rate and expected consumption growth rate should have similar time series
properties. Arguably, the consumption growth rate is not exposed to permanent shocks.
The empirical support for this assumption is the fact that long-term yields do not exhibit
6The idea is to combine the advantages of vector autoregressive models with time-varying parameters
(TVP-VAR) and the parsimony of the constant parameter VAR. Therefore, the assumptions do not rule
out shifts in parameters but also avoid the filtering of a large number of state variables as it is the case for
TVP-VAR models.
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large and persistent swings in periods characterized by a metallic monetary system such as
Gold standard.7
Assumption 2: The variation in risk compensation accruing to long-term nominal bond
holders is small in magnitude and has lower persistence than the real rate variation. Assum-
ing RE, the empirical literature has identified time-varying risk premia as the main source
of the rejection of the expectations hypothesis. At the same time, there is evidence from
survey data showing significant departures from the full information rational expectations
assumption in the short rate expectations (Froot, 1989; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2011; Cieslak
and Povala, 2013). Therefore, deviations from RE are likely to explain part of the failure
of the expectations hypothesis. Indeed, Cogley (2005) evaluates the joint RE–expectations
hypothesis and finds that departures from the prescriptions of rational expectations are
important for describing the observed yield curve dynamics. The time-varying risk premia
extracted from the long term nominal Treasuries, despite high predictability of returns, have
a half-life of less than a year and contribute around 5% to the total yield variation (Cieslak
and Povala, 2011). In most of the analysis, I use annual data, therefore the variation in risk
premia is unlikely to have a sizable impact on my results.
Assumption 3: Inflation expectations are described by a single factor with unit root persis-
tence and stochastic volatility, i.e. I assume an unobserved component model with stochastic
volatility (UC-SV) for realized inflation. This assumption is motivated by the observation
that such a model provides a good statistical representation of inflation in the US (Stock and
Watson, 2007) and in the UK (Cogley, Sargent, and Surico, 2012a). In the UC-SV model,
inflation expectations are modeled as a single-factor random walk process with stochastic
volatility. The assumption has several empirical implications. First, the term structure
of inflation expectations is flat. Second, the real and nominal slope of the yield curve
are identical. Third, short- and long-term nominal yields are cointegrated. The empirical
evidence is largely consistent with all of these implications. Kozicki and Tinsley (2006)
use inflation survey data from multiple sources to estimate the term structure of expected
inflation. The estimated term structure is virtually flat throughout their sample period
7Rose (1988) cannot reject the null of unit root in the ex-post real rate. However, Garcia and Perron
(1996) identify several regime switches in the post-war period and argue that the failure to reject the non-
stationarity of the real interest rate is due to a small number of changes in mean rather than unit root. For
measuring the real rate by r˜t, it is important that the contribution of the real interest rate variation to the
total variance of long term nominal yields is negligible. This continues to be the case even if the real rate
undergoes a low number of regime switches.
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starting in 1955. Additionally, the long-term survey data from the Blue Chip Economic
Indicators (BCEI) panel for the 1984-2010 period, depicted in Panel a of Figure 1.3, confirm
that the term structure of inflation expectations is indeed well described by a single level
factor. Finally, Panel b of Figure 1.3 plots the real slope superimposed with the nominal
slope for the period 1979-2010. Their correlation is 0.84.
For simplicity, the illustration below restricts the aforementioned assumptions to the case
with fixed parameters and constant volatility. The one-period nominal interest rate can be
written as:
it = rt + Etπt+1. (1.3)
The n-period nominal Treasury yield can be decomposed as follows:
y
(n)
t =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Etrt+i +
1
n
n∑
i=1
Etπt+i + rp
(n)
t , (1.4)
where rp
(n)
t represents the risk premium. Assume that the real rate follows an AR(1) process
with zero mean: rt = φrrt−1 + σrε
r
t , where |φr| < 1, further assume that πt = τt + ηt where
inflation expectations τt are described by the random walk: τt = τt−1 + στε
τ
t and ηt is a
serially uncorrelated shock, then we have that r˜t = it − y(n)t :
r˜t = rt − 1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Etrt+i + Etπt+1 − 1
n
n∑
i=1
Etπt+i − rp(n)t
=
(
1− 1
n
(
1− φnr
1− φr
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
limn→∞=1
rt − rp(n)t .
From Assumption 1 it follows that, for large n, the variation in 1
n
∑n−1
i=0 Etrt+i is negligible.
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Clearly, r˜t is not informative about the unconditional mean of the real rate but this is
inconsequential for the EIS estimation.9 Assumption 2 implies that the variation in rp
(n)
t
is of smaller magnitude than the variation in the real rate, i.e. Var (rt) ≫ Var
(
rp
(n)
t
)
.
8Empirically, φr ≈ 0.7 at semi-annual frequency, which is obtained using the Livingston survey-based
proxy for rt in the 1955-2010 sample. For y
(n)
t , I use the ten-year yield, which implies
(
1− 1n
(
1−φn
r
1−φr
))
≈ 0.83.
9Indeed, one of the reasons for estimating the EIS from a linearized Euler equation is the fact that r˜t is
not informative about the unconditional mean of the real rate.
29
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 20100
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
%
p
.a
.
a. Survey-based term structure of inflation expectations (BCEI), 1984-2010
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b. Real and nominal yield curve slope, 1979-2010
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Figure 1.3: Term structure of inflation expectations
Panel a plots the survey-based inflation expectations obtained from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators
survey. The data are semi-annual as the survey is conducted in March and October each year. The sample
period is 1984 through 2010. Est πt+1Y denotes the median survey response about the inflation one year
ahead. Est
1
5
∑5Y
i=1Y πt+i denotes the median survey response about the average inflation over the next five
years and finally Est
1
5
∑10Y
i=6Y πt+i represents the median response about the average inflation between five
and ten years ahead. Panel b compares the real and nominal slope of the yield curve. The data are semi-
annual. The sample period is 1979-2010. The start of the sample is dictated by the availability of the long
term inflation survey data. The real slope is constructed as the difference of the ten-year real yield and real
three-month Treasury bill. The real ten-year yield is obtained using the ten-year inflation expectations from
Livingston and SPF surveys.
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Etπt+1 − 1n
∑n
i=1 Etπt+i = 0 which follows from Assumption 3. If Assumptions 1-3 hold, r˜t
or equivalently the yield curve slope provides an accurate measure of the real rate variation.
III.B. The RE and linearity assumptions
It is instructive to study the two key assumptions that underlie the standard method for
obtaining the ex-ante real rate.
RE assumption. The RE assumption asserts that inflation forecast errors are not predictable.
If the forecast errors are predictable, expected inflation obtained from standard time-series
models will inherit the predictable part of these errors. The slope of the term structure of
nominal yields varies because of changes in expected inflation and fluctuations in the real
rate (Fama, 1990). Additionally, inflation and the real interest rate are negatively correlated
(Mishkin, 1981; Fama and Gibbons, 1982). These stylized facts are based on the following
regression:
πt+m − πt+1 = δ0 + δ1slopet + εt+m, (1.5)
where πt+m denotes the realized inflation between time t and t+m,m > 1 and πt+1 represents
the realized inflation one period ahead.
Panel A of Table II reports the results for the regression (1.5) for m = 2, . . . , 5 years in
the sample 1955-2010. The results confirm that slope is a significant predictor of realized
inflation changes for all horizons considered with R2’s up to 20% and the positive sign.
Estimates of δ1 are significantly below unity which indicates that the slope also predicts the
real rate variation. To understand the source of the inflation predictability, I decompose the
dependent variable in (1.5) as follows:
πt+m − πt+1 = πt+m − Etπt+1 − (πt+1 − Etπt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflation forecast error
,
where the Livingston inflation survey data are used to proxy for Etπt+1. Panels B and C of
Table II report the regression results for (πt+m − Etπt+1) and (πt+1 − Etπt+1) as dependent
variables, respectively. The regressions indicate that all of the predictability of realized
inflation is due to the predictability of one-period inflation forecast errors. This result has
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Table II: Inflation changes and the slope, 1955-2010
Panel A reports the results for the regression (1.5) for different horizons m = {2, . . . , 5} years. Using
inflation surveys, the dependent variable in (1.5) is decomposed as follows: πt+m − πt+1 = πt+m −Estπt+1 −
(πt+1 − Estπt+1) where πt+1−Estπt+1 is the one-year inflation forecast error. πt+m = (log Pt+m − log Pt) /m
where Pt is the CPI index. Panels B and C report the regression results for the decomposed dependent
variable. Estπt+1 is obtained from the Livingston survey which is conducted semi-annually (June and
December). Timing of the variables is as follows. For example, a June 1955 slope observation is constructed
using end of May 1955 bond data. A June 1955 observation for the one-year inflation rate is computed from
the May 1955 and May 1956 CPI. The sample covers the period 1955-2010. Both the sampling frequency
and beginning of the sample period are determined by the availability of inflation survey data. Newey-West
adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses, the number of lags is 6.
m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5
Panel A. pit+m − pit+1 = δ0 + δ1slopet + εt+m
δ1 0.28 0.48 0.58 0.56
( 2.97) ( 3.04) ( 2.80) ( 2.43)
R¯2 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.16
Panel B. pit+m −E
s
tpit+1 = β0 + β1slopet + εt+1
δ1 -0.22 -0.04 0.04 0.03
(-1.32) (-0.20) ( 0.16) ( 0.11)
R¯2 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C. pit+1 −E
s
tpit+1 = γ0 + γ1slopet + εt+1
γ1 -0.49
(-3.27)
R¯2 0.14
several important implications. First, slope is not informative about the variation in expected
inflation which supports the notion that slope predominantly captures the variation in the
real interest rate.10 Second, it indicates a violation of the RE assumption for inflation.11
As a consequence, the real rate obtained from the ex-post realized real rate contains the
predictable part of inflation forecast errors which leads to more volatile and biased estimates
of the ex-ante real rate. Third, the negative correlation between the real rate and the
expected inflation reported in the literature disappears once the ex-ante real rate is obtained
10Equivalently, yield curve slope does not predict changes in survey-based inflation expectations
(Livingston).
11I interpret the deviations from the RE assumption broadly. For instance, these can include a peso
problem, i.e. it can well be that investors anticipated a discrete shift in the inflation process which was then
reflected in asset prices long before it actually occurred. Alternatively, the predictable forecast errors can
arise in a setup with imperfect information. From the perspective of monetary policy, predictable inflation
forecast errors are indicative of the inflation non-neutrality in the short-run. To explicitly account for the
predictable inflation forecast errors documented above, it is straightforward to extend the UC-SV model by
specifying an AR(1) dynamics for the transitory component.
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from the inflation survey data. In the 1955-2010 sample, the correlation between the ex-ante
real rate and inflation expectations is 0.16.
Linearity assumption. A number of papers document that the statistical properties of
inflation change over time (Barsky, 1987; Stock and Watson, 2007; Cogley, Sargent, and
Surico, 2012b). Barsky (1987) shows that the inflation evolved from a highly volatile white
noise process in the period before World War I into a highly persistent one in the post-
1960 period. Stock and Watson (2007) show that the postwar US inflation is well described
by an UC-SV model.12 To evaluate the bias introduced by assuming the linear dynamics
for inflation in the presence of stochastic volatility, I simulate inflation from the UC-SV
model and the real rate as a simple AR(1) process using parameter values consistent with
the data. Details of the simulation exercise are provided in Appendix IX.A. The median
correlation between the true ex-ante real rate and the rate obtained by a linear projection
is 0.34. In the simulation exercise, biased estimates of the real rate translate into a sizable
bias in the EIS estimates. For the true value of EIS=1, the median estimate of the EIS from
the linearized Euler equation is 0.30. The non-linearity can be handled by modeling the
nominal short rate it and inflation πt within a TVP-VAR with stochastic covariance matrix.
Indeed, Cogley and Sargent (2005) show that models with time-varying parameters perform
well under both random walk time variation and discrete structural breaks. However, a
typical TVP-VAR with two lags and three observables (inflation, unemployment, nominal
short rate) requires the filtering of more than 20 time-varying parameters, which necessarily
introduces a significant degree of statistical uncertainty.
The degree to which the RE and linearity assumptions are violated can be seen by comparing
the ex-ante real rate instrumented by r˜t and the ex-ante real rate obtained by regressing
it− πt+1 on it and πt. Figure 1.2 plots the ex-post real rate together with these two versions
of ex-ante real rate. It is clear that including past inflation improves the statistical fit, in
fact the R¯2 increases from 0.15 obtained in regression (1.2) to 0.51. However, the plot shows
that most of the improvement in statistical fit comes from fitting extreme values of inflation
during the two World Wars and the Great Depression. Despite the fact that inflation is
clearly a valid instrument in a statistical sense, it is not a valid instrument economically
because the RE and linearity assumptions are violated. Figure 1.2 also shows that in the
12Earlier work by Evans and Lewis (1995) argues that a two-component model of inflation where the
volatility of shocks to each component follows a regime-switching Markov process closely replicates the
inflation expectations from the Livingston survey.
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post-1980 period, the ex-post real rate and both measures of ex-ante real rate increasingly
move together. Indeed, post-1980, the correlation between the slope and inflation forecast
errors has been declining.13
IV. Estimating the EIS from the aggregate data
Assuming an isoelastic period utility function and the absence of market frictions, the
intertemporal optimality condition for consumption Ct reads:
Et
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(1 +Rrf,t+1)
]
= 1, (1.6)
where γ denotes the risk aversion parameter, β represents the time discounting and Rrf,t+1
is the ex-post real interest rate. Further, assuming conditional log-normality leads to a
linearized version of (1.6):
∆ct+1 = µt +
1
γ
rt + ut+1, (1.7)
where rt = Etlog (1 +Rrf,t+1), ut+1 denotes the expectational error and:
µt =
log (β)
γ
+
γ
2
vart (∆ct+1)− covt (∆ct+1, log (1 +Rrf,t+1)) + 1
2γ
Vart (log (1 +Rrf,t+1)) .
In the previous section, I argue that rt can be replaced by r˜t after accounting for the
unconditional mean of the real rate. Therefore, an estimable version of (1.7) reads:
∆ct+1 = µ¯t + σr˜t + ut+1, (1.8)
where σ ≡ 1
γ
and µ¯t is µt plus the unconditional mean of rt.
14
13Note that all estimates of the EIS using household-level data (e.g. CEX survey) fall into the post-1980
period where the linear projection method for obtaining the ex-ante real rate works reasonably well, which
explains the significant and plausible estimates of the EIS for households participating in asset markets.
14Note that due to the log-linearization, the isoelastic specification of the utility function is not crucial for
relating the expected consumption growth to the real interest rate. Alternative utility specifications such as
Epstein-Zin utility obtain the same relationship.
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IV.A. Estimation
I use the US real per capita annual data on consumption and output for the sample period
1875-2009. I estimate the consumption and output Euler equation on two data sets. First, I
use the data set constructed by Barro and Ursua (1875-2009). Second, the consumption data
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) are used at annual frequency (1929-2009) and
at quarterly frequency (1950-2009). More details regarding both data sets and their sources
are provided in Appendix IX.B. The output data allow me to evaluate the aggregate output
Euler equation (IS equation) used in the New-Keynesian model below. The aggregate output
Euler equation is the core of dynamic equilibrium models used in monetary policy analysis.
Therefore, the EIS estimates from the output Euler equation are key for evaluating the real
effects of monetary policy. Figure 1.4 plots the real consumption ∆ct+1 (Panel a) and output
growth ∆yt+1 (Panel b) superimposed with r˜t for the period 1875-2009. The unconditional
correlation between ∆ct+1,∆yt+1 and r˜t is -0.34 and -0.30, respectively.
If one is willing to assume homoscedasticity and a household’s decision interval of one year (in
addition to Assumptions 1-3 from Section III.A), the log-linearized Euler equation given in
(1.8) can be estimated via OLS. To account for possible correlation between r˜t and conditional
variance terms collected in µ¯t and also to avoid potential issues induced by time-aggregation,
I estimate (1.8) via instrumental variables. The linear IV estimation is standard and is
implemented as a two-step linear GMM. The set of instruments for r˜t includes twice lagged
consumption growth, two lags of r˜t and the lagged nominal three-month Treasury bill yield.
The lags of instruments for r˜t are chosen such that there is no overlap with the consumption
at time t.
IV.B. Estimation results
In addition to the main results reported in Table I based on Barro and Ursua’s data,
this section discusses the estimates of EIS from the BEA consumption data. I evaluate
if the estimated magnitude of the EIS from annual data on total consumption matches the
estimates from non-durable consumption and quarterly data, respectively.
Barro and Ursua’s data set does not distinguish between non-durable and durable consump-
tion expenditures due to limitations on data availability. Given that expenditures on durable
goods are roughly 15% of the non-durable consumption and services, the potential bias in the
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b. Output growth and real short rate, 1875-2009
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Figure 1.4: Consumption and output growth and the real interest rate,
1875-2009
Panel a plots real per capita consumption growth superimposed with the proxy for the short term real
interest rate denoted by r˜t. Panel b plots the real output growth superimposed with r˜t. The data are annual
and the sample period is 1875 through 2009.
EIS estimates is likely to be small.15 To quantify the impact of durable goods expenditures
on the EIS estimates, I estimate the consumption Euler equation using the non-durable
consumption and services in the sub-sample 1929-2009. The sample start is determined by
the availability of the data on non-durable consumption and services from the BEA. Table III
reports the results for three different sample periods. Panel A displays the estimates of EIS
using expenditures on non-durable goods and services. Panel B shows the results obtained
15The main motivation for excluding expenditures on durables is to minimize the measurement error
originating from the discrepancy between expenditures and the consumption itself. However, with decreasing
measurement frequency the error becomes smaller.
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with durable goods expenditures and finally Panel C reports the EIS estimates using total
consumption.
Table III: Euler equation estimates for non-durable consumption, 1929-2009
The table reports the estimation results for the log-linearized Euler equation given by (1.8). The IV setup
is implemented as a two-step GMM. Panel A reports the results for non-durable consumption and services,
Panel B for the durable consumption expenditures and Panel C for the total consumption. Each column
corresponds to a different sample period. The first column shows the full sample estimates, 1929-2009. This
is the longest sample period for which the split into durable and non-durable consumption expenditures is
available. The second column reports the results for 1947-2009, a post-war period. The third column displays
the results for the period 1980-2009. The data are annual. The autocorrelation- and heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses (bandwith=3, Bartlett kernel). The overidentification test refers
to Hansen’s J statistic which is asymptotically χ23 distributed. The “Weak identification test” in each panel
reports the F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap). The critical values for the maximum relative bias are 16.85 for
5%, 10.27 for 10%, 6.71 for 20% and 5.34 for 30%. The critical values for the maximal size are 24.58 for 10%,
10.26 for 20%, and 8.31 for 25%. The critical values are computed using the procedure proposed by Stock
and Yogo (2002). The following variables are used as instruments: two lags of r˜t, the lagged three-month
nominal T-bill and twice lagged corresponding consumption growth.
1929-2009 1947-2009 1980-2009
A. Nondurable consumption & services
σ̂ -0.66 -0.47 -0.45
Robust s.e. (0.30) (0.21) (0.17)
Confidence interval (95%) [-1.25, -0.07] [-0.88, -0.05] [-0.79, -0.12]
Overidentification test (p-val) 0.41 0.69 0.25
Weak identification test (F-stat) 21.77 14.47 15.67
B. Durable expenditures
σ̂ -2.43 -2.59 -2.52
Robust s.e. (0.88) (0.74) (0.79)
Confidence interval (95%) [-4.14, -0.71] [-4.05, -1.13] [-4.07, -0.96]
Overidentification test (p-val) 0.90 0.29 0.19
Weak identification test (F-stat) 18.30 11.73 12.00
C. Total consumption
σ̂ -0.78 -0.68 -0.64
Robust s.e. (0.32) (0.24) (0.21)
Confidence interval (95%) [-1.40, -0.15] [-1.14, -0.22] [-1.05, -0.23]
Overidentification test (p-val) 0.43 0.58 0.20
Weak identification test (F-stat) 22.03 14.46 16.48
The estimate of EIS using non-durables in the 1929-2009 period is −0.66 and statistically
significant. It compares to the estimate of −0.78 using total consumption in the same period.
Similarly, the EIS estimates using non-durable and total consumption expenditures in the
1980-2009 period are −0.45 and −0.64, respectively. Panel B shows that the interest rate
elasticity of durable expenditures is a multiple of the non-durable consumption sensitivity.
Higher sensitivity of durable goods expenditures slightly increases the magnitude of EIS
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estimates when total consumption is used. However, the difference is well within one standard
deviation of the EIS estimate from the non-durable consumption. The estimates are stable
across sub-samples. Particularly, in the most recent period 1980-2009, the estimates of
aggregate EIS have relatively low standard errors despite the low number of observations.
Overall, there is no evidence that the negative aggregate EIS is driven solely by the non-
durable consumption expenditures.
The estimates of σ in Tables I and III are unaffected by the structural break in inflation
and monetary policy which is usually located in the 1979-1982 period (Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler, 2000; Bilbiie and Straub, 2012).16 Comparing the second and fifth columns in both
panels of Table I shows neither a change of sign nor a significant difference in the magnitude
of σˆ. A formal test of equality of σˆ in the period 1875-1979 and 1980-2009 is reported in the
last row of each panel. In both cases the null that the coefficients are equal is not rejected.17
Throughout the paper, I use annual consumption and interest rate data. An important
question is if the results extend to quarterly frequency. One concern is that if the household’s
decision interval is shorter than one year, the aggregation introduces a spurious autocorre-
lation in ∆ct+1 and the estimates of the EIS are biased. Main arguments for measuring
the consumption and output at annual rather than higher frequencies are the transaction
costs and other frictions which might prevent households from instantaneous consumption
smoothing (Gabaix and Laibson, 2001; Jagannathan and Wang, 2007). Additionally, the
variation in real interest rates is persistent (half-life above one year), hence the consumption
could react slowly to changes in the real interest rate because the utility loss induced by the
slow adjustment is low. To evaluate whether my results are robust to time aggregation, I
re-estimate the consumption Euler equation on quarterly data for the period 1950-2009. To
obtain estimates of the EIS that are comparable to the annual data, quarterly consumption
growth is annualized. Table IV reports the estimates of σ for non-durables (Panel A),
durable consumption expenditures (Panel B) and the total consumption (Panel C) across
16Bilbiie and Straub (2012) argue that the main reason for the structural break and the change of sign in
σ is the financial market liberalization which stimulated an increase in asset market participation. However,
they use realized inflation when constructing the ex-ante real rate which is responsible for the identified
structural break.
17In fact, in other countries that have not experienced a structural break in inflation in the recent past
(e.g. Germany, the Netherlands or Canada), the standard method yields negative and significant estimates
of the aggregate EIS of the similar magnitude compared to the US estimates using r˜t.
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Table IV: Euler equation estimates for quarterly data, 1950-2009
The table reports the estimation results for the log-linearized Euler equation given by (1.8). The IV setup
is implemented as a two-step GMM. Panel A reports the results for non-durable consumption and services,
Panel B for the durable consumption expenditures and Panel C for the total consumption. Quarterly
consumption growth data are annualized to be comparable with r˜t which is annual. Each column corresponds
to a different sample period. The first column shows the full sample estimates for which the quarterly
consumption data are available, 1950-2009. The second column reports the results for 1960-2009. The third
column displays the results for the period 1980-2009. The data are quarterly. The autocorrelation- and
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (bandwith=8, Bartlett kernel). The
overidentification test refers to Hansen’s J statistic which is asymptotically χ25 distributed. The “Weak
identification test” in each panel reports the F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap). The critical values for the
maximum relative bias are 19.28 for 5%, 11.12 for 10%, 6.76 for 20%, and 5.15 for 30%. The critical values
for the maximal size are 29.18 for 10%, 11.72 for 20%, and 9.38 for 25%. The critical values are computed
using the procedure proposed by Stock and Yogo (2002). Following variables are used as instruments: lag
one and lag four of r˜t, lags two through four of consumption growth, and lag one of the three-month nominal
T-bill.
1950-2009 1960-2009 1980-2009
A. Nondurable consumption & services
σ̂ -0.24 -0.40 -0.50
Robust s.e. (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
Confidence interval (95%) [-0.60, 0.12] [-0.77,-0.03] [-0.86, -0.15]
Overidentification test (p-val) 0.08 0.12 0.26
Weak identification test (F-stat) 217.55 254.22 151.09
B. Durable expenditures
σ̂ -2.80 -2.64 -2.67
Robust s.e. (0.81) (0.80) (0.77)
Confidence interval (95%) [-4.33, -1.28] [-4.13, -1.14] [-4.18, -1.15]
Overidentification test (p-val) 0.35 0.51 0.60
Weak identification test (F-stat) 200.82 173.01 89.95
C. Total consumption
σ̂ -0.35 -0.50 -0.62
Robust s.e. (0.20) (0.22) (0.24)
Confidence interval (95%) [-0.74, 0.04] [-0.93, -0.07] [-1.08, -0.15]
Overidentification test (p-val) 0.04 0.09 0.17
Weak identification test (F-stat) 206.22 220.89 124.34
three post-war periods. Throughout the table, the magnitudes of EIS closely correspond to
the estimates from annual data (Table III) which indicates that the estimated magnitudes
are invariant to the decision interval of households.
It is possible that the negative EIS is specific to the US data. To evaluate this interpretation,
Table V reports the EIS estimates for selected developed countries. The EIS estimates are
consistently negative and have, in some cases, a larger magnitude than in the US. Arguably,
each of these countries follow different monetary policies. Therefore, the evidence from a
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Table V: Euler equation estimates for selected developed countries
The table reports estimation results for the log-linearized Euler equation given by (1.8). The IV setup is
implemented as a two-step GMM. Panel A reports the results for consumption and Panel B for the real
output. Each column corresponds to a different country. The sample period for each country is 1950-2009,
the only exception is Germany with the sample period 1956-2009 (due to the data availability). The data are
annual and their sources are described in Appendix IX.B. The autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses (bandwith=3, Bartlett kernel). The overidentification test refers
to Hansen’s J statistic which is asymptotically χ23 distributed. The “Weak identification test” in each panel
reports the F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap). The critical values for the maximum relative bias are 16.85 for
5%, 10.27 for 10%, 6.71 for 20%, and 5.34 for 30%. The critical values for the maximal size are 24.58 for
10%, 10.26 for 20%, and 8.31 for 25%. The critical values are computed using the procedure proposed by
Stock and Yogo (2002). The instruments are twice lagged consumption/output growth, two lags of r˜t, and
the lagged nominal Treasury bill yield.
Canada Germany Netherlands Switzerland United Kingdom
A. Consumption Euler equation
σ̂ -0.93 -0.96 -0.91 -0.28 -0.19
Robust s.e. (0.21) (0.34) (0.28) (0.22) (0.24)
Confidence interval (95%) [-1.35, -0.51] [-1.62, -0.30] [-1.46, -0.37] [-0.70, 0.15] [-0.66, 0.27]
Overidentification test (p-val) 0.30 0.08 0.39 0.33 0.70
Weak identification test (F-stat) 11.00 22.79 38.06 12.69 27.05
B. Output Euler equation
σ̂ -0.95 -1.02 -0.84 -1.15 -0.41
Robust s.e. (0.24) (0.29) (0.23) (0.29) (0.18)
Confidence interval (95%) [-1.42, -0.49] [-1.58, -0.46] [-1.30, -0.38] [-1.72, -0.59] [-0.76, -0.06]
Overidentification test (p-val) 0.55 0.66 0.34 0.53 0.30
Weak identification test (F-stat) 10.00 22.84 33.44 11.92 30.79
panel of countries supports the structural interpretation of the negative EIS. Discussion of
some additional econometric issues is provided in Appendix IX.C.
IV.C. Econometric issues
Estimating the EIS parameter from the log-linearized Euler is subject to a number of
potential biases. One obvious source is the stochastic volatility which has been mostly
studied at the household level (Carroll, 2001; Attanasio and Low, 2004). Attanasio and
Low (2004) show that, even in the presence of stochastic volatility, the log-linearized Euler
equation yields unbiased estimates of the EIS if the sample period is long enough, which is the
case in this paper. Furthermore, the stochastic volatility is less of a concern in the aggregate
data where the idiosyncratic volatility is averaged out. Beeler and Campbell (2008) show
that the bias due to the stochastic volatility does not play an important role, at least for the
volatility process calibrated to the US aggregate consumption data. Additionally, in Section
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VII below, I show that the proxy for stochastic volatility of consumption growth does not
significantly alter the EIS estimates.
The observation that the linearized Euler equation (1.7) and its reversed form with the
real rate as a dependent variable lead to very different estimates of the EIS is commonly
interpreted as an evidence for weak instruments (Neely, Roy, and Whiteman, 2001; Yogo,
2004). This is not the case for r˜t. Using the identical instrument set, the estimate of
1
σ
from
the reversed form of the consumption Euler equation (1.8) is -1.66 with the 95% confidence
interval: [−2.65,−0.66] in the 1875-2009 sample. The full sample estimate of σ from the
original specification is -0.51 which is within the confidence interval given by the reversed
form.
I construct moving averages of both quantities, demeaned ∆ct+1 and r˜t, and run a univariate
regression with filtered series. The goal of this exercise is to evaluate the relationship between
consumption growth and the real rate across frequencies. The real rate variation is persistent
and it should be reflected in the persistent variation of expected consumption growth if
the EIS is non-zero. Conversely, if the significant estimates of the EIS reported above are
driven by a few outliers, the filtered series shall not have a similar degree of co-movement.
To compute moving averages, I use the filter proposed in Lucas (1980). For a covariance
stationary series xt, it is given by:
x¯t (β) = α
n∑
k=−n
β|k|xt+k (1.9)
α =
(1− β)2
1− β2 − 2βn+1 (1− β) , (1.10)
where β ∈ [ 0, 1 ). I study the following four degrees of smoothing β ∈ {0, 0.8, 0.95, 0.98}.18
Panels a − d of Figure 1.5 evaluate the comovement of consumption growth with the real
rate for different frequencies as measured by values of β. As the figure shows, the negative
relationship between r˜t and consumption growth is present at all frequencies. Moreover, the
regression coefficient, which is given by the slope of the dash-dotted line, shows a remarkable
stability for all degrees of smoothing. The estimated slope coefficients are close to the EIS
18Note that β = 0 corresponds to a univariate regression of unfiltered series. For β → 1, the regression
approximately measures the relationship at frequency ω = 0 in the frequency domain, for details see
Whiteman (1984).
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estimates reported in Panel A of Table I. The close relationship between the consumption
growth and the real interest rate indicates that expected consumption growth contains a
time-varying and persistent component. Section VII studies this relationship in greater
detail and links the results to the long-run risk literature.
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−3 −2 −1 0 1 2
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
real insterest rate % p.a.
co
n
s.
g
ro
w
th
%
p
.a
.
d. Filtered cons. growth, β = 0.98
slope=-0.77
tstat=-4.78
slope=-0.46
tstat=-5.96
slope=-0.47
tstat=-13.56
slope=-0.46
tstat=-25.40
Figure 1.5: Consumption growth and real interest rate–Lucas filter, 1875-2009
Panels a–d scatter-plot the filtered consumption growth and the real rate measure r˜t for different filtering
parameters β. For β = 0 (Panel a), the filter corresponds to a linear regression of unfiltered series. The filter
is given by equation (1.9). I set n = 50. Blue dash-dotted lines represent the regression coefficient obtained
from a regression of the filtered consumption growth on filtered r˜t. The regression coefficients together with
Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are reported in the lower left corner of each panel. The red dashed line
represents the regression slope of minus one. The data are annual and the sample period is 1875 through
2009.
42
IV.D. Alternative explanations
The relationship between the real interest rate and consumption growth can potentially be
negative for other reasons than the negative aggregate EIS. For instance, the time discounting
can be time-varying and strongly negatively correlated with the real rate.19 In such a case,
one obtains a negative estimate of σ even though the true EIS is positive. However, for
this to happen, the discount factor shock would have to be more volatile than rt, which,
together with the highly negative correlation seems implausible. Alternatively, it can be the
case that the unobserved returns to human capital are negatively correlated with the real
short rate. However, Lustig, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Verdelhan (2012) show that returns
on human wealth are closely positively related to real bond returns. Therefore, the negative
relationship between consumption growth and the real interest rate cannot be replicated
for positive values of σ at the aggregate level unless one is willing to accept counterfactual
assumptions.
V. Model
This section outlines a standard New Keynesian model with limited asset market participa-
tion. The model setup is closely related to Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2004) and Bilbiie
(2008). While these papers focus on the equilibria determinacy in the presence of limited
market participation, I evaluate the asset pricing implications of limited participation.20 The
key ingredient of the model is limited asset market participation rather than a short-run
inflation non-neutrality induced by sticky prices. To make the key mechanism transparent, I
restrict the technology to be the only economic disturbance in the model. The main purpose
of the model is to illustrate one potential mechanism that can replicate the negative sign
and the magnitude of the aggregate EIS. As such, the model is too simple to be evaluated
on quantitative predictions along other dimensions, but could be easily enriched.
19The discount factor shock is often introduced in the empirical implementations of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models (Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008). Given the empirical failure of the consumption
Euler equation, the time-varying discounting picks up the variation in consumption growth. The factor is
usually interpreted as a shock to aggregate demand or demographics. See also Albuquerque, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2012).
20The sample period considered in this paper includes a period before the Fed was operational. The
outlined model is meant to describe the more recent period where the central bank has been actively managing
the short term interest rate.
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The economy consists of two types of households, a representative final-good-producing firm,
a continuum of intermediate-goods-producing firms and a central bank.
V.A. Households
There is a continuum of households on [0,1] where 1−λ fraction of them are forward-looking,
participate in asset markets to smooth consumption and own all assets in the economy–savers
denoted by subscript s. The rule-of-thumb households on [0, λ] denoted by the subscript r do
not participate in financial markets to smooth their consumption and do not have any wealth.
Both types of households have an identical period utility function U which is standard:
U (Ci,t, Ni,t) =
C1−γi,t
1− γ −
N1+ηi,t
1 + η
, (1.11)
where i ∈ {s, r}.21 The parameter γ > 0 represents the degree of risk aversion, η > 0 is the
inverse of labor supply elasticity. Savers solve the usual optimization problem:
max Et
∞∑
j=0
βjU (Cs,t+j, Ns,t+j) , β ∈ (0, 1) (1.12)
by choosing the consumption Cs,t and worked hours Ns,t every period subject to the budget
constraint expressed in nominal terms:
Bs,t+1 +Θs,t+1Vt ≤ Bs,tRt +Θs,t (Vt + PtDt) +WtNs,t − PtCs,t. (1.13)
Bs,t is the quantity of one-period nominal bonds at the beginning of period t,
22 Θs,t denotes
the holdings of savers in firms,23 Vt is the market value of firms and Dt are real dividends.
Wt denotes the nominal wage.
21Separable preferences are used for simplicity. The utility function given by (1.11) is not compatible
with balanced growth path. To resolve this, one could introduce a non-separable utility specification. The
following specification is common in the RBC literature: U (Ct, Nt) =
1
1−σ
[
(Ctv (Nt))
1−σ − 1
]
. The main
result in this paper, namely EIS < 0, is obtained also with this specification.
22Nominal bonds are in the zero net supply because markets are complete and savers are homogenous.
Hence, they can be replaced by a representative agent.
23In a model with the representative agents Θ = 1. In this model, it will depend on the fraction of savers
on the whole population: Θ = 11−λ .
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The no-arbitrage condition implies the existence of a stochastic discount factor Mt,t+1 that
prices all uncertain future cash flows:
Vt = Et [Mt,t+1 (Vt+1 + Pt+1Dt+1)] . (1.14)
The stochastic discount factor together with the assumption of frictionless financial markets
(for savers) allows to rewrite (1.13) in terms of present values:
Et
∞∑
j=t
Mt,t+jPjCs,j ≤ Vt + Et
∞∑
j=t
Mt,t+jWjNs,j. (1.15)
The remaining first order conditions for savers read:
β
UC (Cs,t+1)
UC (Cs,t)
=Mt,t+1
Pt+1
Pt
(1.16)
1
Rt
= βEt
[(
Cs,t+1
Cs,t
)−γ
Pt
Pt+1
]
(1.17)
Nηs,t
C−γs,t
=
Wt
Pt
. (1.18)
The optimization problem of rule-of-thumb consumers involves only the intratemporal trade-
off:
maxCr,t,Nr,t
C1−γr,t
1− γ −
N1+ηr,t
1 + η
, (1.19)
subject to the budget restriction Cr,tPt = WtNr,t. The first order condition for the rule-of-
thumb household is:
Nηr,t
C−γr,t
=
Wt
Pt
. (1.20)
V.B. Production
The final good is produced with a CES production function with elasticity ε, which aggregates
the intermediate goods indexed by k, i.e. Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt (k)
(ε−1)/ε dk
)ε/(ε−1)
. Firms producing
intermediate goods are characterized by linear production technology without capital:
Yt(k) = AtNt(k)− F if Nt(k) > F and 0 otherwise, (1.21)
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where F denotes the fixed costs and At represents the technology, where at = log At is
assumed to evolve as:24
at = ρaat−1 + ε
a
t , (1.22)
with 0 ≤ ρa ≤ 1 and εat ∼ N (0, σ2a). Firms producing intermediate goods face a downward-
sloping demand curve: Ct(k) =
(
Pt(k)
Pt
)−ε
Ct. They take wages as given and the cost
minimization implies the following nominal marginal cost: MCt = Wt/At. The total profit
Dt is given by Dt = (1− (MCt/Pt)∆t)Yt, where ∆t =
∫ 1
0
(Pt(k)/Pt)
−ε dk is defined as
relative price dispersion. Savers, who hold shares in firms, maximize their total value by
choosing price Pt(k). The optimal price reads:
P optt (k) = Et
∞∑
j=0
ωjMt,t+jP
ε−1
t+j Yt+j
Et
∑∞
m=0 ω
mMt,t+mP
ε−1
t+mYt+m
MCt+j. (1.23)
The aggregate price index evolves as:
P 1−εt = (1− ω)
(
P optt
)1−ε
+ ωP 1−εt−1 , (1.24)
where ω represents the fraction of firms being unable to adjust their prices, i.e. Calvo
staggered pricing. The Philips curve follows from linearized versions of (1.23) and (1.24),
for details see standard references, e.g. Woodford (2003b).
V.C. Equilibrium
The equilibrium requires that all markets clear. Labor markets clearing implies Nt =
λNr,t+(1− λ)Ns,t, goods market clearing delivers Ct = Yt and Ct = λCr,t+(1− λ)Cs,t, and
finally asset market clearing implies that Θs,t =
1
1−λ
for all t. Bonds are in zero net supply.
24The technology shock can have a unit-root, in which case the output, consumption, and real wages would
need to be stochastically detrended to obtain stationary dynamics.
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V.D. Key model equations
The aggregate dynamics are described by the following three equations (derivations and
the discussion of steady states are in Appendix IX.E). Lower case letters below denote the
log-deviation of a given variable from its steady state value.
Aggregate Euler equation
The Euler equation of savers has the usual form:
Etcs,t+1 − cs,t = 1
γ
(it − Etπt+1) . (1.25)
The output Euler equation is obtained by aggregating the consumption of savers and rule-
of-thumb agents:
Etyt+1 − yt = 1δγ (it − Etπt+1) + χ [Etat+1 − at] , (1.26)
where yt represents the aggregate output, πt = log Pt/Pt−1 is the inflation and χ = − 1κλη+1−λ
λη(1+κ)
− 1
1+µ
.
Estimates of 1
δγ
from the aggregate intertemporal optimality condition in Table I are con-
sistently negative. Given that savers are risk averse (γ > 0), the negative sign can arise
through δ < 0. The magnitude of the aggregate EIS is largely determined by δ, which is a
function of structural parameters:
δ =
(κλη + 1− λ) (1 + µ)− λη(1 + κ)
(1− λ) (1 + µ) [κλη + γλ(1 + κ) + 1− λ] ,
where κ ≡ 1−γ
η+γ
. In case of full market participation (λ = 0) δ = 1, and the standard IS curve
is recovered. Importantly, δ can have either sign depending on the combination of structural
parameters in the numerator.
Phillips curve
Nominal rigidities introduce a trade-off between the output gap xt = yt − y∗t and inflation:
πt = βEtπt+1 + ψϑ (yt − y∗t ) . (1.27)
Natural level of output y∗t , which depends only on the exogenous technology shock at, is
achieved when prices are flexible, i.e. ω = 0 (see Appendix IX.E for the derivation). Unlike
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most of the recent New-Keynesian model specifications, both the aggregate output equation
and the Phillips curve are purely forward-looking.25 In my setup, the Phillips curve is not
influenced by limited participation.
Monetary policy
The central bank sets the policy rate according to the following interest rate rule:
it = φiit−1 + (1− φi) [φpiπt + φx (yt − y∗t )] . (1.28)
Consistent with the empirical evidence, I assume that the central bank moves the policy rate
gradually, which introduces a substantial degree of smoothing captured by φi.
V.E. Model calibration
Where possible, the choice of parameter values is guided by microeconomic evidence.
Elasticity of labor supply. Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011), argue that the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply should be set to 0.75 which implies η = 1.333. However, the
magnitude of labor supply elasticity is not uncontroversial. For this reason, I report the
results for a range of values reported in the literature, η ∈ {1, 1.333, 2, 4}.
Asset market participation. I set λ = 0.7 which is motivated by the evidence from Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) who classifies 21.75 percent of households as stockholders and 31.40 percent
as bondholders, based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the period 1980-1996.
Similarly, Guvenen (2006) argues that λ = 0.7 represents a lower bound for the fraction of
non-participating households. One concern with choosing high values for λ is the fact that
stock market participation of households has increased significantly in the last decades. I
provide a detailed discussion of this issue in Appendix IX.D. To assess the impact of λ on
my results, I vary its values between 0 and 1.
Rigidities. The elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods is set to ε = 6 which
implies the steady-state markup value µ = 0.2, (Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2007). This
parameter has a minute effect on δ for any plausible markup value. The Calvo parameter of
ω = 0.75 implies that firms can reset prices once a year.
25The backward indexation of prices is usually added to the Phillips curve to make inflation more persistent
and fit the data, but it has little support in micro data, e.g. (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2009).
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Risk aversion. I study parameter values ranging from 0.5 through 10. Values of γ that
are substantially higher than unity are commonly used in the asset pricing literature. In
contrast, Chetty (2006) obtains an upper bound for γ equal to two by exploiting the labor
supply behavior.
Monetary policy. The smoothing parameter φi is set to 0.85, φpi = 0.4 and φx = 1.2. In
the standard New-Keynesian model without limited participation, coefficients above one for
φpi are necessary to ensure the determinacy (Taylor rule). However, in the case of limited
participation, it is possible that 0 < φpi < 1 leads to determinate equilibria (Gali, Lopez-
Salido, and Valles, 2004; Bilbiie, 2008). In this model, πt is a deviation of inflation from its
steady state. Post-war US inflation has a stochastic trend, and Taylor rule estimates that
explicitly account for it, indicate that the central bank reacted by more than one-for-one to
the inflation trend, but the coefficient on the deviations from the stochastic trend is indeed
less than unity. Here, I abstract from the stochastic inflation target.26
Technology shock. The single exogenous shock of the model is the technology shock. I set
ρa = 0.3 and σa = 0.01.
V.F. Model solution
Equations (1.26)–(1.28) together with the exogenous technology shock determine the law of
motion of the endogenous variables in the model, which is given by:
zt = Γzt−1 + Ξat, (1.29)
where zt = [πt, yt, it, y
∗
t ]
′. More details about the model solution are provided in Appendix
IX.E. Table VI collects all the parameters. Numerically solving the model for these parameter
values gives the following dynamics:
Γ =

0 0 0.9570 0
0 0 0.2224 0
0 0 0.9475 0
0 0 0 0
 , Ξ =

0.3335
1.2423
0.1087
0.7496
 . (1.30)
26See Cogley and Sbordone (2008) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011b) for the analysis of the New
Keynesian models with inflation trend.
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Table VI: Model parameters
This table collects the parameter values used to calibrate the model. All parameters refer to quarterly
frequency.
Parameter Value
Preference parameters
Discount factor β 0.99
Risk aversion γ 2
Labor elasticity parameter η 1.33
Price rigidities
Steady state markup µ 0.2
Calvo parameter ω 0.75
Limited participation
Degree of limited participation λ 0.7
Interest rate rule
Interest rate smoothing φi 0.85
Inflation sensitivity φπ 0.4
Output gap sensitivity φx 1.2
Exogenous shocks
Persistence of technology shock ρa 0.3
Volatility of technology shock σa 0.01
The single most important observation about (1.30) is that the dynamics of endogenous
variables are persistent. This is surprising given that the Phillips curve and the aggregate
Euler equation are purely forward-looking. A full participation model does not generate
such a persistence. Thus, limited market participation, could replace habits and backward
indexation, both of which are typically relied upon but lack strong support in the data.
VI. Model discussion
This section inspects the key mechanism in the model that can switch the sign of the
aggregate EIS. Subsequently, it discusses the link between the aggregate consumption and
the consumption of savers. Finally, it shows how the negative sign of the EIS helps reconcile
the consumption-based models with the data.
VI.A. Justifying r˜t as a proxy for the real rate
I simulate the model outlined above and construct a term structure of yields implied by
this model. The details of the New-Keynesian term structure model and of the simulation
exercise are provided in Appendix IX.E. The simulation shows that r˜t, which is the negative
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of the slope of the simulated term structure, closely tracks the real rate constructed as
it − Etπt+1, where an AR(1) model for realized inflation is used to compute Etπt+1. Median
correlation is around 0.7, see Figure 1.11 in Appendix IX.E. As can be seen from the law of
motion of endogenous variables given by (1.30), inflation is more persistent than the output.
Therefore, the slope captures the variation in the real rate.
VI.B. What makes δ negative?
Figure 1.6 plots the values of the aggregate EIS given by 1
δγ
for a range of structural
parameters γ, λ, and η together with its estimate from the total consumption data in the
period 1875-2009 (Panel A of Table I). Parameter values for the degree of limited asset
market participation λ, the risk aversion parameter γ and the labor supply elasticity η,
motivated above are consistent with the estimate of 1
δγ
.
Conditional on a moderate degree of risk aversion γ = 2, Figure 1.7 displays two key
ingredients that drive the sign of δ: (i) inelastic labor supply as measured by η and, (ii)
limited market participation. δ changes its sign at the threshold value of market participation
defined as λˆ. Appendix IX.E derives λˆ in terms of structural parameters.27 For the whole
range of labor supply elasticities considered, the sign of δ switches for non-participation
levels between 0.25 and 0.55.
The intuition for the negative aggregate EIS is as follows. A positive exogenous technology
shock increases the natural level of output y∗t and thus changes the output gap xt. Depending
on the configuration of the parameter values, in particular those in the monetary policy
reaction function, the increase in y∗t translates through the monetary policy reaction into a
positive or negative shock to the real interest rate. In the full participation case, a positive
shock to the real interest rate reduces the demand today as it induces the agents to seize
better investment opportunities and substitute today’s consumption into the future. In
the limited participation model, only savers react to the real rate shock and substitute
consumption intertemporally. Intertemporal choices of savers shift the labor supply curve
(derived in Appendix IX.E):
27The aggregate EIS has a discontinuity point at λˆ. For this reason, the negative sign of the EIS cannot
be achieved by introducing agents with different non-zero EIS (Guvenen, 2006). To obtain the negative sign,
a fraction of households needs to be excluded from all asset markets.
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Figure 1.6: Parameterizations of the output Euler equation.
Panels a− d plot the parameter values for 1δγ in the aggregate output Euler equation given by (1.26). Three
structural parameters are varied. First, the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ takes values between 0.5
and 10. Each panel represents different values of γ. Second, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is varied
between 0.25 and 1 which implies parameter values for η between 1 and 4. Third, the share of rule-of-thumb
consumers λ varies between 0 and 1 (x-axis). The red dashed line represents the estimate of 1δγ based on the
annual data for total consumption and interest rates in the period 1875-2009, see the first column of Panel
A in Table I.
wt =
η
ηλκ+ (1− λ)nt +
(1− λ)γ
ηλκ+ (1− λ)cs,t. (1.31)
For the parameter values given in Table VI, (1−λ)γ
ηλκ+(1−λ)
> 0, i.e. a positive shock to the real
interest rate reduces cs,t and thus the real wage wt. The lower real wage further reduces the
output because rule-of-thumb agents consume their wages. So far, this is the strengthened
standard logic by which a positive shock to the real interest rate induces a fall in output.
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Figure 1.7: Parameterization of δ.
The figure shows the dependence of δ on the elasticity of labor supply parameter η and the asset market
participation parameter λ. Expression for δ is given by (1.27). Note that η is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. Hence, the elasticity of labor supply is varied between 0.25 and 1. The risk
aversion parameter is γ = 2 and the steady-state markup is µ = 0.2.
To invert this logic, one needs to consider the dividend income of savers. As can be seen
directly from the budget constraint, the consumption of savers has two components, wages
and dividends:
cs,t = wt + ns,t +
1
1− λdt, (1.32)
where real profits dt, accruing only to savers, are given by:
dt =
µ
1 + µ
yt − wt + at. (1.33)
If the fall in the aggregate output yt brought about by the interest rate increase is paired
with a correspondingly larger decrease in wages, it leads to a positive income effect for
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savers (equation (1.33)). The positive income effect generates additional labor demand and
the real wage increases. In equilibrium, both the aggregate output and real wages increase.
Hence, a higher real interest rate coincides with an increase in aggregate output induced
by the positive income effect for savers. This mechanism implies that firm markups are
counter-cyclical which is consistent with the empirical evidence (Rotemberg and Woodford,
1999).
VI.C. Consumption of savers and rule-of-thumb consumers
The negative δ implies that the consumption growth of rule-of-thumb consumers is nega-
tively correlated with the variation in the real interest rate. This link arises as a result
of intertemporal choices of savers and does not imply that rule-of-thumb consumers have
a negative EIS. Consistent with this prediction, using UK household-level data, Attanasio,
Banks, and Tanner (2002) report a negative relationship for non-shareholders (Panel C of
Table II in their paper).
The model implies that the consumption of savers loads negatively on the aggregate con-
sumption and positively on technology shocks, which can be seen in equation (1.34) below:
cs,t = δyt + ζat, (1.34)
where ζ > 0 for λ > 0 and is increasing in λ:
ζ =
λη(1 + κ)
(1− λ) [κλη − λ+ γλ(1 + κ) + 1] ,
(derivation of (1.34) and ζ is in Appendix IX.E). Depending on the magnitude of δ and ζ,
the consumption growth of savers is more volatile than the aggregate consumption growth.
For δ < 0 and moderate risk aversion parameter values, i.e. γ ≪ 10, we have that ζ > 1
as illustrated in Panels a–d of Figure 1.8. With larger λ, a smaller fraction of savers holds
all stocks in the economy and is thus more exposed to technology shocks.28 Equation (1.34)
does not imply that the consumption of savers is negatively correlated with the aggregate
consumption in the data. The technology shock at is positively correlated with yt and can
induce a positive correlation in the data despite negative δ. Equation (1.34) also helps
28Setting λ = 0 implies δ = 1 and ζ = 0, which restores the representative agent setup.
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Figure 1.8: Exposure of consumption of savers to the technology shocks.
Panels a − d plot the parameter values for ζ in the equation linking the consumption of savers to the total
output given by (1.34). Three structural parameters are varied. First, the coefficient of relative risk aversion
γ takes values between 0.5 and 10. Each panel represents different values of γ. Second, the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply is varied between 0.25 and 1 which implies parameter values for η between 1 and 4. Third,
the share of rule-of-thumb consumers λ varies between 0 and 1 (x-axis). All plotted values of ζ are obtained
for δ < 0.
explain why the aggregate consumption appears too smooth when compared to substantial
volatility of returns on risky assets. The model suggests that it is not driven by efficient risk
sharing but rather by intertemporal choices of savers which induce the negative correlation
of the consumption of savers with the total consumption.
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VI.D. Why does the standard consumption Euler equation fail?
The Euler equation for aggregate consumption fails to replicate the variation and the level of
interest rates in the data (Weil, 1989). Recently, Cumby and Diba (2007) show that a broad
range of preference specifications in consumption-based models imply a real short rate that
is either negatively correlated with the observed ex-post real interest rate or it is extremely
volatile and uncorrelated with the observed one.
The model outlined in this paper offers one way to reconcile the mismatch between the
consumption-based models and observed short-term yield dynamics. The log of nominal
pricing kernel implied by the model reads:
mt,t+1 = log (β)− γ∆cs,t+1 − πt+1, (1.35)
where ∆cs,t+1 = log Cs,t+1 − log Cs,t denotes the consumption growth of savers. Using the
differenced version of (1.34) and the market clearing condition yt = ct, rewrite (1.35) as:
mt,t+1 = log (β)− γδ∆ct+1 − γζ∆at+1 − πt+1. (1.36)
The comparison of (1.35) with (1.36) provides the intuition for the mismatch between the
observed short term interest rates and the pricing kernel. For δ < 0, which is empirically the
case, the aggregate consumption enters the pricing kernel with the opposite sign compared to
the consumption of savers who are marginal bond investors. The presence of rule-of-thumb
consumers introduces a wedge between the aggregate Euler equation and the Euler equation
of bond market participants (savers). Given that the consumption of savers is not directly
observable, when equating the aggregate consumption Euler equation with observed interest
rates, one needs to use 1
δγ
.
The literature has proposed solutions to the empirical failure of the consumption Euler
equation that are largely risk-based and/or depend on the specifics of monetary policy
(Gallmeyer, Hollifield, Palomino, and Zin, 2007; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2008; Reynard and
Schabert, 2012).29 However, the negative relationship between real interest rates and con-
sumption growth appears to be structural, hence exists irrespective of monetary policy.
29Models with time-varying risk premia add the stochastic second-order terms into the Euler equation
while keeping the first-order relationship unchanged. This is done either through time-varying risk aversion
(e.g. habits) or stochastic volatility (e.g. long-run risk models).
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Indeed, the results in Table I indicate that the relationship exists across periods marked by
very different monetary policy regimes.
VII. Is the negative EIS consistent with long-run risk models?
Empirical results in previous sections imply that the expected consumption growth varies in
a persistent way. This section shows that the persistent component of expected consumption
growth rate extracted from the Euler equation with the negative EIS has asset pricing
implications that are consistent with models featuring long-run cash flow risk (Bansal and
Yaron, 2004; Hansen, Heaton, and Li, 2008).
In the standard long-run risk model (Bansal and Yaron, 2004), both the consumption and
dividend growth, gt and gd,t contain the persistent component xt and their innovations have
stochastic volatility σ2t . Further consider Epstein-Zin preferences with γ and σ denoting the
risk aversion and the EIS, respectively. The essence of the model are two equations given
by (1.37)–(1.38). Both, the short term real rate rt and the log price-dividend ratio zm,t are
affine functions of xt and σ
2
t :
rt = A0,f + A1,fxt + A2,fσ
2
t , (1.37)
zm,t = A0,m + A1,mxt + A2,mσ
2
t , (1.38)
where A1,f =
1
σ
.30 Hence, the expected consumption growth xt has a first-order effect on the
real rate rt. σ
2
t represents the fluctuations in risk and is the key determinant of risky asset
valuations represented by zm,t. The long-run risk literature restricts its attention to positive
values of preference parameters. Therefore, both the EIS and the risk aversion parameter
have to be greater than unity to get plausible asset pricing implications, i.e. price-dividend
ratio increasing in xt and decreasing in σ
2
t . However, it can readily be seen from θ =
1−γ
1− 1
σ
that the negative value of EIS also implies θ < 0 and thus preserves the desirable asset
pricing properties of long-run risk models.
To empirically evaluate the asset pricing properties of xt, I first extract the persistent
component of consumption growth. From (1.37), we have:
30The solution coefficients A1, A2, A0,m, A1,m, A2,m, A0,f , A1,f , A2,f are defined in Bansal and Yaron (2004)
and are not repeated here for brevity.
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xt = −σA0,f + σrt − σA2,fσ2t . (1.39)
The affine relationship given in (1.39) is implemented via OLS:
∆ct+1 = δ0 + δ1︸︷︷︸
−0.81 [−5.23]
r˜t + δ2︸︷︷︸
0.005 [1.32]
σˆ2t + εt+1 R¯
2 = 0.11, (1.40)
where σˆ2t is an empirical proxy for the consumption volatility: σˆ
2
t = log
∑5
i=1 |ηt−i| with
ηt being the innovation in consumption growth obtained from an AR(1) estimated on ∆ct
recursively using the window size of 30 years. The regression results show that the volatility
of consumption growth is unrelated to future consumption growth. Contrary to the argument
that stochastic volatility induces a downward bias in the EIS estimates from the linearized
Euler equation, the estimated δ1 in (1.40) shows that this is not the case. The extracted
persistent component denoted by xˆt, is the fitted value from a restricted version of (1.40)
with δ2 = 0. This is justified given the insignificant estimate of δ2 in the unrestricted version.
Figure 1.9 plots xˆt together with the realized consumption growth. Consistent with the basic
intuition, the expected consumption growth explains a fairly small portion (R¯2 = 0.11) of
the overall variation in consumption growth.
One of the key implications of the long-run risk model is that xt can be predicted by the
price-dividend ratio which is based on the relationship given by (1.38). However, establishing
this link empirically has been a challenge. I use xˆt to estimate (1.38):
zm,t = γ0 + γ1︸︷︷︸
7.97 [2.63]
xˆt + γ2︸︷︷︸
−0.48 [−6.02]
σˆ2t + ǫt R¯
2 = 0.57. (1.41)
In both regressions, (1.40) and (1.41), Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics with three lags
are reported in parentheses. Due to data limitations, regression (1.41) is estimated on
the sample 1926-2009 using annual data.31 Importantly, both xˆt and σˆ
2
t are statistically
significant and have the expected signs. Higher expected consumption growth rate increases
the price-dividend ratio while an increase in consumption volatility depresses it. This result
provides supportive evidence for the validity of xˆt as a persistent component of consumption
31In constructing the price-dividend ratio zm,t, I follow the literature and infer the dividend payments
from monthly returns on the value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks. Monthly
dividend distributions are reinvested in the three-month T-bill. These data are available starting in 1926
which determines the start of the sample for (1.41). Correspondingly, xˆt used in (1.41) is constructed using
the data from the 1926-2009 sample.
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Figure 1.9: Time-varying expected consumption growth, 1875-2009
The figure plots the annual consumption growth together with the estimated persistent component xˆt, which
is obtained as a fitted value from the regression of ∆ct+1 on r˜t. Grey areas represent the recessions. The
data are annual and the sample period is 1875 through 2009.
growth.32 The key takeaway from this exercise is that additional moments in the form of
equity valuation ratios are consistent with the negative value of the EIS. However, this is not
to say that working with the negative EIS is appropriate. Optimally, one should use the EIS
close to unity but apply it to the consumption data aggregated only over households actively
participating in asset markets as has been done in Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2009). In other words, the discrepancy between the aggregate EIS estimates and the micro
evidence is largely a result of aggregation.
32Note that xˆt can be extracted in real-time as r˜t is constructed from asset prices. Estimating (1.40)
recursively gives a stable and significant estimate of δ1.
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VIII. Conclusions
This paper shows that the aggregate elasticity of intertemporal substitution is negative
around -0.5. This empirical finding might seem counterintuitive at first but it is sensible if
one considers that a substantial fraction of aggregate consumption is attributed to agents
whose financial wealth is negligible. These agents have little incentive to participate in asset
markets and largely consume their wage income. This single friction is responsible for the
negative sign of the aggregate EIS and helps explain several empirical puzzles in the asset
pricing and monetary policy literature.
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IX. Appendix
IX.A. A two-component model for inflation
The US inflation can be well described by a two-component model with stochastic volatility (UC-
SV), (Stock and Watson, 2007):
πt = τt + ηt with ηt = σηζη,t
τt = τt−1 + εt with εt = σεζε,t
ln σ2η,t = ln σ
2
η,t−1 + νη,t
ln σ2ε,t = ln σ
2
ε,t−1 + νε,t,
where ζt = (ζη,t, ζε,t) is i.i.d. N (0, I2), νη,t ∼ N (0, γ1) and νε,t ∼ N (0, γ2). All four innovations
are mutually independent.
The simulation exercise replicates the linearized Euler equation given by (1.8), falsely assuming
constant volatility. In the first step, I construct the nominal interest rate by simulating the real
rate and inflation. I simulate realized inflation from the UC-SV model above and set γ1 = 0.2
and γ2 = 0.5 to reflect the higher volatility fluctuations in the transitory component of inflation,
observed in the early part of the 1875-2009 sample. I set T=135 to be consistent with the sample
size used in this paper. I simulate the real rate as an AR(1) process, assuming the following:
φr = 0.75, σr = 1 and r¯ = 1.9, where the data are annual percentages. For consumption growth, I
assume σc = 3.2 and EIS=1. The ex-ante real rate is obtained by linearly projecting the ex-post
real rate observed at t + 1 on past inflation and the nominal interest rate. I simulate the model
1000 times and report median values.
IX.B. Data
This section details the data series used to estimate the consumption and output Euler equations.
Yield data. I study US yields in the period January 1875 through December 2009 unless otherwise
stated. The raw yield data are monthly and are obtained from the Global Financial Data (GFD)
database. I consider the ten-year constant maturity yield (series IGUSA10D) as long term yield.
To construct the short term yield for the whole sample period, I combine the three-month AA non-
financial commercial paper yield (series IPUSAC3D) (1875-1933) with the three-month Treasury
bill (1934-2009). The reason for using the three-month commercial paper in the earlier part of the
sample is the data availability. The ten-year constant maturity yield is interpolated from available
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long term non-inflation-indexed Treasury securities. GFD itself combines various data sources such
as the National Monetary Statistics from the Federal Reserve to obtain the ten-year CMT yield.
r˜t is an average of monthly observations of −slopet within each year.
Consumption and output data (1875-2009). The consumption and output data are constructed
by Robert Barro and Jose Ursua and downloaded from their website.33 These data contain the
total real per capita consumption/output index without further split into durable and non-durable
consumption. Barro and Ursua compile the consumption data from various sources: For the period
1869-1899, the data are from Rhode (2002). For the 1900-1928 period, consumption data are taken
from Lebergott (1996) and the period 1929-2009 is covered by data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The output data are sourced from Balke and Gordon (1989) for the period 1869-1928
and from BEA for the 1928-2009 period.
Consumption data (1929-2009). The consumption data for this period are obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Dept. of Commerce), Tables 2.3.4 and 2.3.5. Non-durable goods
and services as well as durables are deflated by their corresponding price indexes (2005=100).
Population data are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the period 1948-2009. In the
period 1929-1947, the population over 16 years is obtained from the Population Estimates Program
of the U.S. Census Bureau34 by dividing the whole population by 1.5. This ratio of population over
16 years to the total population has been stable in the 1950s.
Output and non-Treasury interest rate data (1869-1983). The real GNP data for the period 1869-
1983 are from Table I, Appendix B in Balke and Gordon (1986). The data in Balke and Gordon
(1986) are assembled from various sources, see Notes on Section 1 of their paper for more details.
The proxy for the real rate r˜t is computed as a difference between the commercial paper rate and
yield on corporate bonds. The commercial paper has a maturity of six-months in most of the
sample. Yields on corporate bonds are Baa-rated (Moodys) corporate bond yields (1919-1983) and
railroad bond yields (1869-1918).
International data
Consumption and output data (1950-2009). Annual consumption and output data for Canada,
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are obtained from the Barro and
Ursua’s data set.
33The dataset is available at http://rbarro.com/data-sets/.
34http://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/totals/pre-1980/tables/popclockest.txt.
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Yield data. All yield data are from the GFD database, see their data descriptions for the original
sources. For all countries, short-term nominal yield is represented by a three-month Treasury bill.
The only exception is Switzerland in the period 1950-1979 where the commercial paper rate is
used instead. The long-term yield is represented by a ten-year Treasury bond yield for Canada,
Germany and Netherlands. For the UK, I use the 20-year government bond and the conferedate
long-term bond for Switzerland. r˜t is a difference between the three-month Treasury bill yield and
the long-term bond yield averaged over monthly observations in a given year.
IX.C. EIS estimation: non-linear GMM and capital taxes
There are at least two reasons for estimating the log-linearized version of the Euler equation as
opposed to estimating equation (1.6) via non-linear GMM (Hansen and Singleton, 1982). First,
it is likely that consumption is measured with error which, if present, causes a more severe bias
in the non-linear estimation. This is especially relevant for the consumption data in the period
before 1947. Romer (1986) shows that macro data before World War II are less accurate and are
constructed using a different methodology than the post-World War II data. Second, r˜t is not
informative about the unconditional mean of the real rate. Given that I want to avoid the use of
the ex-post real interest rate in the estimation, the non-linear estimation is not feasible.
I estimate the aggregate EIS from the pre-tax data. Applying the capital income tax rate to
r˜t directly is not appropriate because this measure does not represent the real interest income
but rather its variation. Additionally, Mishkin (1981) argues that the effective tax rate varies
substantially across households which makes it difficult to know the appropriate tax rate at macro
level. Therefore, I do not adjust r˜t for capital income taxes which might bias the EIS estimates
toward zero. Hence, my estimates of the EIS represent a lower bound on its magnitude.35
IX.D. Empirical evidence on asset market participation
Wolff (2004) reports that the fraction of households with direct holdings of stocks increased from
13.10 percent in 1989 to 21.30 percent in 2001. Moreover, the share of stock-owning households
including indirect holdings through mutual funds or pension accounts rose even more from 31.70
to 51.90 percent in the same period.
35For illustration, the average marginal tax rate for capital income was slightly below 5% before World-
War II, see Table 2 in Barro and Sahasakul (1983). Since the mid-1940s, the rate has been increasing to a
level around 30%.
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However, these numbers might misrepresent the degree of asset market participation for the purpose
of this model. In the model, λ represents the fraction of households that actively participate in
asset markets to smooth consumption which requires substantial liquid wealth. According to Wolff
(2004), only 35 percent of households owned USD 10 000 (in 1995 dollars) or more of stocks in
2001. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), Poterba and Samwick (1995) report that
24.60 and 29.30 percent of households had direct and indirect stock holdings of more than USD 2
000 (in 1992 dollars) in 1983 and 1992, respectively.
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Figure 1.10: Stock market participation and holdings by income, 1989-2007
Panel a plots the percentiles of households with direct or indirect stock holdings split by their income. Two
lower quintiles and two upper deciles are displayed for the period 1989-2007. Panel b plots the median value
of stock holdings of households by income. The values are in 2007 dollars and thus directly comparable
across time. The data are obtained from the Survey of Consumer Finance.
I use the SCF data to show that the financial wealth of low income households has not risen in real
terms in the last two decades. Panel a of Figure 1.10 reports the fraction of stockholders by income
quintiles for the period 1989-2007, and Panel b reports the corresponding median values of stock
holdings adjusted for inflation. The important observation is that while the degree of participation
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has increased, the value of stock holdings for the lowest income quintile has remained virtually
unchanged in the last two decades. In line with this evidence, Carroll (2000) reports that according
to the SCF, the lowest 66 percentiles of the US population by wealth have liquid assets of only
10 percent of their annual wage income. Overall, these numbers indicate that λ = 0.7 is justified.
The likely reason for the limited asset market participation are various forms of costs attached to
it. Section 5 in Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) provides a thorough discussion of participation costs and
their ability to explain the non-participation of a substantial portion of households.36
IX.E. Model
This section provides details on some derivations of the model outlined in Section II.
Steady state
The steady state risk-less interest rate is R = 1β , the net mark-up is µ =
1
ε−1 and define FY = F/Y .
Fixed costs are introduced for convenience. Following Bilbiie (2008), I set the fixed costs share
FY = µ which implies that profits are zero in steady-state. The share of the real wage on the
total output is: WN/PY = (1 + FY )/(1 + µ), share of profit is D/Y = (µ− F )/(1 + µ). Assume
that both savers and rule-of-thumb consumers have the same hours worked in the steady state:
Ns = Nr = N . It follows:
Cs
Y
=
1 + FY
1 + µ
+Θ
µ− FY
1 + µ
using the assumption FY = µ, we have:
Cs
Y
= 1
Cr
Y
=
1 + FY
1 + µ
= 1,
Hence, both types of agents have the same consumption in the steady state: Cs,t = Cr,t =[
NηP
W
]−1/γ
.
Aggregate Euler equation
The aggregate Euler equation is derived by manipulating the the equilibrium conditions and budget
constraints of both types of agents. First, I provide the derivation of the threshold level of
36Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) estimates a median per-period cost of participation of $350 (real 1982-84
dollars).
65
market participation λˆ which is the discontinuity point at where the sign of the output Euler
equation switches. Combining the budget constraint of rule-of-thumb consumers and their first
order condition we get:
Nηr,t =
(
Wt
Pt
Nr,t
)−γ Wt
Pt
Nη+γr,t =
(
Wt
Pt
)1−γ
.
Taking logs and rearranging yields:
nr,t =
1− γ
η + γ
wt. (1.42)
To simplify the notation, define κ ≡ 1−γη+γ . From the budget constraint of rule-of-thumb consumers
we have: cr,t = (1 + κ)wt. Total consumption ct and hours worked nt are defined as:
ct = λcr,t + (1− λ)cs,t (1.43)
nt = λnr,t + (1− λ)ns,t. (1.44)
Combining (1.42) and (1.44) with the labor supply of savers, we obtain the expression for the wage:
wt =
(1− λ)γ
ηλκ+ (1− λ)cs,t +
η
ηλκ+ (1− λ)nt. (1.45)
Plugging the consumption of rule-of-thumb consumers into (1.43) and using (1.45) yields:
ct =
[(1− λ) [γλ (1 + κ) + (ηλκ+ (1− λ))]]
ηλκ+ (1− λ) cs,t +
λη(1 + κ)
ηλκ+ (1− λ)nt. (1.46)
Expressing (1.46) in terms of output gives:
ct =
[(1− λ) [γλ (1 + κ) + (ηλκ+ (1− λ))]]
ηλκ+ (1− λ) cs,t +
λη(1 + κ)
ηλκ+ (1− λ)
1
1 + µ
yt − λη(1 + κ)
ηλκ+ (1− λ)at.(1.47)
The differenced version of equation (1.47) is similar to the regression used in Campbell and Mankiw
(1989) to estimate the fraction of rule-of-thumb households. The co-movement of consumption and
output arises endogenously in the model. However, λη(1+κ)ηλκ+(1−λ)
1
1+µ is not linear in λ, therefore linear
regressions yield biased estimates of the fraction of rule-of-thumb households. The output Euler
equation changes its sign when ∂ct∂yt > 1, therefore the threshold reads:
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1 =
λη(1 + κ)
ηλκ+ (1− λ)
1
1 + µ
λη(1 + κ) = (1 + µ)ηλκ+ (1− λ)(1 + µ)
λˆ =
1 + µ
1 + µ− (1 + µ)ηκ+ η(1 + κ)
=
1
1 + η(1−κµ)1+µ
.
The risk aversion γ influences the threshold value λˆ in a non-linear way through κ. Rearrange
(1.47) and impose the clearing condition ct = yt to obtain:
cs,t =
(ηλκ+ 1− λ) (1 + µ)− λη(1 + κ)
(1− λ) (1 + µ) [κλη + γλ(1 + κ) + 1− λ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ
yt +
λη(1 + κ)
(1− λ) [κλη − λ+ γλ(1 + κ) + 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζ
at. (1.48)
The Euler equation of savers reads:
Etcs,t+1 − cs,t = 1
γ
(it − Etπt+1) , (1.49)
substituting (1.48) into the Euler equation of savers obtains the aggregate Euler equation:
Etyt+1 − yt = 1
δγ
(it − Etπt+1)− 1κλη+1−λ
λη(1+κ) − 11+µ
[Etat+1 − at] (1.50)
Etyt+1 − yt = 1
δγ
(it − Etπt+1) + χ [Etat+1 − at] , (1.51)
where χ ≡ − 1κλη+1−λ
λη(1+κ)
− 1
1+µ
.
Natural real rate
I start by deriving the relationship between the real wage and total output. Combining (1.48) with
the production function given by yt = (1 + µ)at + (1 + µ)nt and the labor supply of savers given
by ηns,t = wt − γcs,t and rearranging obtains:
wt =
η + (1 + µ) (1− λ) γδ
(1 + µ) (1− λ+ ληκ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϑ
yt +
(1− λ) γζ − η
1− λ+ ληκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
ν
at. (1.52)
The New Keynesian Phillips curve reads:
πt = βEtπt+1 + ψmct, (1.53)
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with ψ ≡ (1−ωβ)(1−ω)ω . Real marginal costs can be expressed as mct = wt − at. Using (1.52), mct
can be expressed as:
mct = ϑyt + (ν − 1)at, (1.54)
therefore:
πt = βEtπt+1 + ψ [ϑyt + (ν − 1)at] . (1.55)
The natural level of output y∗t is obtained from (1.55) by setting the inflation to zero:
y∗t =
1
ϑ
(1− ν)at, (1.56)
the Phillips curve can be rewritten in terms of output gap xt ≡ yt − y∗t :
πt = βEtπt+1 + ψϑxt. (1.57)
From the IS curve given by (1.51) evaluated at zero inflation one obtains the natural level of the
real interest rate:
r∗t = δγ
(
1
ϑ
(1− ν)− χ
)
[Etat+1 − at] . (1.58)
The IS curve in terms of output gap reads:
Etxt+1 − xt = 1
δγ
(it − Etπt+1 − r∗t ) (1.59)
Model solution
Collect variables into a vector: zt = [πt, yt, it, y
∗
t ]
′. The equilibrium conditions are collected in
matrix form:
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
1 −ψϑ 0 ψϑ
0 1 1δγ 0
−(1− φi)φpi −(1− φi)φx 1 (1− φi)φx
0 0 0 1
 zt =

β 0 0 0
1
δγ 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Etzt+1 +

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 φi 0
0 0 0 0
 zt−1+
(1.60)
+

0
−χ(ρa − 1)
0
1
ϑ(1− ν)
 at. (1.61)
In a compact form:
B1zt = AEtzt+1 +B2zt−1 + Cat, (1.62)
where matrices A,B1, B2, C are implicitly defined by comparing (1.61) with (1.62). The rational
expectations equilibrium follows:
zt = Γzt−1 + Ξat. (1.63)
The model is solved by the forward method proposed in Cho and Moreno (2011). For convenience,
I define Xt = (z
′
t, at)
′ and rewrite (1.63) in a compact form:
Xt = ̟Xt−1 +Ψε
a
t , (1.64)
where ̟ =
 Γ Ξρa
01×4 ρa
 and Ψ =
 Ξ
1
.
Affine term structure model
In setting up the affine term structure model, I follow Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010) and keep
the risk premia constant. Given that the paper focuses on intertemporal trade-off and expectations,
time-varying risk premia are of secondary importance. The log of the nominal pricing kernel implied
by the model outlined in Section II, reads:
mt,t+1 = log (β)− γ∆cs,t+1 − πt+1, (1.65)
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where ∆cs,t+1 = log Cs,t+1 − log Cs,t denotes the consumption growth of savers. Assuming log-
normality, the pricing equation for short-term bonds implies:
Etmt,t+1 +
1
2
Vartmt,t+1 = −it. (1.66)
Rewrite (1.65) using the relationship between the consumption of savers and the total output given
in (1.48):
mt,t+1 = log (β)− γδ∆yt+1 − γζ∆at+1 − πt+1. (1.67)
Define:
Λ′ =
[
1 γδ 0 0 γζ
]
Ψ,
and Var εat = D, then Vartmt,t+1 = Λ
′DΛ. Given the assumptions, mt,t+1 can be written as:
mt,t+1 = −it − 1
2
Λ′DΛ + Λ′ǫt+1, (1.68)
and the n-period zero coupon yield reads:
y
(n)
t = −
An
n
− Bn
n
Xt
An = An−1 +
1
2
B′n−1ΨDΨ
′Bn−1 − Λ′DΨ′Bn−1
Bn = B
′
n−1̟
B1 = −e′3.
To test if the model-implied term structure recovers the short term real rate, I simulate the model at
the parameters given in Table VI for 220 quarters and construct the yield curve. Then, I construct
the measure of the real rate r˜t = it− y(10)t as in the previous sections and compare it to it−Etπt+1
where Etπt+1 is obtained from an AR(1) model. Figure 1.11 shows the histogram of correlations
between r˜t and it −Etπt+1. The median correlation is around 0.7 which supports the validity of r˜t
as a measure of the short term real rate.
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Figure 1.11: Correlation of r˜t and real rate in a simulated model.
The figure reports the distribution of the correlation between r˜t and the ex-ante real interest rate from
a simulated model. r˜t is obtained as a difference between the nominal short rate and the ten-year yield.
Ex-ante real rate is computed as a difference between short term nominal yield and expected inflation. To
obtain the expected inflation, I estimate an AR(1) model on realized inflation and forecast two quarters
ahead. The model is simulated for 220 quarters with 1000 replications.
IX.F. Robustness and additional results
Ex-ante real rate: robustness checks
This appendix compares r˜t to alternative measures of the real rate variation. First, I compare r˜t
constructed using the nominal UK yield curve to the real interest rate obtained from the inflation-
indexed government bonds. As shown in Figure 1.12, in the period 1985-2011, r˜t closely follows
the real interest rate from UK inflation-indexed bonds with the correlation ρ = 0.6. The shortest
continuously available maturity for the real interest rate is 3.5 years. Intuitively, the one-year
real rate shall exhibit more variation than the one plotted in Figure 1.12 and therefore it is more
suitable for studying the intertemporal trade-off. Second, I compare r˜t in the US to the real rate
constructed using the inflation expectations from the SPF panel in the period 1970-2011. Figure
1.13 superimposes r˜t with the survey-based real interest rate it − Estπt+1 where it represents the
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Figure 1.12: Real yield from UK inflation-indexed government bonds and r˜t,
1985-2011
The figure plots the proxy for the ex-ante real rate r˜t which is computed as the difference between the one-
and ten-year nominal Gilt. Superimposed is the real yield with maturity 3.5 years denoted by rGiltt . Shorter
maturities are not continuously available for real yields in the UK. The data are annual. The sample period
is 1985 through 2011.
three-month Treasury bill and Estπt+1 denotes the survey-based measure of inflation expectations
over the next year. Similarly to the real rate obtained from the Livingston survey, both r˜t and
it − Estπt+1 closely track each other (ρ = 0.53).
Accuracy of the pre-1929 data
The interest rate and consumption data from the period before 1929 are not well-researched.
Therefore, there is a potential issue that at least part of the results are driven by the selection
of the dataset. To address these concerns, I evaluate the main result, namely the estimate of the
EIS using alternative data sources.
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Figure 1.13: Ex-ante real interest rate and r˜t, 1970-2011
The figure plots the proxy for the ex-ante real rate r˜t which is computed as the difference between the
three-month Treasury bill yield and ten-year Treasury yield together with the survey-based real interest rate
it−Estπt+1, where it represents the three-month Treasury bill and Estπt+1 denotes the survey-based measure
of inflation expectations over the next year. The survey data are obtained from the SPF panel and the
median response is a proxy for the expectations. The data are quarterly. The sample period is Q2:1970
through Q3:2011.
First, I re-estimate the consumption Euler equation using the annual data by Robert Shiller.37 The
sample period is 1888-2009. r˜t is defined as the difference between the one-year interest rate and
the long term government bond yield, which is a ten-year Treasury note post 1953. The results are
quantitatively similar, i.e. the estimate of σ is close to -0.5 for the full sample and it is statistically
significant.
Second, between the Civil War and 1920, yields of government bonds are potentially downward-
biased due to the fact that government bonds were held as reserves by banks and these could issue
bank notes against them. To evaluate the potential bias, I use the non-Treasury yields to construct
37http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/chapt26.xls
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r˜t and use it to estimate the Euler equation. The results are quantitatively similar to those using
Treasury yields.
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Chapter 2
Expecting the Fed
I. Introduction
Separating short rate expectations from risk premia in Treasuries is of importance for
policy makers and those seeking to understand the economics of the yield curve.1 Such
decomposition provides insights about how markets perceive the future course of monetary
policy, economic activity, inflation and their associated risks. It is also informative about
the channels—risk premium versus expectations—through which monetary policy influences
the economy.2 Recent academic research has significantly improved our understanding
and measurement of bond risk premia, but still surprisingly little is known as to how
investors form expectations about the future path of monetary policy. This focus can be
justified with the common assumption of the full-information rational expectations (FIRE)
which stipulates that all predictable variation in bond returns comes from risk premia, with
expectations formation being of little independent interest. However, analyzing expectations
1This chapter is based on the paper with the same title written in collaboration with Anna Cieslak from
the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. We thank Snehal Banerjee, Gadi Barlevy,
Greg Duffee, Martin Eichenbaum, Douglas Gale, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Scott Joslin, Philippe Mu¨ller,
Viktor Todorov, as well as Mark Watson and Ken Singleton (discussants) and participants at the SF Fed
conference “The Past and Future of Monetary Policy,” Financial Economics Workshop at NYU, Arne Ryde
Workshop, Chicago Fed, Northwestern Kellogg, Minnesota Mini Asset Pricing Conference, Finance Down
Under Conference, Financial Econometrics Conference in Toulouse, and the Red Rock Finance Conference
for valuable comments.
2See for instance the speech of the former Fed governor Kohn on the importance of this distinction for
the policy making (Kohn, 2005).
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takes on a new importance as central banks around the world embrace the forward policy
guidance.3
We start with the observation that lagged information, spanning length of a business cycle,
improves predictions of future short rate changes relative to conditioning on the current
yield curve alone. This is surprising given that today’s cross-section of yields reflects
risk-adjusted expectations and therefore, absent additional restrictions, should subsume
information relevant for forecasting. We use this observation as a hint to study the properties
of private sector’s expectations about the future path of monetary policy. Our objective is to
assess the degree to which these expectations are consistent with the FIRE or are indicative
of informational frictions faced by agents in real time. To directly disentangle the risk
premium from short rate expectations, we rely on survey data containing the term structure
of private sector’s forecasts of the federal funds rate (FFR)—the conventional US monetary
policy tool—as well as forecasts of longer maturity yields and inflation. Our results suggest
that the view of frictionless rational expectations deviates from the observed behavior of
interest rates in several ways.
While survey-based short rate expectations match almost one-to-one the contemporaneous
behavior of short-term yields and fed fund futures, these expectations are poor predictors
of future short rates except at very short horizons (e.g. Rudebusch, 2002). Consequently,
it is relatively easy to identify lagged information, for instance using past term spreads,
that improves upon survey forecasts, making short rate forecast errors predictable ex-post.
In particular, we find a significant wedge between the ex-ante real short rate implied by
the surveys and one that an econometrician would construct under the FIRE assumption.
This wedge becomes large in the beginning of NBER-dated recessions, reaching up to -200
basis points: In recessions agents overestimate the ex-ante real FFR compared to the FIRE
benchmark.
We construct a measure of expectations frictions as a difference between the survey- and the
FIRE-based real fed funds rate. To the extent that expectations of bond market participants
are well represented using surveys, this variable reflects the idea that there is information in
the time series of monetary policy actions that is not fully impounded in the cross section
3The recent speech of the Fed Chairman Bernanke emphasizes the role of forward policy guidance as
means to influence the public’s expectations about the future path of policy rates (Bernanke, 2011). Recent
papers that stress the role of short rate expectations in shaping the reactions to various monetary policy
measures during the financial crisis are Bauer and Rudebusch (2011) and Swanson and Williams (2012).
76
of yields in real time. We label this variable as MP⊥t . One interpretation is that the Fed
is able to deliver persistent surprises to the market. Accordingly, we show that MP⊥t picks
up the low-frequency movement in monetary policy surprises identified from high-frequency
data (Kuttner, 2001).
The real rate wedge predicts bond excess returns separately from measures of the risk
premium in the yield curve, such as the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) factor. Its effect
is strongest at short maturities (two-year bond), most influenced by the monetary policy,
and subsides for longer-term bonds. In a related way, we find that two factors span the
predictable variation in realized bond returns across maturities.
With the help of survey data on longer-maturity yields, we obtain a model-free decomposi-
tion of annual excess bond returns into a risk premium and an ex-ante unexpected return
component. The unexpected return on a two-year bond moves in lockstep with the (negative
of) FFR forecast errors with correlation in excess of 0.9. Almost 40% of its variation can
be predicted ex-post by MP⊥t . Interestingly, we find that several conditioning variables
used to forecast bond returns, especially variables related to the real activity, predict their
unexpected component, comove withMP⊥t , but are essentially uncorrelated with the survey-
implied risk premia.
Our evidence suggests that those features of short rate expectations pertain to an environ-
ment with an active central bank that itself might adapt its policy rule over time, and are
less likely to characterize the data pre-Fed. In the last three decades, we find that agents’
forecast errors about the short rate comove closely (with a negative sign) with errors they
make when forecasting unemployment, and much less so—inflation.
One concern about the validity of these results is that survey expectations of the federal
funds rate may not reflect the true market perceptions of the future evolution of the policy
rate. It can be that surveys are noisy, and that forecasters simply anchor their predictions
to the current market rates reporting risk-adjusted rather than physical expectations. Thus,
in case of such circularity between surveys and market yields, what we identify as expec-
tations frictions could arise from a pure risk premium variation. Indeed, we find a close
overlap between survey expectations and expectations extracted from the fed fund futures,
which represent a market-wide consensus. We also fail to reject the hypothesis that survey
expectations are consistent with those shaping the short end of the Treasury curve. This
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fact speaks against the hypothesis that noise prevents inference using surveys but it does
not address the second concern about circularity.
It is unlikely, though, that forecasters report risk-adjusted predictions for several reasons.
First, this argument would imply that the risk premium makes survey forecasts less accurate,
and forecast errors more predictable, than they otherwise would be. Using various statistical
models with different levels of sophistication, from a simple random walk through a time-
varying parameters Bayesian VAR, we find that none is able to outperform surveys in
generating more precise real-time forecasts. Moreover, for risk premium to account for our
results, one would need to accept that investors charge a highly volatile and implausibly large
risk premium (on the scale of several hundred basis points) when investing in short-term and
safe rate instruments. While the bulk of our results relies on professional forecasts of the FFR
from the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey, we uncover analogous results in the Survey
of Professional Forecasters comprising different panelists and the T-bill rate predictions. We
also report similar properties of expectation errors in the so-called Greenbook forecasts of
the FFR, i.e. forecasts prepared by the staff of the Federal Reserve before FOMC meetings.
As a last step, we draw on the evidence from money market funds to find that flows in and
out of these funds support the expectations frictions interpretation. After controlling for the
flight to safety and liquidity episodes, our measure of expectations frictions explains 55% of
institutional money market flows and up to 25% of retail flows during a year. Specifically,
the inflows gradually increase after monetary policy has been tight and decline after it has
been easy, suggesting that money market investors extrapolate from the recent past. The
relationship is symmetric in easing and tightening episodes.
Related literature
By studying the role of monetary policy expectations for the yield curve we combine the
insights from the term structure literature with the recent developments in macroeconomics
that emphasize the role of information imperfections and deviations from perfect rational
expectations (see Mankiw and Reis (2011) and Woodford (2012) for overview). The question
of how (through which friction) models of monetary policy can generate its lasting effect on
the real economy is still debated. One promising route and a growing area of macro research
has focussed on information rigidities. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011a, 2012) provide
evidence that information rigidities present in inflation expectations are consistent with
models that relax the FIRE assumption. On the theoretical front, several authors stress
78
the relevance of imperfect knowledge in modeling monetary policy (e.g. Orphanides and
Williams, 2005; Woodford, 2010; Angeletos and La’O, 2012). The evidence we collect about
the short rate dynamics and expectations is reminiscent of natural expectations introduced
by Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel (2010): While many macroeconomic variables have complex
hump-shaped dynamics, agents forecast the future using simple models, and thus partially
overlook the degree of mean reversion in fundamentals. Building on this literature, our
objective is to provide an empirical assessment of expectations frictions faced by bond
investors, their link to macroeconomic sources, and relevance for describing the dynamics
of yields. Our results have potential implications for the measurement of risk premia and
expectations in the curve. Furthermore, they may contribute to the discussion of the channels
through which monetary policy impacts the real economy.
We build on the literatures on measuring bond risk premia and on extracting market-based
expectations of monetary policy from asset prices. For one, motivated by a widely reported
failure of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, a large body of work has focussed
on exploring the risk premium as the source of this violation (Campbell and Shiller, 1991;
Fama and Bliss, 1987; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005). Consistent with FIRE, a common
approach to measuring the risk premium variation is through predictive regressions, i.e. a
projection of realized bond returns on a variety of conditioning variables, including the yield
curve slope, a set of forward rates and macro variables. Perhaps the most vexing conclusion
of the research into bond risk premia is that future bond returns are predictable by variables
that have a weak contemporaneous relation with the cross section of yields giving rise to the
so-called hidden or unspanned term premia factors. This evidence goes back to Ludvigson
and Ng (2009), Cooper and Priestley (2009), and has been formalized in Joslin, Priebsch,
and Singleton (2010), Duffee (2011), Barillas and Nimark (2012), and most recently in Joslin,
Le, and Singleton (2013).
A parallel literature studies the properties of monetary policy expectations extracted from
asset prices (e.g. Rudebusch, 1998; Kuttner, 2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Ferrero and
Nobili, 2009). Sack (2004) argues for a time varying but overall small risk premium in the
fed fund and eurodollar futures. On the other hand, Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) show that
realized excess returns on the fed funds futures are strongly predictable with real variables,
implying large countercyclical risk premia on these assets. Our results suggest a close link
between hidden factors in term premia and the predictable variation in returns on short-term
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interest rate instruments that is induced by the way short rate expectations are formed. In
particular, the proxy for expectations frictions that we construct can be interpreted as an
unspanned monetary policy factor.
A related strand of research uses survey data to study expectations formation in financial
markets. In the foreign exchange market, Frankel and Froot (1987) explain the forward
premium puzzle with expectations errors, and find that these errors are predictable with
past information. Bacchetta, Mertens, and van Wincoop (2009) extend this evidence to
other asset classes including stocks and bonds. Using survey data on bond yields in the
1969–1985 period, Froot (1989) shows that predictable forecast errors contribute to the
violations of the expectations hypothesis for long-maturity bonds. Piazzesi and Schneider
(2011) reach a similar conclusion with more recent data reporting that forecast errors on
one- through 30-year Treasury yields are predictable both with the current term spread
and a linear combination of forward rates. They argue that risk premia implied by the
surveys are more persistent than those obtained with statistical approaches. Building on
this literature, we investigate the source of frictions by relating them to the real short rate
and to monetary policy. In particular, we document that ex-post there is a wedge between
the time series dynamics of the real short rate, and the cross section of yields which captures
perceptions of agents about the future short rate path. This real rate wedge is responsible
for the predictable variation in the ex-post forecast errors about the policy rate.
Deviations from the FIRE have recently gained prominence in studies of other major asset
markets. Singleton (2012) emphasizes the distinctive role of informational frictions and
imperfect information in the commodities market to explain the pricing of oil. Using
micro-survey data on expectations about inflation, stock returns and house prices, Nagel
(2012) relates biases in expectations such as overextrapolation of the recent past to the
life-time macroeconomic experiences of individuals. Similarly, in a contemporaneous study,
Greenwood and Shleifer (2013) draw on responses from equity investor surveys and flows to
confirm the presence of extrapolation in the way investors form expectations about future
stock returns. They highlight the discrepancy between the statistical and survey-based risk
premium measures.
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II. Background
Substantive empirical evidence suggests that variables other than current bond yields have
predictive power for future bond returns and, relatedly, future yields. Such a finding has
been surprising given that yields today reflect market’s conditional expectations of short
rates and excess returns to be realized in subsequent periods, and therefore, the current
yield curve should contain all information useful for forecasting.4 This section discusses how
expectations frictions can be useful in reconciling the empirical predictability results with
this benchmark logic.
Let us consider a realized one-period excess return on a two-period zero coupon bond:
rx
(2)
t+1 = −it+1 + 2y(2)t − it, (2.1)
where y
(2)
t denotes a continuously compounded two-period yield, and it is a one-period (short)
rate. Rearranging (2.1), the two-period yield can be expressed as:
y
(2)
t =
1
2
(it + it+1) +
1
2
rx
(2)
t+1. (2.2)
Equation (2.2) is a tautology that follows from the definition of bond returns. Since it holds
ex-post, realization-by-realization, it also holds ex ante:
y
(2)
t =
1
2
Ft (it + it+1) +
1
2
Ft
(
rx
(2)
t+1
)
, (2.3)
where Ft(·) = F (·|It) is an expectations operator, conditional on all information available
at time t, It. Importantly, (2.3) holds for any model of expectations formation and for any
conditioning information set (e.g. Fama and Bliss, 1987; Fama, 1990).
Most term structure models and tests of the expectations hypothesis assume that Ft(·) is
formed under FIRE. Under FIRE, the realized future short rate equals it+1 = Ft(it+1)+vt+1,
where the forecast error vt+1 is unpredictable by information available at time t. Since the
contemporaneous yield curve reflects such expectations, it also summarizes all information
relevant for forecasting future interest rates. Thus, under FIRE, a variable can forecast future
returns without visibly affecting today’s yields only when it impacts expectations of the short
4Duffee (2012b) gives a recent comprehensive survey of this literature.
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rate and the risk premium in an exactly offsetting manner. Such a cancelation argument has
been used to justify why variables that are weakly related to the contemporaneous yield curve
can predict future bond returns beyond information that is contained in yields themselves
(Duffee, 2011).
An alternative interpretation of this empirical fact, one whose relevance we explore in this
paper, builds on the idea that the FIRE may not hold exactly in the data. We note that the
identities (2.2) and (2.3) jointly imply:
it+1 − Ft(it+1) = −
[
rx
(2)
t+1 − Ft(rx(2)t+1)
]
, (2.4)
where the left-hand side measures agents’ forecast error about the short rate, and the right-
hand side—the unexpected return. Through equation (2.3), any forecast error that agents
make when predicting the short rate must cancel with unexpected returns that they earn
ex-post. Since the cancelation in (2.4) is exact, a variable that predicts forecast errors will by
construction have a zero net effect on the current yield curve. This argument holds equally
for an n-period bond, for which:
n−2∑
j=0
[it+1+j − Ft(it+1+j)] = −
n−2∑
j=0
[
rx
(n−j)
t+1+j − Ft(rx(n−j)t+1+j)
]
. (2.5)
It is possible that both effects, i.e. the cancelation of factors within the yield curve and
ex-post predictable forecast errors, coexist in the data. We draw on evidence from survey
forecasts of the short rate by the private sector and the Fed, from long samples of data
to show that deviations from the FIRE have an empirical merit and could account for the
observed predictability patterns. This does not necessarily mean, however, that people make
obvious mistakes. A broad class of models implies that forecast errors can be predictable
without people’s behavior being irrational. Such a predictability arises under realistic
scenarios: Agents are likely to act under imperfect or noisy information (e.g. Woodford,
2003a). They also are likely not to know the exact monetary policy reaction function but
rationally learn about its parameters (Friedman, 1979), which themselves can evolve over
time.5 Alternatively, faced with complex underlying dynamics, they may base their forecasts
5Indeed, a growing literature documents that the parameters of the monetary policy rule vary over time,
e.g. Primiceri (2005), Boivin (2006), Ang, Boivin, Dong, and Loo-Kung (2010), Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011b).
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on simpler intuitive models that deviate from the truth in a significant way but still imply
a small utility loss (Cochrane, 1989).
On a methodological level, the wedge between ex-ante and ex-post introduced by frictions
can be interpreted as a wedge between the time series and the cross section of yields within
the term structure framework of Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010). Their framework
assumes the existence of macro factors that have predictive properties for future yields in
the time series but are unspanned by their current cross section. Importantly, since a subset
of state variables does not enter the bond pricing equation in the first place, the model does
not require an explicit cancelation between risk premia and expectations to occur within the
yield curve.
III. Short-rate expectations
III.A. Measuring short rate expectations with surveys
We use private sector forecasts of the federal funds rate, the main operating target of the
Fed, from the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (BCFF) survey. The survey contains monthly
forecasts of the FFR provided by approximately 45 leading financial institutions. The sample
of FFR forecasts extends from the inception of the survey in March 1983 through December
2010, spanning a relatively homogenous period for the US monetary policy, during which
the FFR was its main operating tool.6 The forecasts are quarterly averages of the FFR for
the current quarter, the next quarter out to four quarters ahead. From the same survey
source, we also obtain forecasts of the all-items CPI inflation spanning horizons from the
current quarter out to four quarters ahead. Inflation survey is available from June 1984
through December 2010. We use the median forecast across the panelists, because a simple
combination of models/forecasters, such as the mean or median, is known to increase the
forecast precision (e.g. Stock and Watson, 1998). We confirm this result in our data by
studying the persistence in individual forecasters’ ability to outperform the median FFR
6The forecasts are published on the first day of each month, but the survey itself is conducted over a
two-day period, usually between the 23rd and 27th of each month. The exception is the survey for the
January issue which generally takes place between the 17th and 20th of December. BCFF does not publish
the precise dates as to when the survey was conducted.
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forecast. We find that very few forecasters are able to beat the median forecast consistently
across different forecast horizon and over longer time spans.7
Figure 2.1 plots the time series of survey-based FFR forecasts from two perspectives: Panel
a lines up the forecasts for different horizons with the realized FFR at the time when the
forecasts are formed; panel b displays the same information in form of conditional term
structures of forecasts. Panel a reveals that forecasts closely trace the current realizations
of the FFR, suggesting that there is relatively little mean reversion in expectations, i.e.
the market expectations of the short rate are formed as if it followed random walk. Panel b
indicates that investors systematically underestimate both the degree of monetary tightening
and easing.
Which fraction of future changes in the policy rate is anticipated? Focusing on annual
horizon, we estimate:
∆FFRt,t+1 = γ2︸︷︷︸
−0.63 [−2.34]
+ γ3︸︷︷︸
1.04 [3.36]
[Est (FFRt+1)− FFRt] + εFEt+1, R¯2 = 0.18, (2.6)
where ∆FFRt,t+1 = FFRt+1 − FFRt and Est (FFRt+1) denotes the survey-based proxy for
the expectations about FFR one-year ahead. In Table I, we report analogous results for
the forecast horizon h from one quarter to one year. While we cannot reject the null that
γ3 = 1, we observe significantly negative γ2 which is due to the zero-lower bound hit in
2008. Excluding the 2008–2010 period gives an insignificant γ2 and γ3 close to one (not
reported). Given that we cannot reject γ3 = 1, regression (2.6) can be interpreted as a
decomposition with the variation in εFEt reflecting the forecast error. Importantly, estimates
in (2.6) show that more than 80% of annual changes in the policy rate is unexpected by
the private sector. However, while this failure is usually attributed to the time-varying risk
premium, our results suggest that even if risk premium is corrected for (as it is likely to
be the case in (2.6)), private sector expectations are able to forecast only a relatively small
fraction of future short-rate movements.
7Our data allows us to identify a forecaster (an institution contributing to the survey) and trace them
over time. To study the persistence in forecast accuracy, we require a forecaster to contribute at least 36
consecutive months to the survey (the samples differ among forecasters). There are 33 contributors who
survive this filter. For each forecaster, we measure the ratio of their RMSE relative to the RMSE of the
median forecaster. We find that 21% of forecasters are able to achieve a ratio below 1, but only one of them
is below 0.95. The distribution of RMSE ratios is strongly skewed to the right with more than 68% of the
panelists achieving a ratio of 1.05 or worse.
84
A forecast error made by the median forecaster about the future policy rate at horizon h is
defined as:
FEFFRt,t+h = FFRt+h − Est (FFRt+h). (2.7)
Panel c of Figure 2.1 shows that forecast errors have nontrivial dynamics over the monetary
policy cycle: they are on average negative during easings and positive during tightenings.
The most pronounced errors are negative and occur during and after the NBER recessions
meaning that forecasters fail most significantly in predicting the timing and the magnitude
of the easing. In tightening episodes, the forecasters fail to predict the strength and the
pace of interest rate increases. The average error reaches -1.43% and 0.60% at the one-year
horizon in easing and tightening episodes, respectively, with standard deviations of 1.37%
and 0.88%. As such, the private sector predicts a smaller magnitude of monetary policy
actions relative to those that are subsequently realized (more details are in Table XVII in
the Appendix). Forecast errors do not seem to be decreasing over time even though the Fed
has substantially increased its transparency throughout our sample.8 A simple regression
(not reported) of absolute forecast errors on a time trend confirms that there has been no
decline in the errors over time.
III.B. Expectations and the role of lagged information
Survey-based expectations are useful for assessing the discrepancy between the time series
and cross-sectional dynamics of the short rate. In particular, we can analyze the degree to
which agents’ expectations incorporate all past information.
Let us focus on a one-year change in the federal funds rate, ∆FFRt,t+1. To the extent that
the Fed’s inflation target is slow moving, one can expect ∆FFRt,t+1 to mainly reflect the
dynamics of real variables. For instance, over the 1954–2010 period, changes in FFR have
comoved strongly with the annual changes in the rate of unemployment with a correlation of
-60%. In the post-Volcker sample this correlation strengthened to nearly -70%. Therefore, a
variable that predicts real activity is likely to also contain information about future changes
8In our sample, there have been several remarkable operational changes that increased the transparency
of the Fed. First, in 1994 the Fed started issuing a statement following each FOMC meeting. Starting in
March 2002, votes of the committee members are public. In April 2011, the Fed introduced a press conference
following every second FOMC meeting. Sellon (2008) finds that the transparency of the monetary policy
decreased the prediction errors at short horizons while the prediction errors at longer horizons (one year and
more) have not changed.
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in the FFR. The slope of the yield curve offers itself as a candidate predictor, given large
literature that documents its forecast power for future real activity several quarters ahead
(Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Harvey, 1989; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). We project a
one-year change in the FFR on today’s and lagged slope defined as the spread between the
long- and short-term yields, St = y
(20)
t − y(1)t :
∆FFRt,t+1 = α0 + α1︸︷︷︸
−0.07 [−0.74]
St + α2︸︷︷︸
0.79 [6.13]
St−1 + εt+1, R¯
2 = 0.37. (2.8)
For parsimony and easy interpretation of coefficients, we include only lagged St−1 from one
year ago.9 The predictability implied by the estimates in (2.8) is almost entirely driven by
the lagged slope, and significantly higher than the one attained with the survey forecasts
in (2.6). The positive sign of α2 means that high past slope (steep yield curve) is a signal
that FFR will increase in the future, which is consistent with the slow mean-reversion of the
short rate at the business cycle frequency.
To verify whether agents perceived the dynamics of the short rate in real time in the same
way that an econometrician can observe it ex-post, we test if their expectations subsume
information in the lagged slope:
∆FFRt,t+1 = α3+ α4︸︷︷︸
0.27 [1.16]
[Est (FFRt+1)− FFRt] + α5︸︷︷︸
0.66 [5.08]
St−1+ εt+1, R¯
2 = 0.37. (2.9)
We note that in the presence of St−1 the coefficient on the expected path (the first term
in (2.9)) drops to 0.27 from 1.04 reported in equation (2.6). This indicates that the two
regressors in (2.9) contain common information. However, while under the FIRE α5 should
not be statistically different from zero, the estimates in (2.9) strongly reject this null. This
has the important implication that forecast errors are ex-post predictable:
FEFFRt,t+1 = δ0 + δ2︸︷︷︸
0.44 [3.62]
St−1 + εt+1, R¯
2 = 0.15. (2.10)
In Table II, we report analogous results for different forecast horizons. Private sector forecasts
are quite accurate at short horizons but deteriorate rapidly as the horizon increases. This
9While allowing more lags improves model specification in terms of BIC and AIC, the improvement is
marginal relative to the specification with just one lag and adding multiple lags does not significantly alter
our conclusions.
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feature is visible in panel B of Table II, where the economic and statistical significance of
St−1 for predicting forecast errors increases with the horizon.
III.C. Measuring expectations frictions
The predictability of forecast errors raises the question about economic variables that con-
tribute to the wedge between what agents see ex-ante and what an econometrician finds
ex-post. The federal funds rate varies either because of inflation or because the real FFR
is not constant through time. To the extent that inflation expectations follow a highly
persistent process with a low volatility of shocks (e.g. Neely and Rapach, 2008; Faust and
Wright, 2011), by taking changes in the FFR we net out the effect of inflation. In this
section, we document that there is a persistent discrepancy between an ex-ante real FFR
measured using survey data and ex-ante real rate constructed under the assumption of FIRE.
We introduce a measure of expectations frictions that focuses on this aspect of short rate
dynamics.
Following the literature (e.g. Laubach and Williams, 2003; Clark and Kozicki, 2004), we
define the real federal funds rate, rt, as:
rt = FFRt − πt, (2.11)
where πt is the annual inflation, πt = log (Pt/Pt−1) and Pt is the level of CPI. We are
interested in (2.11) in an ex-ante form:
ret = Et(FFRt+1)− Et(πt+1). (2.12)
The literature has proposed different ways of measuring the ex-ante real rate. The most
common approach that relies on the FIRE assumption is to obtain the ex-post real rate
as rt+1 = y
(1)
t − πt+1, where y(1)t is the one-period nominal yield, and project it on a set
of time-t instruments (Fama, 1975; Mishkin, 1981; Yogo, 2004).10 By taking the nominal
yield as given, this approach focusses on approximating the unobserved expected inflation
component and abstracts from how expectations about the real economy are formed. Since
we are interested in the latter aspect, we instrument not only for πt+1 but also for FFRt+1.
10 Usually, the set of instruments contains πt, FFRt, y
(1)
t and St, but any time-t variable could be a valid
instrument.
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First, we project rt+1 on the following instruments: the year-on-year CPI inflation πt, FFRt,
a one-year nominal yield y
(1)
t , an annual change in the rate of unemployment ∆UNEt, and
the term spread St.
11 Note that none of the variables is revised or contains forward-looking
information. The fitted value from this projection is the FIRE version of the ex-ante real
FFR:
rˆe,FIREt = Et
[
rt+1| πt, y(1)t , FFRt,∆UNEt, St, St−1
]
. (2.13)
As a second approach, we construct the ex-ante real FFR directly from surveys of professional
forecasters:
re,survt = E
s
t (FFRt+1)− Est (πt+1), (2.14)
where as before Est (·) denotes the survey-based expectation. We define a measure of
expectations frictions as a difference between rˆe,FIREt and r
e,surv
t , which we call the real
rate wedge and denote as MP⊥t :
MP⊥t = rˆ
e,FIRE
t − re,survt . (2.15)
If investors form their expectations in accordance with FIRE, both measures of the ex-ante
real rate should coincide, or differ just by a noise component. The empirical properties of
MP⊥t turn out to differ in significant ways from this benchmark.
To construct (2.14), we use inflation and FFR surveys described in Section III.A. This allows
us to obtain MP⊥t at a monthly frequency for the sample period 1984:06–2010:12. Panel
a of Figure 2.2 superimposes the two real rate estimates, rˆe,FIREt and r
e,surv
t . Panel b plots
their difference (2.15).
MP⊥t has several interesting features. First, the wedge becomes consistently negative during
the NBER-dated recessions. During recessions investors expect a higher real rate compared
to that implied by the FIRE. The magnitude of the deviation is sizable reaching around -200
basis points. Second, MP⊥t explains a nontrivial part of the variation in ex-post forecast
errors about the FFR:
11Our results are robust to the selection of instruments. Important for our results is to include lagged
information, either in the form of lagged term spread or changes in unemployment.
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FEFFRt,t+1 = δ0 + δ1︸︷︷︸
0.96 [6.03]
MP⊥t + εt+1, R¯
2 = 0.39. (2.16)
This supports the idea that the wedge captures information that may be omitted from the
time-t information set of the forecasters. Third, and in a similar way, MP⊥t is weakly
related to the time-t yield curve. Table III reports a projection of MP⊥t on the first five
yield principal components (PCs). Neither of the first three PCs, which summarize vast part
of the yield curve, is statistically significant. The only significant regressor is PC5, albeit we
find this result not to be stable across different data sets of zero coupon yields and across
sample periods. Together, five PCs account for 19% of the variance in the real rate wedge.
One may wonder whether the weak link between yields and MP⊥t is an artifact of survey
data which may not reflect true expectations of bond market participants. We find, however,
that the average survey expectation of the FFR over the next four quarters comoves very
closely with the contemporaneous one-year yield, explaining 99% of y
(1)
t in levels and 94%
in annual changes. We handle the question of survey reliability in Section V in more detail
(see also Appendix X.B).
MP⊥t can be interpreted as an indication that the monetary policy is able to generate
persistent surprises relative to the expectations of the public. Therefore, it is useful to
compare its dynamics with standard measures of monetary policy shocks. One widely applied
measure based on the fed fund futures has been suggested by Kuttner (2001), and further
supported by Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) as more robust to the presence of risk premia
compared to other alternatives. Kuttner (2001) obtains monetary policy shocks from one-
day changes in the fed fund futures around the FOMC announcements. The data is available
on his webpage for the period 1989:06–2008:06, which we extend through 2010:12 using the
same methodology. Panel a of Figure 2.3 plots the daily series of monetary policy shocks.
An interesting observation is that monetary policy shocks appear in clusters. Specifically,
initially negative surprises are followed by more negative surprises resulting in persistent
dynamics. In panel b of Figure 2.3, we superimpose MP⊥t with the time series of cumulative
Kuttner’s surprises defined as the moving sum of the daily shocks accumulated over eight
consecutive FOMC meetings (an approximate number of meetings per year), thus matching
the annual horizon of MP⊥t . The cumulative surprises confirm the persistent nature of
monetary policy shocks, and also point to a large degree of their comovement with MP⊥t
with correlation of 57%. The largest discrepancies between the two series occur in the early
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part of the sample. Indeed, before 1994 the Fed was not explicitly announcing changes
to its target, which could complicate the identification of monetary policy shocks in that
period (Kuttner, 2003). Overall, however, these results suggest that MP⊥t is related to the
persistent component of monetary policy surprises which is not contained in today’s market
expectations.
IV. Bond excess returns and ex-post forecast errors
This section studies whether expectations frictions could affect the measurement and inter-
pretation of bond risk premia. While a common approach to measuring premia is through
predictive regressions of realized returns on a set of conditioning variables, our previous
results suggest that part of variation identified in this way may come from the ex-post
predictability of forecast errors. This distinction is important as the two channels are
economically different. In standard asset pricing models, risk premia reflect the compensation
expected and required by investors for the covariance risk of Treasury returns with their
marginal utility. Expectations frictions, in turn, are manifest in the ex-post predictability of
ex-ante unexpected returns after the risk premium has been corrected for.
In a first step, we notice that the real rate wedge,MP⊥t , has predictive power for the realized
excess bond returns. In a second step, we further decompose the realized return into an
expected and unexpected part, and study their properties. To summarize the outcome, up
to half of the predictable variation in realized bond returns stems from a component that is
ex-ante unexpected. The effect, however, is not uniform across maturities: it is strongest at
the short end of the yield curve, and subsides as the maturity increases.
IV.A. Predictive regressions of bond excess returns
We estimate standard predictive regressions of bond excess returns across maturities:
rx
(n)
t,t+1 = δ0 + δ1RPt + δ2MP
⊥
t + ε
(n)
t,t+1, (2.17)
where rx
(n)
t,t+1 is the annual holding period excess return on a Treasury bond with n years
to maturity, and RPt is an empirical measure of bond risk premia, i.e. of the expected
component of returns. We use two alternative measures of RPt from the earlier literature:
the linear combination of forward rates proposed by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), CPt,
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and the cycles factor ĉf t from Cieslak and Povala (2011). The CPt is a commonly used
in-sample benchmark for the time-varying bond risk premium. The ĉf t can be constructed
in quasi real-time by estimating a small number of parameters, it has a stable out-of-sample
properties, and as we document below, it does not predict ex-post forecast errors.12
Table IV summarizes the results of return forecasting regressions for bonds with maturities
of two, three, five, ten and twenty years.13 Due to overlapping data, we report t-statistics
based on Hodrick’s reverse regression (rows “t(H)”) as well as the Newey-West t-statistics
(rows “t(NW)”). Panel A, B1 and C1 report univariate regressions using MP⊥t , and the
two risk premium variables, respectively. The main observation is that MP⊥t is a significant
predictor of realized excess returns (panel A), and that predictive power comes mainly from
its component that is orthogonal to the contemporaneous yield curve (last row of panel A).
The predictive power of MP⊥t is the most significant, both economically and statistically,
at short maturities. In contrast, for both risk premium proxies (panels B1 and C1), the
significance of coefficients increases with the maturity, and the explained fraction of returns
at the short end of the yield curve is about half of that at the long end. Panels B2 and C2
report the estimates of equation (2.17). The negative sign of the δ2 coefficient is consistent
with the interpretation that lower MP⊥t anticipates higher bond returns and lower yields in
the future. In the presence of MP⊥t , the significance of either ĉf t or CPt remains nearly
unchanged, indicating that the real rate wedge captures a new source of predictability.
One may be concerned about statistical biases that arise with long-horizon returns, overlap-
ping data, and artificially splined zero-coupon yield curves that we use above. Therefore,
in Table V we repeat the predictive exercise with monthly excess returns on true bond
portfolios from CRSP. The estimates confirm our above conclusions. Specifically, MP⊥t
has a negative and highly significant loading, and it dominates the other two predictors in
forecasting returns of portfolios with short maturities.
These results suggest that realized bonds returns move around on two factors which represent
largely independent sources of their predictability. Indeed, we notice that one can construct
two orthogonal factors (rxLt+1, rx
S⊥L
t+1 ) that span almost the entire variation of realized returns
12 Cieslak and Povala (2011) decompose the yield curve into long-horizon inflation expectations and
maturity-related interest rate cycles. Then, the term structure of cycles is used to separate the risk premium
variation from the business cycle variation in short rate expectations.
13We obtain zero coupon yields from the constant maturity Treasury (CMT) rates provided by the Fed
Board.
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across different maturities. The first factor rxLt+1 is simply the return on the long term
bond (20-year maturity), while the second factor rxS⊥Lt+1 represents part of the return on
the short-term bond (two-year maturity) that is orthogonal to rxLt+1. Using this two-factor
decomposition, we find that rxS⊥Lt+1 is strongly predictable by our measure of expectations
frictions, but is unrelated to RPt proxies. For rx
L
t+1 the reverse holds true. These regressions
are not reported in any table for brevity.
IV.B. Decomposing realized bond returns
To explicitly decompose bond returns into an expected and ex-ante unexpected component,
we rely on survey forecasts of interest rates from the BCFF survey available from December
1987 through December 2010. The survey contains private sector’s predictions of interest
rates at different maturities and for horizons of one through four quarters ahead. The panel
of participants is the same as for the FFR survey forecasts.
Interest rate forecasts are useful because they allow us to separate in a model-free way an
expected part (risk premium) and an unexpected part (forecast error) of realized returns.
We focus on the two-year bond return for two reasons. First, for the two-year bond the
BCFF data allow us to construct a direct (without approximations) survey-based expected
excess return for a one-year holding period. Second, this maturity captures the segment of
the yield curve for which we expect the effect of expectations frictions to be most relevant.
Using survey forecasts of the one-year yield one year ahead, we obtain a decomposition of
the realized excess return into an expected and unexpected component as:
rx
(2)
t,t+1 =
[
f
(2)
t − Est (y(1)t+1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk premium
Est (rx
(2)
t,t+1)
−
[
y
(1)
t+1 − Est (y(1)t+1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexpected return
rx
(2)
t,t+1 − E
s
t (rx
(2)
t,t+1)
. (2.18)
In equation (2.18), the unexpected return is equivalent to agents’ forecast error about the evo-
lution of the one-year rate at the one-year horizon (with a minus sign), −
[
y
(1)
t+1 − Est (y(1)t+1)
]
=
rx
(2)
t,t+1 − Et(rx(2)t,t+1). This variable, in turn, is strongly correlated with the FFR forecast
errors, corr
(
FEFFRt,t+1 ,
[
rx
(2)
t,t+1 − Et(rx(2)t,t+1)
])
= −0.93.
In Table VI, panel A, we regress each of the two elements on the RHS of (2.18) on MP⊥t
and other time-t predictors. For comparison, we perform a similar exercise using FEFFRt,t+1 as
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the dependent variable, on a sample starting in 1987. The main conclusion is that MP⊥t
predicts a significant fraction of unexpected returns and of the FFR forecast errors, but has
no explanatory power for the expected return component. These regressions are in column
(1) of each subpanel of Table VI. Columns (2)–(4) run regressions allowing separate loadings
on rˆe,FIREt and r
e,surv
t . While alone each component contributes little to predicting the
unexpected return, jointly both become highly significant. In particular, the free coefficient
loadings are very close to the 1,-1 restriction that we impose when constructing MP⊥t in
(2.15). Finally, column (6) reports that while ĉf t has a strong correlation with survey-based
expected return on the two-year bond, it shows no predictability of the unexpected return
and of FEFFRt,t+1 supporting its interpretation as a expected return.
It is useful to link these results to the recent literature that has emphasized the role of hidden
or unspanned factors in driving bond risk premia, i.e. factors that predict returns but are
weakly related to contemporaneous yields. While several macro variables have been shown
to have this feature, especially those related to the real activity, the economic underpinnings
of such factors are still debated. The real rate wedge lends itself for an interpretation as
the unspanned monetary policy factor, but rather than to the usual notion of risk premia,
it points to an existence of expectations rigidities. When we orthogonalize MP⊥t with
respect to the information in the yield curve, by projecting it on five contemporaneous
PCs, the resulting factor is 90% correlated with the original one. Its explanatory power for
the forecast error, FEFFRt,t+1 increases marginally (by 3 percentage points), in line with the
intuition that forecast error predictability should come from variables that are not spanned
by the contemporaneous yield curve.
It is worth establishing a link betweenMP⊥t and macro variables that have been documented
to forecast returns. Beginning with Cooper and Priestley (2009) and Ludvigson and Ng
(2009), many authors find that real activity variables help predict excess bond returns beyond
the predictability attained with yields or forward rates. This literature also recognizes that
real variables are only weakly spanned by the cross section of yields.14 How do our findings
relate to this result? We address this question in panel B of Table VI, by regressing each of
the elements on the RHS of (2.18) on two measures of real activity: Chicago Fed National
Activity Index (CFNAI) and the annual change in unemployment (∆UNEt), respectively.
14The common approach to show the lack of spanning is to project a macro variable on yields with different
maturities. For real activity measures, the R2 from this regressions is typically low, suggesting that the cross
section of yields does not span the information that a given variable contains.
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CFNAI is essentially indistinguishable from the real activity factor constructed in Ludvigson
and Ng (2009), and is a version of the Stock and Watson (1999) common real factor. The
main observation is that while neither of the real variables has explanatory power for the risk
premium part, both are strongly significant predictors of unexpected returns and monetary
policy forecast errors. The estimates of bivariate regressions using real activity proxies
jointly with MP⊥t support a weak relationship of those variables with expected returns, but
a strong relationship with the forecast errors and unexpected returns. It is unclear whether
real macro variables contain new information relative to MP⊥t . While it is possible that our
measure of information frictions is imperfect, we note that the coefficient loadings on the
macro variables interact with MP⊥t . In Figure 2.4 we superimpose MP
⊥
t with ∆UNEt and
CFNAIt, showing that there is comovement between the series (correlation of -0.35 and 0.36,
respectively), and the troughs in MP⊥t precede those in real activity.
V. Additional evidence on the quality of surveys
In this section, we summarize evidence from additional data sources that provide different
angles of assessing the expectations formation process in the yield curve. First, we ask how
easy it is to outperform survey forecasts of the federal funds rate with statistical models in
real time. Second, we compare surveys with market-based forecast of the FFR from the fed
fund futures. Third, we analyze whether internal FFR forecasts of the staff at the Federal
Reserve Board are subject to expectations frictions similar to those of the private sector.
Fourth, we link the FFR forecast errors that agents make when forecasting macro variables,
i.e. unemployment and inflation. Fifth, we perform statistical tests for the presence of
information rigidities in the FFR forecasts consistent with sticky and noisy information
models. Finally, we discuss evidence from money market flows.
V.A. Do statistical models outperform surveys in real time?
This section compares forecast accuracy of surveys with several statistical models of the
short rate estimated in real time. The main results are in panel A of Table VII. Given ample
evidence that simple methods of forecasting interest rates often work best in real time (e.g.
Duffee, 2009; Wright, 2011), we report naive forecasts assuming the FFR to follow a random
walk (row 2), and two univariate specifications: an AR(2) (row 3) and an AR(p) allowing
up to 16 quarterly lags which are selected dynamically with the BIC from all possible lag
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combinations (row 4). We additionally consider three multivariate specifications (rows 5
through 7): a recursive VAR(2) estimates obtained with OLS (row 5), and two Bayesian
VARs: a constant parameters VAR(2) with a Minnesota prior (row 6) and a time-varying
homoscedastic VAR(2) with time varying parameters in the spirit of Primiceri (2005) (row
7). All VARs are second order and include three variables: CPI inflation, unemployment
and the FFR. All models are estimated recursively on an expanding window with a burn-in
period of 73 quarters, with the out-of-sample forecasts constructed for the period of 1983:Q1
through 2010:Q4. The out-of-sample period corresponds to the period for which the relevant
survey data are available.
Across all forecast horizons, surveys provide the lowest RMSE by a wide margin (row 1),
followed by the autoregressive model with a fixed number of lags (AR(2)), and by the random
walk. For instance, compared to the forecast error from the AR(2), the relative error made
by survey forecasters ranges from 63% at a one-quarter horizon to 92% at four quarters.
Importantly, also more sophisticated methods, including time-varying Bayesian VARs, fail
to match the precision of the FFR survey forecasts in real time. These results for the FFR
resonate well with the finding that, at least in the recent data, surveys tend to outperform
statistical forecasting methods, as documented for inflation forecasts by Ang, Bekaert, and
Wei (2007b) using post-1985 out-of-sample period.15
V.B. Market-based forecasts
In panel B of Table VII, we compare forecast errors made by the median survey panelist to the
ones implied by the fed fund futures. Historical futures data are available from Bloomberg
starting from 1988:12 for contract horizons up to six months. We match end-of-month futures
data with the monthly survey forecasts.16 Clearly, futures-based forecasts of the FFR differ
15 While surveys forecasts are hard to beat with statistical models at the short maturity range, it is
possible to outperform them in real time at longer maturities (two years and above). This is consistent
with the evidence that statistical models estimated in real time predict excess returns on bonds with long
maturities better than surveys. For instance, at a forecast horizon of one-quarter a dynamic affine term
structure model with three factor generates lower RMSEs than surveys at maturities of two years and above
(the outperformance is marginal for the two-year bond, and increases with the maturity). However, at the
forecast horizon of four-quarters ahead, surveys produce uniformly lower forecast errors for all maturities,
and their outperformance is most visible at the short end of the yield curve. We thank our discussant Ken
Singleton for making this point.
16Futures data have been used in earlier studies by Kuttner (2001), Piazzesi and Swanson (2008),
Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), among others. The comparison of survey and futures forecasts is
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from the physical forecasts by the presence of a risk premium. Using surveys, we obtain an
estimate of the futures risk premium that is on average four basis points for the six-month
contract with a standard deviation of 16 basis points. Given the small magnitude of the
risk premium, the forecast errors implied from the futures (i.e. the negative of the realized
futures returns) are highly correlated with these from surveys, with correlation coefficient of
0.89 at a three-month horizon and 0.93 at a six-month horizon. The futures-based RMSEs
for the three- and six-month ahead forecasts are marginally lower relative to the surveys,
by three and two basis points respectively, but for the six-month horizon we fail to find a
statistically significant difference between these two sources of FFR predictions.
One interpretation is that the median survey response represents quite well market-wide
expectations of the short rate. Another interpretation is that survey respondents simply
anchor their forecasts at the current market rates, and thus report risk-adjusted rather than
physical expectations.17 This latter hypothesis is unlikely to hold true for several reasons.
First, the evidence above tells us that in real time it is hard to beat survey forecasts with
statistical models of the physical short rate dynamics. Therefore, the risk premium that
forecasters potentially include when forming their expectations, if any, should not be a
significant confounding factor. Second, we obtain very similar estimates of risk premia in
short-term interest rates to those in the fed fund futures when using expectations of different
survey respondents (Survey of Professional Forecasters, SPF) and for other interest rates (3-
month T-bill). These estimates confirm that risk premia at the short end of the yield curve
are small relative to the overall variation in short-term rates, and are volatile around zero.
Contrary to the realized returns, they also systematically decline before and at the beginning
of recessions, consistent with the role of short maturity instruments in liquidity and safety
provision.
necessarily imperfect because futures are settled based on the average FFR that prevails during the contract
month, while the forecasters predict average quarterly FFR rates. To make the setup comparable, we use
monthly data, and calculate the survey forecast error with respect to the monthly average of the FFR that
prevails at time 3, 6, 9 and 12 months from the time of the forecast. Survey forecast errors when using either
quarterly or monthly FFR averages are very highly correlated, with correlations 0.94, 0.98, 0.99 and 0.99 for
one through four quarters ahead, respectively.
17Private conversations with some of the prominent survey participants suggest that forecasters understand
very well the difference between the physical and risk neutral dynamics and do not anchor their forecast to
the latter, but rather use sophisticated models and judgement to form their predictions.
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V.C. Expectations by the Federal Reserve’s staff
Before each FOMC meeting, the staff of the Federal Reserve prepares their own forecasts of
the FFR from the current quarter up to five quarters ahead. The forecasts are published
in Greenbook with a five-year lag and available in the financial assumptions files on the
Philadelphia’s Fed website. The Greenbook has several useful characteristics. First, the staff
at the Fed has extensive access to economic data resources when forming their predictions.
The publication lag together with the Fed’s ability to observe the current expectations of
the market participants, and their possibly better understanding of the policy rule can lead
to information asymmetries between the private sector and the policy makers (Romer and
Romer, 2000). Second, forecasts of the staff are unlikely to be influenced by subjective, worst-
case scenario considerations that characterize the forecasts of the FOMC members (Romer
and Romer, 2008; Ellison and Sargent, 2010). Finally, because the names of individual
members of the staff are not revealed, reputational concerns are a potentially lesser issue
compared with the private sector surveys. In sum, Greenbook forecasts could be viewed as
an upper bound on the short rate predictability that agents are able to attain.18
In Table VIII we provide cross-correlations between four-quarter ahead forecast errors of the
Fed staff and the private sector for the FFR. Despite differences in the characteristics of the
forecasters’ panel and in their access to information, the FFR forecast errors of the staff and
the private sector have a correlation reaching 88%.
In Table IX, we revisit the question whether expectations of the Fed staff are closer to the
FIRE compared with those of the private sector. Specifically, we use their forecasts of the
FFR at the frequency of the FOMC meetings to replicate the regressions reported in Table
II in the available Greenbook sample 1983–2006. The forecasts of the staff are surprisingly
similar to those of the private sector: While the economic and statistical significance of past
information is somewhat lower, the lagged values of the slope St−1 predict forecast errors,
and, in the presence of the Greenbook expectations, continue to be significant predictors
of short rate changes. For instance, at the four quarter horizon, St−1 explains 20% of the
variation in the Greenbook forecast errors, with a coefficient loading of 0.53 (Newey-West
18We abstract here from the fact that the number of staff members preparing the forecasts may be smaller
than the number of participants in the private sector surveys, and therefore the Greenbook forecasts may
not equally benefit from the forecast errors averaging which tend to increase the forecast precision.
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t-statistic of 3.62). This evidence indicates that, even with access to extensive information,
it is inherently difficult to predict the policy rate in real time.
V.D. Comovement between forecast errors of FFR and macro variables
It is known that a Taylor-type monetary policy rule that includes inflation and unemployment
describes the path of the short rate quite well. Therefore, we expect to attribute at least a
part of the FFR forecast errors to the forecast errors that agents make about macro variables
themselves.
Starting from a basic Taylor rule, according to which monetary policy reacts to inflation and
unemployment, we can decompose the monetary policy forecast errors into two components
corresponding to macro variables. To this end, we regress FEFFRt,t+h at a given horizon on the
corresponding inflation and unemployment forecast errors, FECPIt,t+h and FE
UNE
t,t+h :
FEFFRt,t+h = γ0 + γ1FE
UNE
t,t+h + γ2FE
CPI
t,t+h + εt,t+h. (2.19)
Private sector expectations of macro variables are obtained from the quarterly Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF), which provides a term structure of forecasts at horizons
corresponding to those for the FFR. Table VIII reports the cross correlations of the variables
involved in (2.19) for the Fed staff and private forecasts. The important observation is that
while the FFR errors are relatively weakly correlated with errors on inflation, they comove
strongly (and negatively) with those on unemployment.
To establish a more formal link, equation (2.19) cannot be estimated with OLS because
forecast errors on macro variables are likely to be correlated with the innovations to errors on
the FFR. Therefore, we estimate (2.19) with instrumental variables, using contemporaneous
oil shock and lagged values of the CFNAI as instruments.19
Table X summarizes the IV regressions for private sector forecasts at horizons three and
four quarters ahead. We consider two sample periods: the full sample (1983–2010) and the
sample ending in 2006 to make sure that the results do not depend on the spike in the
19Following Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011a), we define the oil shock as the residual from an AR(2)
model estimated on the four quarter changes in the oil price. The data is obtained from the FRED database.
This variable is a valid instrument since it is uncorrelated with the lagged information and orthogonal to
shocks to the monetary policy forecast errors.
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unemployment during the recent crisis. The key finding is that monetary policy forecast
errors comove strongly with those on unemployment and much less with those on the CPI
inflation. FECPIt,t+h is only marginally significant in the pre-crisis sample and is a small
contributor to the overall variation in FEFFRt,t+h, while FE
UNE
t,t+h is significant at the 1% level
across both samples and forecast horizons. The R¯2 from the regressions indicate that about
40% of the sample variation in the monetary policy forecast errors can be related to macro
sources. The results also suggest a causal relationship: Private sector expectation errors
about monetary policy arise, at least partially, from their errors in forecasting the path of
unemployment, and real activity more generally.20
V.E. Testing information frictions
In this section, we test whether the predictability of ex-post FFR forecast errors we document
above can be justified within stylized rational models with information rigidities. Specifically,
expectations can deviate from the FIRE if rational agents face informational frictions such
as noisy information as in Woodford (2003a) or information stickiness as in Mankiw and
Reis (2002). Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011a) show that in these models, the average
(across agents) ex-post forecast error should be predictable with a positive sign by the
average forecast revision at the corresponding horizon. Accordingly, the baseline test can be
performed by estimating:
FEFFRt,t+h = β0 + β1
[
Est (FFRt+h)− Est−1/4(FFRt+h)
]
+ εt+h, (2.20)
where under information frictions β1 > 0. The results of estimating (2.20) are reported in
column (1) of Table XI for horizons h from one through three quarters.21 The coefficient β1
is positive and statistically significant across h, supporting the hypothesis that forecasters
act under information frictions. Forecast updates alone explain up to 17% of the variation
in ex-post forecast errors, and their statistical significance is strongest at short horizons.
20Interestingly, in unreported results we fail to establish a similarly strong relationship for the forecasts of
the Fed staff. This is intuitive to the extent that the Fed believes monetary policy can influence the path of
macro variables.
21For the FFR we report estimates of (2.20) using the forecast error and forecast revision of the median
forecaster to be consistent with the previous results. The results are essentially identical when using
means. The mean and median forecast errors and updates are more than 0.99 correlated with each other at
corresponding horizons.
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The models of information frictions summarized by (2.20) imply that forecast updates should
account for the entire predictable variation in ex-post forecast errors. In columns (2) and
(3) of Table XI, we augment regression (2.20) with variables that we have found to contain
information about the FFR forecast errors, MP⊥t and lagged slope St−1, respectively:
FEFFRt,t+h = β0 + β1
[
Est (FFRt+h)− Est−1/4(FFRt+h)
]
+ βXXt + εt+h, (2.21)
where βX represents the loading on each of these additional factors. The results of the
extended test suggest that lagged yield curve information has explanatory power beyond
forecast updates, which is increasing with the forecast horizon. For instance, at the three-
quarter horizon, MP⊥t raises R¯
2 of the regression by 29% relative to the baseline case (2.20),
and is highly statistically significant (t-statistic of 6.4). Similar results, albeit somewhat
weaker, pertain to the lagged term structure slope. The lower significance of the slope is
consistent with the fact that it partially reflects risk premium variation which should not
predict forecast errors.
One way to assess whether frictions that we document reflect a more general feature of
the expectations formation is to study their explanatory power for forecast errors about
macro variables other than the FFR. To this end, we estimate equations analogous to
(2.21) for the forecasts of unemployment and CPI inflation. In constructing both we use
unrevised data and the forecasts from the SPF survey. The evidence in favor of expectations
frictions is particulary strong for unemployment, where the amount of predictable variation
in ex-post forecast errors reaches R¯2’s up to 29%. We notice that our measures of frictions
are statistically and economically significant, contributing a large fraction to the explained
variation. Since it is hard to argue that forecast errors about unemployment are confounded
by risk premium effects, this evidence provides additional support to the importance of
expectations frictions present in the yield curve.
V.F. Evidence from money market flows
In addition to survey forecasts, the relative merit of the expectations frictions interpretation
can be further assessed through the lens of investors’ actions. Since our results pertain to the
way people form expectations about the short rate, we should be able to trace the potential
effect of frictions to positions investors take in short-term interest rate instruments, such
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as money market funds. We obtain monthly values of net assets in the US money market
funds from the H.6 statistical release of the Fed Board. We define a proxy of annual money
market flows as the year-over-year log change in the funds held in the money market funds,
and denote this variable as Flowst−1,t. We distinguish between retail and institutional funds,
each representing 24% and 68% of the total money market fund assets, respectively, because
these two components feature somewhat different flow patterns that are interesting in our
context.22
If investors were fully forward looking and able to exploit the predictable variation in the
short rate in real time, we would expect their money market allocations to increase in
anticipation of a higher short rate (tightening) and decrease otherwise (easing). To the
extent that a higher MP⊥t is a signal that the short rate will increase in the near future, we
should observe its positive correlation with the flows. Figure 2.5 suggests that the opposite
is in fact true in the data: the flows have a highly negative contemporaneous correlation
withMP⊥t . One way to explain the sign is that money market flows simply reflect the flight-
to-safety episodes that coincide with monetary policy easings. Contrary to this intuition,
the relationship between flows and MP⊥t is symmetric rather than one-sided, i.e. it holds
both in easing and tightening episodes. Another possibility, consistent with the expectations
frictions story, is that to a large degree market participants extrapolate from the recent past
and thus do not fully accommodate the mean reversion in the short rate.
In panel A of Table XII we report predictive regressions of the changes in FFR and the FFR
forecast errors, respectively, from t to t+1 on the money market flows in the year ending at
time t. The regression coefficients are negative for both retail and institutional flows, with
a stronger statistical significance in the latter case. Specifically, increased institutional flows
are associated with a subsequent monetary policy that is easier than initially expected (i.e.
the FFR forecast errors observed ex-post are low or negative).
In panel B of Table XII, we provide three sets of regressions. In column (1), we establish
that flows are high when the monetary policy is unexpectedly easy during the same year,
as measured by MP⊥t . For instance, the standardized coefficient loadings of institutional
22As of 2010 year-end, the total net assets in money market funds in the US reached about 2.8tr USD,
making it one of the largest asset classes, according to the 2012 Investment Company Factbook. For these
two classes, respectively, the percentage flows have a mean of 5% and 14%, standard deviation of 13% and
16%, a minimum of -32% and -30%, and a maximum of 29% and 49%. While part of these fluctuations are
simply due to the changes in money market rates, it is likely to be a small fraction of that due to net flows,
given the extent of the overall variation in the net asset values.
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flows on MP⊥t is −0.75 (t-stat = −8.1, R2 = 0.56), meaning that a one standard deviation
decrease in MP⊥t coincides with an increase in institutional money market assets of nearly
12%. A similar relationship, yet slightly weaker, holds true for the retail funds. In column
(2), we augmentMP⊥t with a number of contemporaneous controls for safety and liquidity.
23
In the presence of controls, the economic and statistical relationship between the flows and
MP⊥t remains largely unchanged as visible in the reported coefficients. In column (3), we
predict flows over the subsequent year (from t to t + 1) with the term structure slope St.
The sign of the loading on St in column (3) is negative meaning that the flows into money
markets are high (low) if the slope has been flat (steep) in the recent past. We note that a
high slope is associated with an easy monetary policy. One interpretation is that when the
FFR has been high in the past agents expect high interest rates to continue to prevail in
the future. As such, the direction of money market flows is in line with our evidence about
expectations formation in that expectations do not fully reflect the lagged information that
is present in the physical dynamics of the short rate.
These results are interesting in the context of the findings of Piazzesi and Swanson (2008).
Specifically, Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) show that the realized returns in fed fund futures
are predictable with the net open interest of speculators in eurodollar futures. This suggests
that certain market participants are able to exploit the predictability in the short rate at
the expense of others. While we are able to replicate this result in our sample, i.e. net open
interest of speculators in eurodollar futures predicts ex-post FFR forecast errors, we fail to
establish an analogous link with the net open interest of traders in the fed fund futures
market itself. Open interest in the fed funds futures appears unrelated to the predictable
variation in the errors. Together with the evidence suggesting the presence of frictions for the
cash money market investors, these results may point towards market segmentation, whereby
a particular specialized segment of the derivatives market is able to correctly recognize and
exploit the expectations frictions. While this topic deserves a deeper investigation, we leave
it to our subsequent research.24
23We include the market-wide liquidity of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), the value of funding liquidity
of Fontaine and Garcia (2011), noise illiquidity measure of Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013), and stock market
volatility series VXO. In several other specifications that are unreported in any table we have extended the
set of controls with real activity indicators (CFNAI) and have found essentially unchanged results.
24We note that while less developed and smaller than the Eurodollar, the fed funds futures market has
been expanding rapidly in the last decade reaching 50% of the size of the Eurodollar market in mid-2004 as
measured by the nominal open interest. At the same time, after Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) results were
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VI. Short rate dynamics pre- and post-Fed
The sample for which survey data are available is relatively short and therefore restrictive.
In this section, we explore the predictability of annual short rate changes in the sample
1875–2011 which spans different monetary policy and institutional settings. The goal is to
study how predictable short rate changes are by comparing two perspectives: (i) a time-
series perspective that uses a highly stylized statistical model of short rate dynamics and
(ii) a cross-sectional perspective that extracts predictive information from the cross-section
of yields. Absent time-varying risk premia and/or deviations from the FIRE, the time-series
and cross-sectional predictability should, in general, coincide.25 We find, however, that the
cross-section appears to contain significantly less information about future rates than an
unconstrained time series model. This finding characterizes the data after the founding of
the Fed, but not before.
We start with a deliberately simple empirical model in which short rate changes are linear
in lagged values of the short rate itself:26
it+1 − it = αc +
∑
j∈0,1,2,4
αjit−j + ε
i
t+1, (2.22)
where it denotes the short rate and time is measures in years. A formal lag selection procedure
(reported in Table XV the Appendix) chooses a low number of lags up to four years back.
Accordingly, for simplicity, equation (2.22) includes four lags up to four years.27
We are interested in both the degree of predictability and the stability of this model. To
cover different monetary policy regimes, we consider quarterly data from 1875 through 2011,
divided into five subperiods marked by important institutional changes: (i) pre-Fed (1875–
made public in 2004, we have not observed a weakening of the link between the realized fed fund futures
returns and the open interest in the eurodollar market.
25As we discuss above, this statement does not hold true if there is an exact offsetting between risk premia
and expectations within the yield curve—a special case described by Duffee (2011, 2012b).
26Linear models of the term structure of this type have been studied in the earlier literature (Modigliani
and Sutch, 1966, 1967; Sargent, 1972). Modigliani and Shiller (1973), Mishkin (1980) discuss the conditions
under which this type of models is consistent with rational expectations.
27By selecting a low number of fixed lags, we avoid issues with collinearity. Table XV in the Appendix
re-estimates (2.22) with optimally selected lags using BIC leading to very similar conclusions. Alternatively,
we have also implemented a polynomial distributed lag model and found that the it places a statistically
and economically significant weight on distant lags.
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1913), (ii) post-Fed – pre-Accord (1914–1951), (iii) post-Accord – pre-Volcker (1951–1979),
(iv) post-Volcker (1984–2011), and (v) post-Accord (1951–2011). Our data is obtained from
the Global Financial Database and comprises the long-term government yield, yLTt , and the
three-month rate which we use as a proxy for the short rate, it.
28
Panel A of Table XIII summarizes the results for equation (2.22). There are two main
observations. First, one-year changes in it are highly predictable, except for the special
period of interest rate controls and wars (1914–1951). Second, higher-order lags of the
short rate carry significant information about future rates relative to a restricted model
that excludes lags, increasing the R¯2 by an order of magnitude. This pattern pertains to the
period post-Fed Accord, but is largely absent before. For instance, our simple model explains
up to 40% of short rate changes in the pre- and post-Volcker samples. The importance of
specific lags varies over time.
Switching to the cross-sectional dimension, current yields contain a footprint of real-time
market expectations of short rates going forward. In particular, the term structure slope
arises as a linear combination of expected short rate changes and time-varying risk premia.
The presence of risk premia confounds the direct measurement of short rate expectations
as formed by the market. If, however, the model in (2.22) is a good representation of the
physical short rate dynamics, we can use the following projection to decompose the slope
into the expected short rate change and the risk premium:
St = δc +
∑
j∈0,1,2,4
δjit−j +RP
S
t , (2.23)
where the slope is defined as St = y
LT
t − it and RP St is the regression residual.29
28The short rate is constructed as the three-month commercial paper before 1934 and the three-month
T-bill rate afterwards. T-bills become available in late 1920s and thus do not cover the period before the
Fed. However, using T-bill or commercial paper rate leads to very similar results for the overlapping period,
and therefore should not bias the results. In the pre-Fed period commercial paper was considered to have
government credit risk. Following the literature, we use quarterly data by smoothing monthly series with a
three-quarter moving average because there is evidence that the short rate was highly seasonal prior to the
founding of the Fed in 1914 (e.g. Miron, 1986).
29Note that due to the data availability, our measure of the slope corresponding to one-year change in the
short rate is imperfect. Optimally, one should use the difference between one-year forward rate and the short
rate, which are not observed. In using the slope between the long-term and the three-month yields we make
the implicit assumption that expectations of short rate changes move on a single mean-reverting factor.
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Panel B of Table XIII reports the estimates of (2.23) in different subsamples. The results
reveal that a linear combination of past short rates explains a vast fraction of the slope
variation, between 68% and 96%.
Assuming that projection (2.23) is the correct model for extracting short rate expectations
embedded in the yield curve, we should observe that: (i) the fitted value Sˆt from the
regression predicts future short rate changes and (ii) the fitted residual R̂P
S
t predicts future
excess bond returns but not short rate changes, i.e. all information about future short
rates that the slope contains is subsumed in Sˆt. To verify the latter, panel C of Table XIII
summarizes predictive regressions of one-year excess return on a ten-year bond30 using Sˆt
and R̂P
S
t . Across subsamples, the only significant predictor of excess returns is R̂P
S
t which
suggests that lags of the short rate distinctly absorb the part of slope variation, Sˆt, related to
short rate expectations. Note that in the pre-Fed period marked by the Gold standard, bond
excess returns are not predictable. For comparison, panel C also reports analogous R¯2’s (in
brackets) obtained with the Cochrane-Piazzesi (CP) factor in the available 1952-2011 period
for which the factor can be constructed. The return predictability by R̂P
S
t is on par with
that of the CP factor.
The key insight from decomposing the slope is that, in the period characterized by an active
Fed, the amount of predictable variation in the short rate implied by the cross section is in
the range of 2% to 17% (panel D) and is significantly lower than the predictability that can
be achieved with the time series model (panel A) of up to 40%.
One criticism of the approach above is that by just using the slope we under-represent the
cross-sectional information in yields. Do distant lags of the short rate continue to matter if
we condition on the complete information in today’s yield curve? To answer this question,
we extend the predictive regression (2.22) by including up to six principal components (PCs)
of yields. We consider the longest possible period 1952-2011 for which we can obtain a cross-
section of five zero coupon yields in the Fama-Bliss data. We augment these data with the
three-month T-bill rate to capture the variation at the short end of the curve:
it+1 − it = β0 +
N∑
j=1
βjPC
j
t + δ1it− lag1
4
+ δ2it− lag2
4
+ εPCt+1, (2.24)
30Excess return on a ten-year bond is constructed from total return indices on the ten-year bond and the
three-month Tbill, both obtained from the GFD database.
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with lag1 and lag2 selected optimally using the BIC criterion considering all lag combinations
up to 16 quarters. Panels A and B of Table XIV report the results for N = 3, 6, respectively.
Comparing column (1) and (2), we see that adding lags substantially increases the R¯2. The
null hypothesis of δ1 = δ2 = 0 is rejected at the 1% level (column 3). In both panels and
across different samples, the results indicate that lags of the short rate matter for forecasting
even after conditioning on today’s yield curve.
The key takeaway is that short rate changes appear ex-post more predictable than the cross-
sectional information in yield curve would imply. The slope decomposition suggests that the
result is unlikely to be explained away with time varying risk premia, and that expectations
frictions also play a role. The conclusion seems to coincide with the presence of an active
central bank.
VII. Conclusions
This paper studies how agents form expectations about the short rate and thus about the
future path of monetary policy actions. We show that distant lags of the yield curve forecast
future short rate changes beyond information embedded in today’s cross section of yields.
This empirical fact leads to a broader observation: There exist systematic differences between
the ex-ante real fed funds rate perceived by agents in real time and its counterpart estimated
by an econometrician who works under the assumption of the FIRE.
These findings are potentially important for understanding the information content of the
yield curve as a reflection of risk premia and expectations about the economy. In partic-
ular, by referring to expectations frictions, our results both support and cast light on the
observation in the literature that information not contained in the current yield curve helps
predict future yields and bond returns. Constructing the real rate wedge as a proxy for
such expectations rigidities, we show that they induce predictable dynamics of bond returns
that are distinct from the statistical and survey-based measures of bond risk premia. More
generally, however, our results leave open the issue of the specific channels through which
expectations frictions arise. The answer to this question matters for the interpretation of
unanticipated monetary policy shocks and thus for the analysis of the real effects of monetary
policy. We leave this investigation to our future research.
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VIII. Figures
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Figure 2.1: Short rate expectations
Panel a plots the time series of FFR forecasts from the BCFF survey at the time that the forecasts are
made. The forecasts are for the current quarter up to four quarters ahead. Panel b plots the term structures
of forecasts. For clarity, while the forecasts are given monthly, the plot shows those made in the middle of
each quarter, i.e. Feb, May, Aug and Nov of each year. Panel c displays the time series of forecast errors for
horizons from one through four quarters ahead.
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Figure 2.2: Wedge between the FIRE and survey-based real fed funds rate
Panel a plots the two versions of ex-ante real federal funds rate. The first one, denoted by rˆe,FIREt , is
obtained using instrumental variables. The second, re,survt is constructed from federal funds and inflation
surveys from the BCFF survey. Panel b shows the dynamics of MP⊥t which is obtained as a difference
between rˆe,FIREt and r
e,surv
t .
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Figure 2.3: Monetary policy surprises
Panel a plots monetary policy shocks constructed by Kuttner (2001) and available on his webpage for the
sample period 1989:06–2008:06, which we extend through 2010:12 using the same methodology. Kuttner
obtains his measure of monetary policy surprises from daily changes in the fed fund futures around the days
of target changes by the FOMC. Panel b superimposes MP⊥ with the monetary policy surprises. Kuttner’s
surprises are obtained as a moving sum of the daily surprises over eight consecutive FOMC meetings. Both
the left and right axis are in basis points p.a.
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Figure 2.4: Expectation frictions and real activity
The figure plots the measure of friction in monetary policy expectationsMP⊥t and two real activity variables:
the annual unemployment growth (∆UNEt) and the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAIt).
Unemployment growth is multiplied with -1 so that it has a positive correlation with CFNAIt and MP
⊥
t .
For comparability, all variables are standardized.
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Figure 2.5: Money market flows
The figure superimposes money market flows with the contemporaneous values of MP⊥t . The flows are
defined annual log changes in the assets of the money market funds. Panel a displays institutional flows;
panel b retail flows.
111
IX. Tables
Table I: Private sector forecasts of short rate changes
The table reports regressions of the realized changes in the federal funds rate on the change expected by
forecasters in the BCFF survey.
FFRt+h − FFRt = γ2 + γ2 [Est (FFRt+h)− FFRt] + εFEt+h
The data is monthly. T-statistics are Newey-West adjusted with 12 lags.
h = 1Q h = 2Q h = 3Q h = 4Q
γ2 -0.09 -0.24 -0.44 -0.63
(-1.53) (-1.96) (-2.27) (-2.34)
γ3 0.83 0.94 1.05 1.06
( 4.68) ( 3.01) ( 3.23) ( 3.36)
t-stat (γ2 = 0) (-1.53) (-1.96) (-2.27) (-2.34)
t-stat (γ3 = 1) (-0.95) (-0.20) ( 0.14) ( 0.18)
R¯2 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.18
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Table II: Private sector’s expectations of monetary policy rate
The table predict forecast errors on FFR with the slope of the term structure, St = y
(20) − y(1)t . Panel A
reports the regressions of the FFR changes on the expected change in the short rate and the lagged slope.
Panel B reports analogous regressions for the forecast errors. We estimate the following equation:
∆FFRt,t+h = α3 + α4 [E
s
t (FFRt+h)− FFRt] + α5St−1 + εt+h (2.25)
and analogous for forecast errors (FEFFRt,t+h) as the LHS variable in panel B. Time subscripts and horizons
are expressed as the fraction of the year, i.e. St−1 is lagged by one year. The data is monthly in the period
1983–2010.
h = 1Q h = 2Q h = 3Q h = 4Q
A. Short rate changes ∆FFRt,t+h
const -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(-2.27) (-2.74) (-3.50) (-4.43)
Est (FFRt+h)− FFRt 0.83 0.73 0.52 0.27
( 4.89) ( 2.20) ( 1.56) ( 1.13)
St−1 0.06 0.20 0.41 0.66
( 1.94) ( 2.33) ( 3.22) ( 4.95)
R¯2 0.32 0.29 0.33 0.37
const -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(-3.27) (-3.78) (-4.34) (-4.83)
St−1 0.15 0.34 0.54 0.75
( 3.51) ( 4.19) ( 5.06) ( 5.97)
R¯2 0.12 0.21 0.30 0.37
B. Forecast errors FEFFRt,t+h
const -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-2.23) (-2.90) (-3.35) (-3.75)
St−1 0.04 0.15 0.28 0.44
( 1.52) ( 2.40) ( 2.95) ( 3.55)
R¯2 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15
Table III: Spanning of MP⊥t by the cross-section of yields
This table reports the results from a regression of MP⊥t on five principal components of yields. The sample period is 1984:06
through 2011:12. Standard errors are obtained with Newey-West adjustment with 15 lags.
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 R¯2
β -0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.17 3.54 0.19
t-stat -1.00 1.86 -0.33 0.27 3.16
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Table IV: Forecasting annual excess bond returns
The table present the predictive regressions of realized excess bond returns across maturities. rx
(n)
t,t+1 is
excess return with an annual holding period. The explanatory variables are two empirical measures of bond
risk premium: the cycle factor of Cieslak and Povala (2011) (LHS panels) and CP factor of Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2005) (RHS panels), as well as the proxy for expectations frictions MP⊥t . For ease of comparison,
both left- and right-hand variables are standardized. The data is monthly and covers the period 1984–2010.
T-statistics in parentheses in rows denoted “t(NW)” use Newey-West standard errors adjusted with 15 lags;
t-statistics in brackets in rows denoted “t(H)” are based on Hodrick’s reverse regressions delta method
extended by Wei and Wright (2013).
rx(2) rx(3) rx(5) rx(10) rx(20)
A. rx
(n)
t,t+1 = δ0 + δ1MP
⊥
t + εt,t+1
MP⊥t -0.51 -0.45 -0.34 -0.19 -0.07
t(NW) (-4.48) (-3.88) (-2.87) (-1.57) (-0.59)
t(H) [-2.94] [-2.67] [-2.17] [-1.55] [-0.91]
R¯2 0.25 0.20 0.11 0.03 0.00
rx(2) rx(3) rx(5) rx(10) rx(20)
B1. rx
(n)
t,t+1 = δ0 + δ1ĉf t + εt,t+1
ĉf t 0.49 0.54 0.63 0.72 0.70
t(NW) ( 4.02) ( 4.91) ( 6.27) ( 7.70) ( 6.98)
t(H) [ 2.28] [ 2.70] [ 3.26] [ 3.88] [ 4.10]
R¯2 0.24 0.29 0.39 0.51 0.49
B2. rx
(n)
t,t+1 = δ0 + δ1ĉf t + δ2MP
⊥
t + εt,t+1
ĉf t 0.51 0.56 0.64 0.72 0.71
t(NW) ( 4.93) ( 6.00) ( 7.25) ( 8.09) ( 6.87)
t(H) [ 2.68] [ 3.05] [ 3.51] [ 4.03] [ 4.11]
MP⊥t -0.52 -0.47 -0.37 -0.22 -0.10
t(NW) (-5.41) (-4.53) (-3.33) (-1.89) (-0.80)
t(H) [-3.21] [-2.96] [-2.49] [-1.87] [-1.17]
R¯2 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.56 0.50
rx(2) rx(3) rx(5) rx(10) rx(20)
C1. rx
(n)
t,t+1 = δ0 + δ1CPt + εt,t+1
CPt 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.47 0.51
t(NW) ( 2.21) ( 2.10) ( 2.44) ( 2.76) ( 2.90)
t(H) [ 0.68] [ 1.00] [ 1.47] [ 1.87] [ 2.01]
R¯2 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.26
C2. rx
(n)
t,t+1 = δ0 + δ1CPt + δ2MP
⊥
t + εt,t+1
CPt 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.50 0.53
t(NW) ( 3.79) ( 3.37) ( 3.43) ( 3.29) ( 3.06)
t(H) [ 1.32] [ 1.59] [ 1.97] [ 2.18] [ 2.10]
MP⊥t -0.55 -0.49 -0.39 -0.25 -0.13
t(NW) (-4.92) (-4.20) (-3.16) (-1.90) (-0.98)
t(H) [-3.06] [-2.83] [-2.41] [-1.86] [-1.26]
R¯2 0.42 0.36 0.32 0.28 0.28
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Table V: Forecasting monthly bond portfolio excess bond returns
The table present the predictive regressions of realized excess returns of bond portfolios. For instance,
rx
(<12m)
t,t+1/12 is excess return with a monthly holding period on a portfolio of bonds whose maturities are below
12 months. Returns are in excess of the one-month Tbill rate. All returns and Tbill data is from CRSP.
The explanatory variables are two empirical measures of bond risk premium: the cycle factor of Cieslak
and Povala (2011) (LHS panels) and CP factor of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) (RHS panels), as well
as the proxy for expectations frictions MP⊥t . For ease of comparison, both left- and right-hand variables
are standardized. The data is monthly and covers the period 1984–2010. T-statistics in parentheses use
Newey-West standard errors adjusted with 15 lags.
rx(<12m) rx(<24m) rx(<36m) rx(<60m) rx(<120m)
A. rx
(n)
t,t+1/12
= δ0 + δ1MP⊥t + εt,t+1/12
MP⊥t -0.20 -0.17 -0.14 -0.08 -0.05
(-3.51) (-3.34) (-2.82) (-1.75) (-1.07)
R¯2 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
rx(<12m) rx(<24m) rx(<36m) rx(<60m) rx(<120m)
B1. rx
(n)
t,t+1/12
= δ0 + δ1ĉf t + εt,t+1/12
ĉf t 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24
( 1.78) ( 2.66) ( 3.06) ( 3.75) ( 3.98)
R¯2 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
B2. rx
(n)
t,t+1/12
= δ0 + δ1ĉf t + δ2MP
⊥
t + εt,t+1/12
ĉf t 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.24
( 1.98) ( 2.98) ( 3.42) ( 4.03) ( 4.18)
MP⊥t -0.21 -0.18 -0.15 -0.09 -0.06
(-3.81) (-3.52) (-2.79) (-1.71) (-1.11)
R¯2 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05
rx(<12m) rx(<24m) rx(<36m) rx(<60m) rx(<120m)
C1. rx
(n)
t,t+1/12
= δ0 + δ1CPt + εt,t+1/12
CPt 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.16
( 1.54) ( 2.38) ( 2.40) ( 2.51) ( 2.50)
R¯2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
C2. rx
(n)
t,t+1/12
= δ0 + δ1CPt + δ2MP⊥t + εt,t+1/12
CPt 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.17
( 2.08) ( 3.27) ( 3.29) ( 3.16) ( 2.91)
MP⊥t -0.22 -0.19 -0.16 -0.10 -0.07
(-3.76) (-3.59) (-2.95) (-1.95) (-1.35)
R¯2 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02
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Table VI: Expected returns versus expectations friction
We regress components of the realized return on a two-year bond between time t and t + 1 on time t variables. In panel A, as dependent variables,
we consider the unexpected return rx
(2)
t,t+1 − Est (rx(2)t,t+1) = −(y(1)t+1 − Est (y(1)t+1)), private sector’s forecast error about the federal funds rate four quarters
ahead FEFFRt,t+1 = FFRt+1−Est (FFRt+1), and the expected return component Et(rx(2)t,t+1) = f (2,1)t −Est (y(1)t+1). We explain the variation in the dependent
variables with our measure of information rigidities MP⊥t , and with its components. In panel B, we regress the same dependent variables on two macro
factors related to the real activity: the year-over-year growth in the rate of unemployment and the CFNAI. The data is monthly and covers the period
1987:12–2010:12; the beginning of the sample is dictated by the availability of the one-year yield forecasts in the BCFF survey.
A. Regressions of components of realized returns on MP⊥
Unexpected return, rx
(2)
t,t+1 − E
s
t (rx
(2)
t,t+1) Expected return, E
s
t (rx
(2)
t,t+1) Forecast error, FE
FFR
t,t+1
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MP⊥t -0.63 0.15 0.69
(-5.12) ( 0.90) ( 6.57)
re,FIREt -1.04 -0.28 0.38 0.32 1.17 0.37
(-4.82) (-2.59) ( 1.51) ( 2.84) ( 6.38) ( 3.17)
re,survt 0.95 0.11 -0.08 0.23 -1.00 -0.06
( 4.80) ( 0.77) (-0.30) ( 2.04) (-5.74) (-0.47)
St−1 -0.47 -0.11 0.45
(-3.63) (-0.57) ( 3.57)
ĉf t 0.17 0.48 -0.10
( 1.22) ( 4.33) (-0.78)
R¯2 0.39 0.39 0.08 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.23 0.47 0.49 0.13 0.00 0.20 0.01
B. Regressions of components of realized returns on macro variables
Unexpected return, rx
(2)
t,t+1 − E
s
t (rx
(2)
t,t+1) Expected return, E
s
t (rx
(2)
t,t+1) Forecast error, FE
FFR
t,t+1
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
CFNAIt -0.39 -0.16 0.17 0.13 0.42 0.18
(-2.43) (-2.20) ( 1.49) ( 1.55) ( 2.08) ( 1.92)
∆UNEt 0.42 0.21 -0.05 0.01 -0.42 -0.19
( 2.63) ( 2.25) (-0.47) ( 0.08) (-2.27) (-1.75)
MP⊥t -0.56 -0.55 0.10 0.16 0.62 0.62
(-4.29) (-4.04) ( 0.63) ( 0.92) ( 5.28) ( 5.00)
R¯2 0.15 0.18 0.41 0.43 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.50 0.50
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Table VII: Private sector forecasts of short rate changes
Panel A reports the root mean squared error (RMSE) in percent per annum for the out-of-sample forecasts of
the FFR at horizons from one to four quarters ahead. We consider the following models: (1) the survey based
forecast, (2) random walk, (3) univariate AR(2), (4) univariate AR(p) with lags selected dynamically using
BIC (UDLS), (5) VAR(2) estimated recursively by OLS, (6) Bayesian VAR(2) estimated with the Minnesota
prior (reset at each iteration), (7) time-varying parameters homoscedastic Bayesian VAR(2) (TVP-VAR).
All models are estimated recursively with a burn-in period of 73 quarters. The data is quarterly. The
out-of-sample period is 1983:Q1–2010:Q4, i.e. it coincides with the availability of survey forecasts. Panel B
compares the RMSEs of forecast errors from the survey and from the fed fund futures. The sample starts
in 1988:12, when the fed fund futures data become available. T-statistics test for the difference between the
respective MSEs; the correlation is between the survey and futures-based forecast errors.
h = 1Q h = 2Q h = 3Q h = 4Q
A. RMSE of forecast errors (% p.a.) from different models
(1) FFR survey 0.33 0.75 1.12 1.47
(2) RW 0.54 0.95 1.31 1.63
(3) AR(2) 0.52 0.95 1.29 1.60
(4) UDLS 0.55 0.97 1.30 1.61
(5) VAR(2) OLS 0.55 0.93 1.30 1.64
(6) VAR(2) Bayesian 1.14 1.46 1.75 2.02
(7) TVP VAR(2) 0.56 1.02 1.42 1.79
B. RMSE for surveys and fed fund futures, 1988:12-2010:12
Fed fund futures 0.33 0.70 – –
FFR survey 0.36 0.72 – –
t-stat (diff = 0) 2.49 0.86 – –
correlation 0.89 0.93 – –
Table VIII: Correlations
The table reports unconditional correlations between forecast errors made by the private sector (professional
forecasters) and the Fed staff (Greenbook). Private sector forecasts are from the BCFF survey for the FFR,
and from the SPF survey for CPI inflation and unemployment. All forecasts are for four quarters ahead.
The data is quarterly in the sample 1983:Q1–2006:Q4.
FFR ⋆ UNE ⋆ CPI ⋆ FFR † UNE † CPI †
FFR ⋆ 1.000
UNE ⋆ -0.744 1.000
CPI ⋆ 0.317 -0.080 1.000
FFR † 0.883 -0.703 0.286 1.000
UNE † -0.736 0.905 -0.121 -0.679 1.000
CPI † 0.296 -0.066 0.975 0.299 -0.146 1.000
⋆ denotes private sector (professional forecasters) forecasts; † denotes the Greenbook forecasts.
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Table IX: Fed’s staff monetary policy expectations from Greenbook
Panel A reports the regressions of the FFR changes on lagged expected path of the short rate and lagged
monetary policy cycle. Panel B reports analogous regressions for the forecast errors. We estimate the
following equation:
∆FFRt,t+h = γ0 + γ1
[
EGBt (FFRt+h)− FFRt
]
+ γ2St−1 + εt+h (2.26)
and analogous for forecast errors (FEFFRt,t+h) as the LHS variable. Time subscripts and horizons are expressed
as the fraction of the year, i.e. St−1 is lagged by one year. The data is at the frequency of the FOMC
meetings and spans the period 1983:3–2006:12, having 191 observations in total.
A. Short rate changes ∆FFRt,t+h
h = 1Q h = 2Q h = 3Q h = 4Q
const -0.26 -0.63 -1.02 -1.39
(-3.04) (-3.12) (-3.16) (-3.29)
Est (FFRt+h)− FFRt 1.01 0.89 0.68 0.60
( 8.65) ( 5.62) ( 3.02) ( 2.15)
St−1 0.08 0.22 0.40 0.56
( 2.93) ( 3.39) ( 3.77) ( 4.05)
R¯2 0.37 0.31 0.28 0.30
const -0.31 -0.63 -0.99 -1.36
(-2.50) (-2.68) (-2.88) (-3.15)
St−1 0.14 0.29 0.45 0.62
( 2.91) ( 3.31) ( 3.74) ( 4.13)
R¯2 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
const -0.11 -0.23 -0.30 -0.39
(-1.87) (-1.60) (-1.37) (-1.38)
Est (FFRt+h)− FFRt 1.09 1.02 0.86 0.87
( 7.61) ( 4.94) ( 3.23) ( 2.75)
R¯2 0.34 0.22 0.13 0.10
B. Forecast errors FEFFRt,t+h
const -0.27 -0.64 -1.04 -1.42
(-2.67) (-3.05) (-3.22) (-3.33)
St−1 0.09 0.22 0.38 0.53
( 2.64) ( 3.19) ( 3.48) ( 3.62)
R¯2 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.20
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Table X: IV regressions with macro expectations
The table reports the regressions of FFR forecast errors on the errors about CPI inflation and unemployment.
As instruments, we use the contemporaneous oil shock and past CFNAI lagged by one quarter. Oil shock
is the residual from an AR(2) estimated on the oil price change. For both instruments we report the first
stage estimates. Row labeled “Weak (size, 10%)” displays the outcome of the Stock-Yogo test for the bias
in standard errors. “No” indicates that we reject the null that significance level is smaller than at least 10%
when the desired level is 5%, i.e. we fail to find evidence of biased standard errors due to the presence of
weak instruments. T-statistics (in parentheses) use Newey-West adjustment.
Sample: 1983:Q1–2010:Q4 Sample: 1983:Q1–2006:Q4
Forecast errors, FEFFRt,t+h
h = 3Q h = 4Q h = 3Q h = 4Q
LS IV LS IV LS IV LS IV
FECPIt,t+h 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.15
1.36 -0.02 2.33 0.75 3.17 2.07 3.42 1.84
FEUNEt,t+h -0.96 -0.94 -1.01 -0.96 -1.52 -1.81 -1.62 -1.99
-3.55 -2.43 -3.76 -2.54 -8.39 -6.77 -9.73 -5.90
R¯2 0.39 0.37 0.47 0.45 0.54 0.52 0.61 0.58
Weak (size, 10%) — No — No — No — No
First stage
FECPIt,t+h FE
UNE
t,t+h FE
CPI
t,t+h FE
UNE
t,t+h
h = 3Q h = 4Q h = 3Q h = 4Q h = 3Q h = 4Q h = 3Q h = 4Q
Oil shockt+h 0.12 0.12 — — 0.17 0.17 — —
5.50 5.49 — — 6.57 6.69 — —
CFNAIt — — -0.55 -0.65 — — -0.39 -0.46
— — -4.50 -4.25 — — -5.10 -4.31
R¯2 0.29 0.27 0.37 0.34 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21
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Table XI: Tests of information frictions
Panel A, column (1) denoted “Baseline”, reports estimates of equation (2.20). Columns (2)–(3) augment
this regression respectively with: MP⊥t in column (2), and St−1 in column (3). Panels B and C perform
the same test for forecast errors about unemployment and CPI inflation, respectively, i.e. forecast errors for
each macro variable are regressed on the corresponding forecast update. FFR forecasts are from the BCFF
survey; unemployment and CPI forecasts are from the SPF survey. The RHS variables are standardized. The
data is quarterly and spans the sample period 1984:Q3–2010:Q4. T-statistics use Newey-West adjustment
with 6 quarterly lags.
A. FFR B. Unemployment C. CPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Coeff. Baseline MP⊥t St−1 Baseline MP
⊥
t St−1 Baseline MP
⊥
t−1 St−1
Horizon, h = 1Q
β0 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(-1.03) (-2.85) (-2.57) (-1.03) (-1.12) (-1.14) (-0.69) (-0.69) (-0.70)
β1 0.28 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.22
( 6.54) ( 2.57) ( 4.77) ( 2.55) ( 1.96) ( 2.53) ( 3.01) ( 2.88) ( 2.99)
βX 0.16 0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.03
( 3.99) ( 1.88) (-1.89) (-2.03) ( 0.63) ( 0.26)
R¯2 0.14 0.26 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.02
Horizon, h = 2Q
β0 -0.14 -0.24 -0.24 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
(-1.39) (-3.45) (-2.86) (-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.27) (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.06)
β1 0.46 0.13 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.22 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
( 4.92) ( 1.75) ( 3.67) ( 3.22) ( 2.24) ( 3.09) (-0.09) (-0.17) (-0.06)
βX 0.38 0.18 -0.13 -0.13 0.08 0.06
( 5.24) ( 2.56) (-4.29) (-2.26) ( 0.76) ( 0.43)
R¯2 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
Horizon, h = 3Q
β0 -0.26 -0.41 -0.41 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22
(-1.71) (-4.06) (-3.17) ( 0.22) ( 0.25) ( 0.24) (-1.66) (-1.67) (-1.68)
β1 0.75 0.21 0.39 0.30 0.24 0.25 0.01 -0.01 0.02
( 5.17) ( 2.74) ( 4.10) ( 3.21) ( 1.96) ( 2.75) ( 0.15) (-0.11) ( 0.19)
βX 0.62 0.32 -0.25 -0.24 0.13 0.13
( 6.35) ( 3.19) (-5.79) (-2.52) ( 1.04) ( 1.16)
R¯2 0.17 0.46 0.25 0.17 0.29 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table XII: Evidence from money market flows
Panel A runs predictive regressions of changes in the FFR and forecast errors on the annual money market
flows, for retail and institutional money market funds, respectively. Panel B explains the annual change in
the flows with two variables: contemporaneous measure of expectations friction MP⊥t+1, and slope St. In
column (2) we report the results using MP⊥ and the control variables for the flight to quality and liquidity:
Pastor-Stambaugh market-wide liquidity, Hu-Pan-Wang noise illiquidity, Fontaine-Garcia value of funding
liquidity, and stock market volatility VXO. Annual flows are log year-over-year changes in the money market
funds. All variables are standardized. T-statistics are Newey-West adjusted with 15 lags. The sample is
monthly in the period 1984:6-2010:12, except for the regression in panel B marked with ∗ where we use the
period 1987:01–2010:12, due to availability of some of the controls.
A. Predicting short rate with flows: Yt,t+1 = α+ βFlowt−1,t + εt,t+1
Retail flows Institutional flows
Dependent Yt,t+1: ∆FFRt,t+1 FEFFRt,t+1 ∆FFRt,t+1 FE
FFR
t,t+1
(1) (2) (1) (2)
β -0.38 -0.17 -0.52 -0.44
(-3.17) (-1.48) (-4.35) (-4.25)
R¯2 0.14 0.03 0.27 0.19
B. Predicting flows: Flowt,t+1 = α+ βXt + εt,t+1
Retail flows Institutional flows
Regressor Xt: MP⊥t+1 MP
⊥
t+1 St MP
⊥
t+1 MP
⊥
t+1 St
w/controls∗ w/controls∗
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
β -0.51 -0.77 -0.77 -0.75 -0.80 -0.72
(-3.79) (-5.97) (-6.62) (-8.11) (-6.72) (-6.58)
R¯2 0.25 0.52 0.59 0.56 0.62 0.52
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Table XIII: Statistical model of the short rate with lags, 1875-2011
Panel A reports the results from the predictive regression of one-year change in the short rate. Four lags
of the short rate are used as predictors. Maximum lag is 16 quarters. Panel B of the table reports the
decomposition of the slope given by (2.23). Panel C reports the estimation results for a predictive regression
using the fitted value (short rate expectations) and the residual (risk premia) from (2.23). Excess return
on a ten-year bond is constructed from total return indices on ten-year bond and three-month Tbill, both
obtained from the GFD database. Numbers in brackets [·] in the R¯2 column report the R¯2’s obtained with
the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor. Panel D reports the results for predicting the short rate changes using Sˆt. Data
are quarterly and are from the Global Financial Database. The slope is constructed as a difference between
ten-year par coupon yield on Treasuries and the three-month yield. The three-month yield is spliced from
the three-month commercial paper (1875-1933) and three-month Treasury bill (1934-2011). Newey-West
adjusted (6 lags) t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
A. ∆it,t+1 = αc +
∑
j∈0,1,2,4 αjit−j + ε
i
t+1
Sample α0 α1 α2 α4 R¯2 R¯2 no lags
1875:3-1913:4 -0.81 0.02 0.10 -0.05 0.40 0.40
(-5.21) ( 0.14) ( 1.10) (-1.54)
1914:1-1951:2 -0.22 0.00 0.15 -0.03 0.07 0.05
(-1.81) ( 0.02) ( 1.27) (-0.20)
1951:3-1979:2 -0.52 -0.37 0.34 0.51 0.39 0.04
(-3.47) (-2.78) ( 3.26) ( 3.71)
1984:1-2011:4 0.02 -0.47 -0.01 0.23 0.41 0.11
( 0.27) (-3.63) (-0.10) ( 3.16)
1951:3-2011:4 -0.01 -0.27 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.06
(-0.10) (-1.88) ( 0.38) ( 1.59)
B. St = δc +
∑
j∈0,1,2,4 δjit−j +RP
S
t
Sample δ0 δ1 δ2 δ4 R¯2 R¯2 no lags
1875:3-1913:4 -1.02 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.96 0.94
(-63.31) (-0.56) ( 2.64) ( 4.23)
1914:1-1951:2 -0.78 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.94 0.91
(-12.20) ( 0.29) ( 2.91) ( 1.65)
1951:3-1979:2 -0.56 0.14 0.31 0.19 0.79 0.10
(-9.96) ( 3.16) ( 5.71) ( 3.05)
1984:1-2011:4 -0.39 -0.10 0.22 0.23 0.68 0.15
(-5.71) (-1.42) ( 3.60) ( 7.45)
1951:3-2011:4 -0.44 0.08 0.21 0.20 0.70 0.12
(-9.79) ( 1.46) ( 4.33) ( 5.15)
C. rx
(10)
t+1 = β0 + β
eSˆt + βrxR̂P
S
t + ε
rx
t+1 D. ∆it,t+1 = β0 + β
eSˆt + εet+1
Sample βe βrx R¯2 βe R¯2 R¯2 slope
1875:3-1913:4 0.09 0.22 0.05 1.13 0.39 0.35
( 0.75) ( 0.92) ( 5.70)
1914:1-1951:2 0.15 0.40 0.18 0.28 0.07 0.06
( 0.98) ( 2.37) ( 1.60)
1951:3-1979:2 -0.03 0.31 0.08 [0.04] 0.56 0.17 0.14
(-0.25) ( 2.59) ( 3.61)
1984:1-2011:4 -0.03 0.56 0.30 [0.21] 0.50 0.12 0.09
(-0.22) ( 5.68) ( 2.65)
1951:3-2011:4 0.16 0.38 0.16 [0.20] 0.26 0.02 0.03
( 1.21) ( 3.90) ( 1.25)
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Table XIV: Predicting short rate changes with lags, 1952-2011
The table reports the results from a predictive regression for one-year change in the short term interest rate.
We use principal components and lags of the short term interest rate. Panel A reports the results for three
principal components and Panel B for six principal components. Each panel displays the results for three
different sub-samples; (i) pre-Volcker period and (ii) post-Volcker period and (iii) full sample. Lags of the
short rate are optimally selected using BIC selection criteria. The maximum lag is 16 quarters. Selected lags
are reported in the last two columns of each panel. First column reports the adj. R2 obtained with PCs,
the second column reports the adj. R2 using PCs and two optimally selected lags. The data are quarterly
and PCs are obtained from the Fama-Bliss yield data augmented by the three-month Tbill to capture the
information at the short end.
R¯2 PCs only R¯2 PCs & lags Wald p-val Opt. lag1 (Qtrs.) Opt. lag2 (Qtrs.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. it+1 − it = β0 +
∑3
j=1 βjPC
j
t + δ1it−lag1/4 + δ2it−lag2/4 + εt+1
1952:3–1979:2 0.09 0.39 0.00 9 14
1984:1–2011:4 0.38 0.53 0.00 4 16
1952:3–2011:4 0.14 0.21 0.01 3 16
B. it+1 − it = β0 +
∑6
j=1 βjPC
j
t + δ1it−lag1/4 + δ2it−lag2/4 + εt+1
1952:3–1979:2 0.08 0.36 0.00 13 –
1984:1–2011:4 0.37 0.55 0.00 5 16
1952:3–2011:4 0.18 0.25 0.01 3 16
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X. Appendix
X.A. Lag selection for the short rate
Table XV: The predictive power of lags for short rate changes
The table reports the predictive power of the short rate it for the future one-year change in the short rate
it+1 − it, considering the short rate at different lags k. We use the BIC to select the lag length for the
short rate considering all possible combinations of lags from zero to 16. For the best specification, the
table reports the BIC, the R¯2, the specific lags chosen, and the relative probability (Rel.prob. no lags).
Rel.prob. no lags measures the probability of a model without lags, i.e. based on it−k (k = 0), relative
to the first best specification with lags. Relative probability is obtained as: exp{(BICbest − BICk=0)T/2},
where BIC = ln(σ̂2)+ ln(T )n/T , n is the number of regressors, σ̂2 = SSE/T of the regression, and T is the
sample size. Similarly, Rel. prob. fix lags measures the probability of the model with fixed lags relative to
the best lag specification. The data is quarterly.
it+1 − it = γc +
∑
k γkit−k + εt+1
Sample BIC R¯2 R¯2 no lags Rel. prob. no lags R¯2 fixed lags Rel. prob. fix lags Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
1875:3–1913:4 0.53 0.42 0.37 0.05 0.38 0.00 0 8 14
1914:1–1951:2 0.00 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.00 1 7 11
1951:3–1979:2 0.33 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.01 2 14 –
1984:1–2011:4 0.27 0.42 0.11 0.00 0.42 0.02 4 16 –
1951:3–2011:4 0.86 0.15 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.00 3 16 –
X.B. Survey data
To test for potential biases in the FFR forecasts, we regress future t+h realizations of the FFR on
the time-t forecasts, for h ranging from one to four quarters ahead, FFRt+h = α+βE
s
t (FFRt+h)+
εt,t+h. An unbiased forecast implies that α = 0 and β = 1 (Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969). Table
XVI summarizes the results. We fail to reject the null at all horizons suggesting the private sector
reports unbiased forecasts of the future FFR.
Do survey forecasts match the yield curve dynamics?
We test whether FFR forecasts are a good approximation to the market-wide consensus about the
path of the short rate that is reflected in the yield curve. A yield on a zero coupon bond is a
sum of the average short rate that is expected to prevail until the maturity of the bond and a risk
premium. Therefore, we can decompose one-year nominal yield y
(1)
t into short rate expectations
and risk premia by averaging the available FFR forecasts over the current quarter through four
quarters ahead:
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Table XVI: Testing for survey bias
Table reports the Mincer-Zarnowitz test for survey bias for four forecasting horizons: one (h = 1Q) through
four (h = 4Q) quarters. The joint null hypothesis is α = 0, β = 1. The standard errors are obtained by
Newey-West adjustment with 12 lags.
FFRt+h = α+ βE
s
t (FFRt+h) + εt,t+h
h=1Q h=2Q h=3Q h=4Q
α -0.14 -0.28 -0.47 -0.52
(-1.90) (-1.54) (-1.47) (-1.07)
β 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.99
(62.84) (27.39) (16.09) (10.47)
pval (β = 1) 0.25 0.40 0.42 0.54
R¯2 0.98 0.92 0.82 0.68
Table XVII: Forecast errors across monetary policy regimes
The table reports the means and standard deviations of the forecast errors across forecast horizons from one
to four quarters ahead. We condition on the monetary policy regime: easing, tightening and neutral. The
regimes are identified on a daily frequency using changes in the FFR target: easing (tightening) episode is
defined as the time from the day on which the target FFR has increased (decreased) to the next monetary
policy move. Neutral regime is when there has been no monetary policy action for longer than the span
between two FOMC meetings. We identify 75 months as tightening, 94 months as easing and 140 months
as neutral. From the daily data we construct the end of month series.
h=Q1 h=Q2 h=Q3 h=Q4
Tightening, N = 75 months
mean (µT ) 0.18 0.40 0.49 0.60
std 0.32 0.56 0.78 0.88
Easing, N = 94 months
mean (µE) -0.32 -0.77 -1.14 -1.43
std 0.51 0.73 1.04 1.37
Neutral, N = 140 months
mean (µN ) -0.09 -0.23 -0.41 -0.62
std 0.19 0.47 0.76 1.13
Z-test (µE = µT ) 3.94 9.15 12.78 15.89
pval 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
y
(1)
t = γ0︸︷︷︸
−6e−4 [−0.74]
+ γ1︸︷︷︸
0.99 [62.62]
1
5
4∑
k=0
Est (FFRt+ k
4
) + νt, R¯
2 = 0.99, (2.27)
where Est (FFRt+h) denotes the time-t survey-based forecast of the FFR at horizon h (expressed
in years). T-statistics (in brackets) are Newey-West adjusted with 12 monthly lags. Note that the
regression jointly tests the accuracy of survey data and decomposes y
(1)
t into short rate expectations
and risk premia comprised in νt. Hence, νt = RPt+γ1ǫt where ǫt represents the survey inaccuracies,
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and RPt measures the variation in the risk premium. The estimates suggest that the median survey
responses at different horizons quite accurately represent market expectations about the future path
of the monetary policy, as we cannot reject the hypothesis that γ0 = 0 and γ1 = 1 at the standard
significance levels. Moreover, since expectations explain nearly all variation in the one-year yield,
the risk compensation and/or survey inaccuracies can be assumed to be small.
Table XVIII: Forecast errors for unemployment and CPI inflation
Table reports RMSE for unemployment and CPI inflation. The level of variables and the RMSE is in
percentages. We report the RMSE for the Greenbook and SPF forecasts. The numbers in parentheses are
RMSEs divided by the standard deviation of the realized inflation and unemployment, respectively. The data
is quarterly. In Panel I, the sample period is 1983:Q2–2006:Q4, i.e. when the Greenbook sample ends. In
Panel II, the sample period is 1974:Q4–1991:Q4 for unemployment and 1981:Q3–1991:Q4 for CPI inflation.
The end of the sample used in Panel II is consistent with the end of sample used by Romer and Romer
(2000).
h=Q1 h=Q2 h=Q3 h=Q4
Panel I. 1983:Q1–2006:Q4 sample
A. Greenbook
UNEMPL 0.30 0.42 0.56 0.67
( 0.23) ( 0.33) ( 0.44) ( 0.52)
CPI 1.60 1.72 1.76 1.81
( 0.92) ( 0.99) ( 1.02) ( 1.04)
B. SPF
UNEMPL 0.28 0.42 0.56 0.66
( 0.22) ( 0.32) ( 0.43) ( 0.51)
CPI 1.56 1.64 1.70 1.77
( 0.90) ( 0.95) ( 0.98) ( 1.02)
Panel II. Pre-1992 sample
A. Greenbook
UNEMPL 0.43 0.63 0.74 0.87
(1974:Q4–1991:Q4) ( 0.43) ( 0.64) ( 0.75) ( 0.88)
CPI 2.10 2.19 2.03 2.15
(1981:Q3–1991:Q4) ( 1.21) ( 1.26) ( 1.17) ( 1.24)
B. SPF
UNEMPL 0.44 0.64 0.79 0.95
(1974:Q4–1991:Q4) ( 0.45) ( 0.65) ( 0.80) ( 0.97)
CPI 1.94 2.13 2.18 2.34
(1981:Q3–1991:Q4) ( 1.12) ( 1.23) ( 1.25) ( 1.35)
126
Chapter 3
Information in the term structure of
yield curve volatility
Unless held till maturity,1 Treasury bonds are risky investments, and their riskiness changes
over time and with the maturity of the bond. As one stark example, the current interest rate
environment in the US suggests that we can learn a great deal about macroeconomic and
financial conditions by looking into bond volatility. With short-term interest rates bound
close to zero for almost two years and expected to remain low in the near future, long-
term yields have become increasingly autonomous. Indeed, a clear near-term outlook for the
monetary policy has tamed the short-end of the yield curve, but at the same time it has
raised new questions about the long-run policy impact on the economy, thus contributing to
increased volatility at longer maturities.
The US Treasury market is the largest and the most liquid debt market in the world. It
provides investors, central banks and governments worldwide not only with the store of
value and liquidity but Treasuries also serve as the main source of collateral in repurchase
1This chapter is based on the paper with the identical title written in collaboration with Anna Cieslak
from the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. We thank Torben Andersen, Luca
Benzoni, Snehal Banerjee, John Cochrane, Jerome Detemple, Paul So¨derlind, Viktor Todorov, Fabio Trojani,
Pietro Veronesi, Liuren Wu, Haoxiang Zhu and seminar and conference participants at the New York
University (Stern), Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Bank of Canada,
Baruch College, University of St. Gallen, 4th Financial Long-Run Risk Forum (Institute Luis Bachelier),
European Finance Association Meeting (2010), 3rd Annual SoFiE Meeting, EC2, European Winter Finance
Summit (Skinance), University of Chicago PhD brownbag, TADC London Business School, SFI NCCR PhD
Workshop in Gerzensee for their comments. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Swiss
National Science Foundation (NCCR FINRISK project under the direction of Fabio Trojani).
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and OTC derivatives transactions. The fluctuations in Treasury yields and in their volatility
have substantial impact on a wide range of asset markets. A rise in interest rate volatility
may signal macroeconomic uncertainty and trigger a monetary policy action, but might
also lead to an increase in haircuts for Treasury bonds used as collateral in about half of
the repo transactions, and thus diminish the lending capacity in the financial system.2 As
such, the today’s environment makes the understanding of interest rate volatility especially
compelling.
Using comprehensive data on transactions in the US Treasury market, we explore the
key drivers of volatility in government bonds. To this end, we decompose the stochastic
covariance matrix of on-the-run yields into two volatility components corresponding to yield
factors with a short and long duration, respectively, and an additional variable that captures
the degree of comovement between the short and long maturity segment of the yield curve.
This decomposition serves to uncover the following results.
First, we ask what interest rate volatility can tell us about the funding conditions in the
market. We find an intriguing lead-lag relationship between yield volatility and market-wide
liquidity. The long-duration volatility component captures almost half of the variation in
a broad measure of the value of funding liquidity. That element of liquidity is visible in
the on-/off-the-run premium across bond maturities and reflects the tightness of financial
conditions in asset markets (Fontaine and Garcia, 2011). Typically, it also preempts an
action of the monetary authority. An increase in the long-duration volatility component
predicts a decline in the value of funding liquidity up to six months ahead with an R2 of
nearly 50%. The short-duration volatility, instead, dominates in explaining the transitory
episodes of liquidity dry-ups that do not necessarily trigger a monetary policy reaction (e.g.
GM/Ford downgrade), but reflect the amount of arbitrage capital available in the market
(Hu, Pan, and Wang, 2013). Importantly, an increase in the short-end volatility component
predicts that the arbitrage capital will be scarce in the future.
Second, we explore the macroeconomic drivers of volatility in yields. A combination of
expectations and uncertainty about monetary policy, inflation and real activity accounts for
2According to SIFMA quarterly report, in the third quarter of 2010 the outstanding volume of repos
and reverse repos among primary dealers in US government securities exceeded $4.62 trillion on average per
day (SIFMA, 2010). The argument that increased volatility of Treasuries can lead to diminished lending
capacity in the system has gained traction recently among practitioners as the outlook for the US economy
has become more uncertain and the government debt remains at historically high levels (see e.g. JP Morgan,
2011).
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up to 30% of the variation in yield volatility. Short- and long-run volatility are related to
different macro variables. The long-end volatility shows a pronounced response to the real
activity measures such as the uncertainty about unemployment, and to expectations about
the path of monetary policy. Quite differently, the short-term volatility is most strongly
linked to the monetary policy uncertainty. Finally, the comovement term is associated with
the uncertainty about inflation, monetary policy and the real economy, showing that those
variables influence the extent of correlation between yields across maturities.
Third, we study how interest rate volatility is related to the risk compensation required by
investors for holding Treasury bonds. When short-duration volatility is high, as induced
by an increased monetary policy uncertainty, bond risk premia tend to rise. This effect is
statistically and economically strong for bonds with a two-year maturity, but it dissipates
quickly as the maturity increases. Given that, as we show, the amount of interest rate
volatility has an imperceptible effect on the cross section of yields, our evidence contributes
to the current literature that studies “hidden” factors in bond risk premia (Duffee, 2011;
Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton, 2010).
Two aspects of our approach are new to the literature and instrumental in obtaining the
above results. On the methodological front, we are the first to embed information from the
realized covariance matrix of yields identified with high-frequency data within an estimation
of a new term structure model. High-frequency sampling of the Treasury zero curve allows
us to extract factors in on-the-run yields that are invisible at lower sampling frequencies but
carry information about liquidity, uncertainty and risk premia. The term structure model
with a stochastic covariance matrix of yields, in turn, imposes an economically intuitive
structure on the data, and allows us to perform the decomposition of volatilities in a way
that ensures their consistency with yield curve factors themselves.
Our focus on the Treasury market provides a different perspective of interest rate volatility
than the Libor implied volatility in swaptions, caps and floors.3 Most importantly, with help
of high frequency data on cash bonds, we obtain closest possible measurement of second
moments of yields that we model and aim to understand. Other important differences can
also be traced back to the defining features of the spot and derivatives markets. Due to
their liquidity and safety features, Treasury bonds are held by a wide range of investors.
3Interest rate derivatives have been the focus of many authors (e.g. Joslin, 2010; Trolle and Schwartz,
2009, 2011).
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They are also directly linked to the macroeconomic outlook through the monetary policy
channel. In contrast, Libor derivatives are traded by a narrower investor base, and reflect
specific effects such as the hedging demand induced by the corporate bond issuance or
mortgage convexity hedging (Azarias, 2010; Duarte, 2008). Hence, their link to liquidity
and macroeconomy can be less direct. For robustness, we show that the implied volatility
from short-maturity Treasury options, the Merrill Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE), is
well explained by the trailing realized yield volatility. However, many of our findings are
hard to establish using option-based volatility estimates because such estimates confound
into a single variable information from securities with very different durations.
Related literature
Our paper is related to the literature on realized volatility, term structure modeling with
stochastic volatility, and the research into the role of US Treasury bonds in liquidity and
collateral provision.
Recent advances in high-frequency econometrics have encouraged a model-free look into the
statistical properties of bond volatility. Andersen and Benzoni (2010) test empirically the
volatility implications of affine term structure models (ATSMs) using realized volatility over
the 1991–2000 period obtained from the GovPx database. In line with the early evidence
in Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2002), they confirm that systematic volatility factors are
largely independent from the cross section of yields, and call for extensions of the popular
models in the volatility dimension.4
In the latent factor domain, several recent papers document that benchmark models with
stochastic volatility face difficulties in explaining variation in yield volatility, and those
difficulties become increasingly severe at the long end of the yield curve. Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Jones (2009, CDGJ) report that over the 1988–2005 sample variance series
generated by a standard three-factor model, A1(3), are essentially unrelated to the model-
free conditional volatility measures. Using the same model, Jacobs and Karoui (2009) find
a correlation between model-implied and EGARCH volatility reaching up to 75% over the
1970–2003 period. However, in the more recent 1991–2003 sample this correlation breaks
4Several other papers document a weak relation between the bond volatility, realized as well as derivative-
based, and the spot yield curve factors: Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2002, CDG), Heidari and Wu (2003),
and Li and Zhao (2006).
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down and becomes negative at the long end of the curve. Recently, in a study of Japanese
yields in the zero bound environment, Kim and Singleton (2011) arrive at a similar conclusion
based on several different models. These authors suggest that additional volatility factors
may be needed to explain the volatility at the long maturity range. We contribute to this
discussion by designing a new term structure model that accommodates the multivariate
nature of yield volatilities, and support its estimation with the information from the realized
covariance matrix of yields. Explaining 98% of volatility both at the short and long end of
the yield curve in the 1992–2010 period, we find that these two elements of our approach
alleviate the problems documented in the literature.
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007) and Jones, Lamont, and Lumsdaine (1998)
show that relative to other liquid asset markets, bond prices tend to provide a clear and
pronounced reaction to economic news. These studies suggest that a rich economic content
is present in bond volatilities. The model model-based decomposition of the volatility curve
allows us to study how its components react to measures of economic and financial conditions.
Several recent studies introduce stochastic volatility into macro-finance term structure mod-
els.5 Adrian and Wu (2009) and Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2012) highlight the
importance of a stochastic covariance between the real pricing kernel and (expected) inflation
in determining excess bond returns. These models attach economic labels to different yield
volatility components. To the extent that the volatility itself remains unobservable or is
extracted from an auxiliary model, the identification of its components relies on specific
assumptions. Explaining the volatility curve per se is not in direct focus of those models.
We, instead, start from a latent factor model, and having decomposed yields and volatilities,
we aim to understand the impact of economic and financial quantities on both curves.
Given the role that US Treasuries play in the current financial system, it is important to
understand how volatility of bonds relates to the fluctuations in demand for liquidity and
collateral. A growing literature focuses on extracting information about liquidity premia
from the cross section of bonds with different age (e.g. Vayanos and Weil, 2008; Fontaine
and Garcia, 2011). Recently, Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) compose a noise illiquidity measure
as an average yield pricing error of Treasury bonds. We show that yield volatility of short
and long duration exhibits distinct links to those concepts of liquidity. We conclude that
5Examples of such models are Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2012), Adrian and Wu (2009), Hautsch
and Ou (2008), Bekker and Bouwman (2009) or Haubrich, Pennacchi, and Ritchken (2011).
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observing volatility in on-the-run Treasuries can inform policy makers about the funding
conditions in the market.
I. Data
We use high-frequency nominal Treasury bond data spanning two long expansions, two
recessions and three monetary cycles in the US economy. This section describes our data
set. Technical details are delegated to the online appendix.
I.A. High-frequency bond data and zero curve tick-by-tick
We obtain 19 years’ worth of high-frequency price data of US Treasury securities from
January 1992 through December 2010 by splicing historical observations from two inter-
dealer broker platforms: GovPX (1992:01–2000:12)6 and BrokerTec (2001:01–2010:12). The
merged data set covers about 60% of transactions in the secondary US Treasury bond market
(Mizrach and Neely, 2006). In total, we work with around 50 million on-the-run Treasury
bond quotes/transactions.
GovPX comprises Treasury bills and bonds with maturities three, six and 12 months, and
two, three, five, seven, ten and 30 years. BrokerTec, instead, contains only Treasury bonds
with maturities two, three, five, ten and 30 years. In the GovPX period, we identify on-
the-run securities and use their mid-quotes for further analysis. Unlike GovPX, which is a
voice-assisted brokerage system, BrokerTec is a fully electronic trading platform attracting
vast liquidity and thus allowing us to consider traded prices of on-the-run securities. Roughly
95% of trading occurs between 7:30AM and 5:00PM EST (see also Fleming, 1997), which
we treat as the trading day. We sample bond prices at ten-minute intervals taking the last
available price for each sampling point.
The raw data set contains coupon bonds. We use the equally-spaced high-frequency price
data to construct the zero coupon yield curve for every sampling point following the proce-
dure of Fisher, Nychka, and Zervos (1994).
While the availability of the high-frequency data is a restriction on the length of our sample,
the 1992–2010 sample captures a homogenous interest rate environment. There is empirical
6GovPX started operating in 1991.
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evidence that the conduct of monetary policy changed significantly during the eighties (e.g.,
Ang, Boivin, Dong, and Loo-Kung, 2010). The Treasury market functioning has also shifted
dramatically with the advent of automated trading, interest rate derivatives and the swap
market. Finally, as we discuss below, the rise of the repo market in the last two decades has
had a significant influence on interest rate volatility.
I.B. Realized yield covariances
The high-frequency zero curve allows us to estimate the realized covariance matrix of yields.
We consider two, three, five, seven and ten-year yields, i.e. the most liquid maturities in the
secondary bond market (see also Fleming and Mizrach, 2009, Table 1).
Let yt be the vector of zero yields with different maturities observed at time t. Time is
measured in daily units. The realized covariance matrix is constructed by summing up
the outer products of a vector of ten-minute yield changes, and aggregating them over the
interval of one day [t, t+ 1]:
RCov(t, t+ 1;N) =
∑
i=1,...,N
(
yt+ i
N
− yt+ i−1
N
)(
yt+ i
N
− yt+ i−1
N
)′
. (3.1)
N = 58 is the number of equally spaced bond prices (yields) per day t implied by the
ten-minute sampling, and i denotes the i-th change during the day. For frequent sampling,
the quantity (3.25) converges to the underlying quadratic covariation of yields (Jacod, 1994;
Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard, 2004). The weekly or monthly realized covariances follow by
aggregating the daily measure over the corresponding time interval. To obtain annualized
numbers, we multiply RCov by 250 for daily, 52 for weekly or 12 for monthly frequency,
respectively. In the online appendix we verify the robustness of this estimator, and compare
it to alternatives proposed in the literature (e.g., Hayashi and Yoshida, 2005).
We aim to ensure that our volatility measures reflect views of active market participants
rather than institutional effects. This motivates the following two choices: First, our
construction of the RCov dynamics relies on the within-day observations, excluding the
volatility patterns outside the US trading hours.7 The second choice lies in focusing on
7We observe several abrupt spikes in the between-day volatility, which we cannot relate to any major news
in the US market. To account for the total magnitude of volatility, we add to the within-day number the
squared overnight yield change from close (5:00PM) to open (7:30PM). We then compute the unconditional
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intermediate and long maturities. The very short end of the curve (T-bills) is deliberately
excluded from the realized covariance matrix computations because over our sample period
this segment exhibited a continuing decline in trading activity, with data available only till
March 2001.8 Moreover, its dynamics is confounded by interactions with the LIBOR market
and monetary policy operations. Such distortions are not directly relevant to the analysis
we perform.
There are several reasons for using intraday as opposed to daily data to construct the
covariance matrix of yields. First, the intraday data contain contemporaneous information
about the uncertainty and the variation in liquidity demand that is hard to spot in daily
returns. For instance, during the week of Lehman Brothers collapse, the realized volatility
of the two-year Treasury bond based on intraday returns was almost twice as high as the
daily realized volatility. Second, by the standard statistical argument the use of intraday
returns increases the precision of the realized covariance matrix estimator (e.g. Andersen
and Benzoni, 2008).
I.C. Empirical facts about interest rate volatility
Summary statistics. Table I reports summary statistics for weekly yields (panel a) and
realized volatilities (panel b). Figure 3.1 plots average curves, both unconditional and
conditional on the monetary policy cycle. A monotonically increasing term structure of
average yields is accompanied by a humped term structure of volatilities, with the hump
occurring at the three-year maturity. In our sample, the monetary easing raises the slope of
the yield curve, lifts the level of yield volatility and increases the magnitude of the hump.
[Figure 3.1 and Table I here.]
Compared to the smooth evolution of yields, the volatility curve experiences periods of
elevated and abruptly changing dynamics apparent in Figure 3.2.
[Figure 3.2 here.]
average of the total and within-day realized yield covariation, respectively, and each day scale the within-day
RCov dynamics by the total-to-within ratio.
8The decline in the trading of short maturity bonds is not particular to GovPX or BrokerTec data. A
similar development took place in the interest rate futures market.
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Factors in volatilities. Similar to the cross-section of yields, at least three factors are also
needed to explain the dynamics of the realized volatility curve. The first three principal
components explain 89.7%, 7.7% and 1.5% of its variation (panel b of Figure 3.3). Impor-
tantly, this observation comes from analyzing two- to ten-year yields only, and thus is not
driven by idiosyncratic volatility at the very short end of the curve.
The recent financial crisis emphasizes the multivariate structure of yield volatilities. As seen
in Panel b of Figure 3.2, while the two-year realized volatility increased visibly already during
the summer 2007, the ten-year volatility remained relatively low until the Lehman collapse.
Following the extraordinary measures undertaken by the Fed and the US Treasury and the
promise of low rates for an “extended period of time,” the two-year realized volatility fell
sharply in the beginning of 2009, and reached all-time low in the second half of 2010. At the
same time, as the uncertainty about the long-term economic outlook continued, the ten-year
volatility remained at elevated levels.
[Figure 3.3 here.]
Link between interest rates and volatilities. Much of the theoretical and empirical evidence
points to a link between the level of interest rates and their volatility. The affine or quadratic
models, for instance, imply that the same subset of factors determines both yields and their
volatilities. As one example, a single-factor CIR model suggests that the volatility is high
whenever the short rate is high (Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross, 1985).
While the CIR-type prediction remained valid through the early 1980s (Chan, Karolyi,
Longstaff, and Sanders, 1992), more recently the unspanned stochastic volatility (USV)
literature has argued that the yield-volatility relation is weak (Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein,
2002). Using realized volatility we show that this relationship can in fact be nonlinear.
Figure 3.4 scatter-plots weekly realized volatilities against the level of interest rates with
a matching maturity. The shape of a nonparametric regression fitted to the data suggests
an asymmetrically U-shaped relation, which contrasts with the early 1980s’ episode. The
volatility is low for the intermediate interest rates range, and increases when rates move
toward either extreme. Naturally, after the short rate strikes the zero lower bound during
the recent crisis, the volatility at the short end of the curve also dies out. Outside this
special interest rate environment, the rise in volatility is more pronounced in low interest
rate regimes than it is in high interest rate regimes, which explains the negative unconditional
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correlations between yields and volatilities reported in panel c of Table I. As an illustration,
the last panel of Figure 3.4 plots the realized volatility conditional on Federal funds rate
changes. We superimpose the results for the entire sample period until December 2010, and
for the pre-crisis period ending in December 2007. The figure shows that the cuts in the
federal funds rate lead to a stronger upward revision in volatility than do tightenings. The
asymmetry is most pronounced for shorter maturities (two years) and weakens at the longer
end of the curve.
[Figure 3.4 here.]
II. The model
We are interested in decomposing the variation in the yield covariance matrix in a way that
is consistent with a small number of factors driving yields. To this end, we formulate a
flexible model able to describe the joint dynamics of yields and volatilities. Later, we verify
its econometric fit and provide an economic interpretation of factors. All proofs are collected
in the online appendix.
Our benchmark model is cast in a reduced-form continuous-time framework. We distinguish
between two types of factors: expectations factorsXt, and covariance factors Vt. The physical
dynamics are given by the system:
dXt = (µX +KXXt)dt+
√
VtdZ
P
X,t (3.2)
dVt = (ΩΩ
′ +MVt + VtM
′) dt+
√
VtdW
P
t Q+Q
′dW P′t
√
Vt, (3.3)
where Xt is a n-vector, and Vt is a n×n a covariance matrix process (Bru, 1991; Gourieroux,
Jasiak, and Sufana, 2009a). Accordingly, ZPX and W
P are an n-dimensional vector and a
n×n matrix of independent Brownian motions.9 µX is a n-vector of parameters and KX ,M
9It is straightforward to introduce correlations between expectations and volatility shocks ZX and W
by setting dZX = dWρ +
√
1− ρ′ρdB for some constant vector ρ, where dB is an n-dimensional Brownian
motion independent of columns in dW . We state the general solution for ρ 6= 0 in the online appendix. As a
preliminary check, we can learn how these shocks in yields and volatilities are related in the data by estimating
a VAR(1) for the joint system. Let us include three bond portfolios mimicking the level, slope and curvature
of the yield curve plus three realized volatility factors: the level RV 2Yt , the slope (RV
10Y
t −RV 2Yt ) and the
covariance RCov5Y,10Yt . The VAR results are not reported in the main text. The highest cross-correlation
between shocks does not exceed 16% (the yield slope portfolio and the volatility level). Therefore, for the
empirical implementation of the model, we set ρ = 0. The details of model estimation follow in Section II.B.
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and Q are given as n×n parameter matrices. To ensure a valid covariance matrix process Vt,
we specify ΩΩ′ = kQ′Q with an integer degrees of freedom parameter k such that k > n− 1,
and require that Q is invertible. This last condition guarantees that Vt stays in the positive
definite domain (see e.g., Gourieroux, 2006).
The short interest rate is an affine function of Xt variables, but contains an additional source
of persistent shocks:
rt = γ0 + γ
′
XXt + γfft. (3.4)
The state ft evolves as:
dft = (µf +Kfft +KfXXt)dt+ σfdZPf,t, (3.5)
with ZPf,t denoting a single Brownian motion independent of all other shocks in the economy.
γf ,Kf and σf are scalars, and γ′X and KfX are (1× n)-vectors of parameters.
One can think of ft as a short-term monetary policy expectations factor. Xt, instead,
summarizes economic variables that drive longer term yields. As such, Xt can impact the
conditional expectation of ft. Time-varying volatility enters the model through long term
factors: Vt describes the amount of risk in the economy, with out-of-diagonal elements of
Vt determining the conditional mix between Xt’s. We focus on modeling the stochastic
covariance of yields of intermediate to long maturities, whose variation we can observe
with support of high frequency data. Given the different institutional properties of shortest
maturity yields and the unavailability of traded high-frequency data, we assume constant
conditional volatility for ft.
For convenience, we collect Xt and ft factors in a vector Yt = (X
′
t, ft)
′, whose dynamics can
be compactly expressed as:
dYt = (µY +KY Yt) dt+ ΣY (Vt)dZPt , (3.6)
with a block diagonal matrix ΣY (Vt)ΣY (Vt)
′ =
 Vt 0
0 σ2f
 and KY =
 KX 0n×1
KfX Kf
.
Bonds are priced using the standard no-arbitrage argument. We specify a general reduced-
form compensation ΛY,t required by investors to face shocks in the state vector:
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ΛY,t = Σ
−1
Y (Vt)
(
λ0Y + λ
1
Y Yt
)
, (3.7)
where λ0Y is a (n+1)-vector and λ
1
Y is a (n+1)× (n+1) matrix of parameters. We require
the invertibility of each block of matrix ΣY (Vt), which is ensured by
√
V t positive definite,
and σf > 0. In equation (3.7), we assume that only Z shocks are priced. Therefore, the risk
neutral dynamics of Xt follow from the standard drift adjustment:
µQY = µY − λ0Y (3.8)
KQY = KY − λ1Y , (3.9)
and the dynamics of Vt remain unchanged.
10
Prices of nominal bonds are obtained by solving P τt = E
Q
t
(
e−
∫ τ
0 rsds
)
. Using the infinitesimal
generator for the joint process {Yt, Vt}, the solution for the nominal term structure has a
simple affine form:
P (t, τ) = eA(τ)+B(τ)
′Yt+Tr[C(τ)Vt], (3.10)
where Tr(·) denotes the trace operator. The coefficients A(τ), B(τ) and C(τ) solve a system
of ordinary differential equations:
∂A (τ)
∂τ
= B(τ)′µQY +
1
2
B2f (τ)σ
2
f + kTr [Q
′QC(τ)]− γ0 (3.11)
∂B (τ)
∂τ
= KQ′Y B(τ)− γY (3.12)
∂C (τ)
∂τ
=
1
2
BX(τ)BX(τ)
′ + C(τ)M +M ′C(τ) + 2C(τ)Q′QC(τ), (3.13)
where we split the B(τ) loadings as B(τ) = [BX(τ)
′, Bf (τ)]
′ and γY = (γ
′
X , γf )
′. The
boundary conditions for the system (3.11)–(3.13) are A(0) = 01×1, B(0) = 0(n+1)×1 and
C(0) = 0n×n. B(τ) has a standard solution typical to Gaussian models; C(τ) solves a matrix
Riccati equation.
Defining yτt = − 1τ lnP τt , the term structure of interest rates has the form:
10It is straightforward to introduce a priced volatility risk without losing the tractability. However, due to
weak spanning of volatility states by bonds it is impossible to identify the market price of risk for volatility
from bonds alone. For this, additional volatility-sensitive instruments such as bond options are needed,
which is not the focus of this paper.
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yτt = −
A(τ)
τ
− B(τ)
τ
′
Yt − Tr
[
C(τ)
τ
Vt
]
. (3.14)
Yields are an affine function of the entire state vector (Yt, vec(Vt)
′)′. Under uncorrelated
shocks dZ and dW , and the short rate (3.4), we leave only one channel open through which
volatility states appear in the yield curve equation, i.e. the diffusive term in the Yt dynamics
(3.6). Thus, the instantaneous yield covariation is only driven by the covariance factors:
v
τi,τj
t :=
1
dt
〈dyτ1t , dyτ2t 〉
=
1
τ1τ2
{Tr [BX(τ2)BX(τ1)′ + 4C(τ2)Q′QC(τ1)]Vt + Bf (τ1)Bf (τ2)σ2f}. (3.15)
II.A. Discussion
In the basic setup, we consider three variables in Yt, i.e. ft plus a two-dimensional vector Xt,
where Xt has a 2× 2 covariance matrix Vt. The form of Vt leads to a three-factor model of
yield volatilities with a covariance and two volatility states. The combination of six factors
gives us the flexibility to fit both yields and their volatilities. The state space we consider is
large, but involves a manageable number of identified parameters (13 excluding ΛY,t).
Our distinction between volatility and yield curve variables builds on the Am(n) classification
of ATSMs introduced by Dai and Singleton (2000). The new element is that Vt represents a
complete covariance matrix, and as such involves an interaction component which can switch
sign.11 To make the roles of factors interpretable, we exclude interactions between Vt and
Xt through the drift. Even though such interactions are usually allowed, we find that they
are not called for by the data.
The presence of Vt in expression (3.14) distinguishes our model from the unspanned stochastic
volatility settings, which impose explicit restriction so that the volatility factors do not
enter the cross section of yields. Such separation usually improves the volatility fit of low-
dimensional ATSMs (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Jones, 2009). However, as highlighted
by the literature, there appear to be few reasons, except statistical ones, for such constraint
to strictly hold. The volatility variables could appear in the term structure of yields through
at least two channels. One of them is the convexity bias (see also Phoa, 1997; Joslin, 2010). A
11In ATSMs, independent CIR processes generate stochastic volatility one-by-one, and therefore condi-
tional covariances they imply are a linear combination of the volatility factors.
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second one is the relation between the amount of uncertainty and the expected excess returns.
In that the term premia compensate for risks, they should be related to the changing amount
of interest rate volatility.
II.B. Estimation
We estimate the model on a weekly frequency (∆t = 1
52
) combining pseudo-maximum
likelihood with filtering. All technical details on estimation and identification are presented
in the online appendix.
The transition equation for Yt is specified as an Euler approximation of the physical dynamics
(3.6):12
Yt+∆t = µ¯Y,∆t + ΦY,∆tYt + u
Y
t+∆t, (3.16)
where uYt is a vector of heteroskedastic innovations u
Y
t = ΣY (Vt)
√
∆tǫt+∆t. The transition
equation for the matrix process Vt is obtained by an exact discretization of the dynamics
(3.3):
Vt+∆t = kµ¯V,∆t + ΦV,∆tVtΦ
′
V,∆t + u
V
t+∆t, (3.17)
where uVt represents a symmetric matrix of heteroskedastic innovation. µ¯Y,∆t, µV,∆t, ΦY,∆t
and ΦV,∆t are explicit functions of the continuous-time parameters.
We introduce two types of measurement equations based on yields (yτt ) and their quadratic
covariation (v
τi,τj
t ):
yτt = f(St; Θ) +
√
Rye
y
t (3.18)
v
τi,τj
t = g(Vt; Θ) +
√
Rve
v
t . (3.19)
Functions f(St; Θ) and g(Vt; Θ) denote model-implied expressions (3.14) and (3.15) corre-
sponding to the observed measurements yτt and v
τi,τj
t ; Θ collects model parameters. v
τi,τj
t is
obtained from the high-frequency zero curve using estimator (3.25).
12In the online appendix, we provide expressions for an exact discretization of the Yt dynamics. We find
that the use of the Euler scheme is virtually immaterial when ∆t = 1/52, but offers a considerable increase
in computational speed compared to the exact discretization. Therefore, the results presented here rely on
the expression (3.16).
140
The weekly realized covariance matrix estimator is still noisy. Therefore, we construct every
week a four week rolling realized covariance matrix. Such an adjustment makes it easier for
the Kalman filter to distinguish between the noise and the fundamental volatility.
We assume additive, normally distributed measurement errors eyt and e
v
t with zero mean
and a constant covariance matrix. In estimation, we use six yields with maturities of six
months and two, three, five, seven and ten years with Ry = σ
2
yI6. Additionally, we include
three volatility measurements: variances of the two- and ten-year bond and the covariance
between the five- and ten-year bond. We allow for different errors across equations, i.e.
Rv = diag(σ
i
v), where i = 1, 2, 3, and diag(·) is a diagonal matrix.
The assumption that the realized and the instantaneous covariance matrices of yields are
equivalent is an approximation implicit in our choice of measurements. Equation (3.19) uses
the fact that 1
dt
〈dyτt 〉 = vτt and 1dt〈dyτit , dy
τj
t 〉 = vτi,τjt , where dt = 1/52. In absence of jumps,
the estimator (3.25) converges to the integrated covariance matrix of yields. We recognize
that the measurement (3.19) is not exact, but on a weekly frequency the error due to the
approximation can be assumed negligible.
In order to handle the non-Gaussianity in factor dynamics we use the square-root Unscented
Kalman Filter (UKF), proposed by Julier and Uhlmann (1997), and recently applied by
e.g. Carr and Wu (2007) or Christoffersen, Jacobs, Karoui, and Mimouni (2009). To secure
against local minima, we apply a global optimization algorithm—differential evolution (Price,
Storn, and Lampinen, 2005). We confirm that the algorithm achieves the global minimum
by repeating the estimation several times.
Finally, we impose parameter restrictions that ensure econometric identification of the model.
After identification restrictions, our preferred model that we discuss below has nine param-
eters which drive the yield curve (two of those describe market prices of risk), and six
parameters which drive the term structure of volatilities.
With the inclusion of several parameters in ΛY,t, the search for a global maximum likelihood
optimum becomes slow. For this reason, we adopt a parsimonious form of market prices of
risk by estimating only two diagonal parameters in ΛY,t related to longer-duration factors
Xt, (λ
1X
11 , λ
1X
22 ), i.e. those that carry information about bond risk premium. The goal of our
model is to decompose the cross section of yields and volatilities in a mutually consistent
way. Estimating alternative and richer forms of the market price of risk (unreported), we
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find that the risk premium specification has a minor impact on the factor decomposition we
obtain. This observation is consistent with Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Jones (2009).
III. Estimation results
III.A. Parameter estimates
Table II provides parameter estimates for our model indicated by the label G3SV3 (mean-
ing: three conditionally Gaussian plus three volatility factors). On the level of explaining
yields, we benchmark the performance of the estimated model to the Gaussian three-factor
counterpart (G3SV0) which we estimate with the standard Kalman filter. This comparison
evaluates whether volatility factors, while beneficial for capturing second moments of yields,
introduce a risk of misspecification on the side of fitting yields.
[Table II here.]
For each factor type (Vt and Yt) at least one variable is more persistent and one faster-
moving. While this observation is common for the yield dynamics, our estimates indicate
that it also holds true for the volatility curve. The most important difference between Vt
states comes in their respective volatilities (vol of vol), as captured by the parameters of the
Q matrix. The volatility of the V11 and V12 state is just about a half of V22, indicating that
a multivariate volatility assumption is borne out by the data.
We also note large differences in the speed of mean reversion between Yt and Vt factors: as
expected, the autocorrelation coefficients decline much more rapidly for the volatility states.
The degrees of freedom parameter k in equation (3.3) controls the extent of non-Gaussianity
present in the volatility factors: the higher the k the more Gaussian the dynamics.13 Across
various version of the model which we estimated, the model consistently selects k = 2. This
low value reflects the need for factors with a pronounced right tail.
The bottom section of Table II provides the log-likelihood values for estimated specifications.
For comparison with the Gaussian benchmark, we split the log-likelihood implied by our
13Buraschi, Cieslak, and Trojani (2008) discuss the role the degrees of freedom parameter in the Vt
dynamics. See also online appendix for the properties and construction of the Vt process. The representation
of Vt as the sum of k outer products of the multivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process provides the key intuition
for the role of k.
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model into two parts related to yields and to volatilities, respectively. The numbers indicate
the improvement in volatility modeling offered by G3SV3 does not impede the fitting of
interest rates across maturities.
Simultaneously, the model is able to explain well the evolution of the second moments. Figure
3.5 superimposes the observed and model-implied behavior of the level and the slope of the
volatility curve, and the covariance between the five- and ten-year yield. Level and slope are
proxied by the two-year volatility and the spread between the ten- and two-year volatility,
respectively. The plot shows that the model-implied dynamics track observed volatility very
closely in terms of magnitudes, persistence and signs, both at the short and the long end of
the curve.
[Figure 3.5 here.]
Table III confirms these conclusions. We provide two measures of in-sample model perfor-
mance: the root mean squared errors (RMSE) and the percentage of variation in yields and
volatilities explained by the model. The latter is measured with the R2 coefficient from
a regression of the observed on the model-implied dynamics. The RMSEs show that on
average the model misses the true yield by about three basis points. Its performance is
very similar to the purely Gaussian case. At the same time, we are able to explain 98%
of the variation in the second moments dynamics. An important result is that the model
captures volatilities equally well at long and short maturities (Table IV), explaining 99% of
two-year volatility and 97% of the ten-year volatility. Recently several authors have noticed
that fitting yield volatilities at the long maturity range remains a significant challenge; even
at short maturities the fit can be poor with traditional models explaining only about 50%
of the volatility variation. Our results show that a multifactor volatility combined with the
information in the realized covariance matrix of yields successfully alleviates these problems.
[Table III here.]
One might worry about over-fitting in our six factor model either on the yield or on the
volatility side. To address this concern, we estimate the G3SV3 model on the sample from
January 1992 through December 2007, and then use these parameter to price yields and
fit volatilities on the whole sample including the financial crisis, i.e. January 2008 through
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December 2010. These results are reported in the last column of Table II. It turns out that
the model can fit both yields and volatilities in that period equally well as in the pre-crisis
period. This result is reassuring especially because the parameters are stable during the
financial crisis which saw the most extreme movements in volatility on record.
III.B. Filtered states
This section discusses the properties and roles of the factors filtered by the model. Their
good fit to the data indicates that these six factors summarize well the information in the
cross-section of yields and volatilities.
Figure 3.6 plots the state variables extracted by the unscented Kalman filter. Panels on the
left display the evolution of the three yield curve factors, Y = (X1, X2, f)
′, those on the right
show the volatility factors V¯ = (V11, V12, V22)
′.
[Figure 3.6 here.]
Factors have a joint interpretation: The roles that the model assigns to the Xt states
correspond with the covariance interpretation of the respective volatility factors Vt. To
see this, it is useful to study the effects that different variables have on the yield curve.
Figure 3.7 plots the responses of yields to shocks in each element of the state vector. Panels
on the left (a1, a2, a3) display the reaction of the curve to perturbations of the Yt variables;
panels on the right (b1, b2, b3)—to shocks in Vt variables. In each subplot, the solid line
depicts the yield curve when all variables are held at their unconditional means. Instead,
the dashed and dotted lines plot the yield curve response when a given factor is set to its
10th and 90th percentile, respectively.
Let us for the moment focus on the impact of the yield curve factors. The effect of the
ft state is most pronounced at the short end of the curve. A downward (upward) shift
in ft moves the short yield significantly below (above) its unconditional mean. The effect
diminishes with the maturity, and is consistent with the filtered time-series pattern of ft
which closely tracks the Federal Funds rate (see Figure 3.6c). The two Xt factors influence
the longer segment of the curve. X2 is most active at intermediate maturities (two–three
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years), inducing changes in the curvature. X1 acts predominantly at long maturities, thus
changing the slope.14
[Figure 3.7 here.]
Corresponding with theX1 andX2 factors, V11 generates volatility at longer maturities, while
V22 captures the shorter end of the volatility curve. Table IV reports t-statistics obtained
by regressing observed yield volatilities and covariances on the elements of the state vector.
The significance of V11 and V22 factors for explaining the observed volatility across maturities
has an opposite pattern: The effect of V22 decreases whereas the effect V11 increases with
the maturity. The out-of-diagonal element V12 is strongly significant, and has the largest
impact on the yield covariance dynamics. Accordingly, we will term the volatility factors as
the long-end (long-duration) volatility state, the short-end (short-duration) volatility state
and a covariance state, respectively.
[Table IV here.]
III.C. Are volatility factors revealed by the yield curve?
Let us focus again on Figure 3.7. Its right-hand panels (b1, b2, b3) plot the response of the
yield curve to large changes in volatility. Relative to the strong reaction induced by the
Yt factors, the impact of the volatility states on the cross section of yields turns out much
weaker. Even spectacular shifts in the V22 and V12 factors—we consider their tenth and
90th percentile values—do not exert a visible effect on interest rates of any maturity. The
impact of V11 is only revealed at maturities beyond five years, still it does not exceed a few
(on average seven) basis points. This is intuitive: Abstracting from the potential volatility
impact on the term premiums, we would expect the long-term volatility factor V11 to show
up at longer maturities via the convexity effect. Since this effect is mainly present in long
yields, the response of the yield curve to V22 should be less pronounced, or even negligible.
14Since factors are latent, we do not discuss the direction of their impacts when at the tenth or 90th
percentile. The particular sign is a consequence of the identifying normalization we impose. ft factor is an
exception, given its close resemblance to the federal funds rate.
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III.D. Zero rate bound
How may our factor interpretation change in a zero-lower bound environment that the US
entered post 2008? In the last two years of our sample the effective federal funds rate
(FFR) has been fluctuating between zero and 25 basis points. At the longer end, however,
yields have been volatile and away from the zero bound. Our model accommodates such
a yield environment due the maturity-ordered factor structure in yields and the stochastic
covariance matrix of yield curve shocks. Throughout the sample, the factor ft tracks short-
term monetary policy expectations and is very smooth, which can be attributed to the
transparency of Fed’s communication. The estimated volatility of shocks to factor ft, given
by σf in Table II, is identical pre-crisis (1992-2007) and in the full sample (1992-2010). Thus,
there is no change in statistical and economic role of ft before and during the period when
the zero lower bound was hit. The long-end factor X1 has a zero loading at short maturities
and thus is little affected by the zero bound. Over the course of recent crisis, the Fed has
been increasingly clear at communicating that FFR target range will stay at very low levels
for an extended period. This expectations channel has brought the short term volatility V22
to historically lowest levels following the Lehman failure, and again in the second half of
2010 when the Fed started pursuing the second round of quantitative easing (QE2). At the
same time, on both occasions long-end volatility V11 has ticked up (see Figure 3.8).
IV. Which economic forces are reflected in the Treasury volatility?
This section explores the link between the volatility factors and various proxies for liquidity,
macroeconomic uncertainty and alternative measures of market volatility. We also ask how
yield volatility states relate to term premia in Treasury bonds. We show that a model-based
decomposition of Treasury volatility facilitates our understanding of its economic content.
There are several takeaways from this section. First, separating the volatility of Treasuries
into the short- and long-duration factors is essential for revealing its economic content.
Second, the volatility factors provide timely information about the state of the economy
that cannot be read from yields at low frequencies. Third, a large part of the variation
in volatility can be traced back to time-varying liquidity conditions and macroeconomic
uncertainty. Finally, interest rate volatility provides supportive evidence on the presence of
hidden factors driving bond risk premia, and suggests that the hidden factors can reflect the
uncertainty about monetary policy.
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IV.A. Short versus long-end volatility dynamics
Figure 3.8 displays the evolution of long- and short-end volatility in our sample, showing
that volatility factors have a pattern that is distinct from the business cycle variation. While
typically before recessions only the short-end volatility rises, after recessions short- and long-
end volatility both tend to spike up. The latter is the case for each post-recession period
in our sample: in 1992 (post 1990–1991 recession) the long-end volatility factor increased
by more than six standard deviations away from its unconditional mean; similarly in 2003
(post 2001 recession) long-end volatility moved six standard deviations from the mean; at
the end of 2008 (post 2007–2008 recession) the short-end volatility factor V22 reached all time
high moving more than eight standard deviations from its unconditional average level. For
comparison, the unconditional mean of the volatility is around 90 basis points. The short-
term volatility factor V22 also increases sharply during periods of distress in asset markets
such as the LTCM and the Russian crisis or the dot-com bubble. Interestingly, during the
recent financial crisis, the short-term volatility reached extreme levels already in the Fall 2007
and persisted until 2009; the long-term volatility, instead, remained low until the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers. Possibly, prior to September 2008 market participants considered the
ongoing crisis to be short lasting similar to the LTCM crisis, and the fall of Lehman changed
that view.
[Figure 3.8 here.]
The advantage of the model-based decomposition over direct volatility proxies such as
realized or implied volatility is that the latter merge together effects of different duration.
This is evident by comparing the filtered volatility factors (Figure 3.8) with the realized
volatility (Figure 3.2). Later in this section, we discuss the link between our decomposition
and implied yield volatility from options.
IV.B. Links between volatility and liquidity
A store of liquidity and the highest quality of collateral are the main motives driving demand
for the US Treasuries. We ask how these motives are reflected in yield volatility by studying
three types of linkages between liquidity and volatility.
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The first is the financial conditions and funding liquidity channel. High value of the long-
end volatility factor V11 is observed when prospects for the economy are weak, and monetary
policy is expected to ease (see Section IV.C). In such periods, financial conditions and funding
liquidity typically deteriorate. Hence, one would expect the long volatility state V11 and
funding liquidity to be closely linked. To reconcile this interpretation with the data, we
associate the volatility factor V11 with a measure of funding liquidity conditions extracted
from the cross-section of on- and off-the-run bonds, as recently proposed in Fontaine and
Garcia (2011):15
liqFGt = δ0 + δ1V11,t + εt. (3.20)
The regression of the funding liquidity factor liqFG on the long volatility factor V11 gives
an R2 of 39% with V11 being negatively related to the value of funding liquidity and highly
significant (Newey-West t-statistic is −5.2). Elevated levels of long-term volatility signal
a decrease in the value of funding liquidity (e.g. as induced by monetary policy easing).
However, to uncover this strong relationship one needs the model-based decomposition of
volatility: A regression of liqFG on the raw realized volatility or the short-end volatility factor
V22 gives R
2’s of about 10–11% and an insignificant t-statistic.
It is interesting to study the lead-lag relationship between the long-end volatility and the
funding liquidity. To investigate the lead-lag structure, we modify the regression (3.20) to
include lags:
liqFGt = δ0,i + δ1,iV11,t−i + εt, (3.21)
with i = −18, . . . , 18 months. Panel a of Figure 3.9 shows the R2’s, δ1,i coefficient and the
t-statistics from these regressions. The results suggest a strong predictive power of the long-
end volatility for funding liquidity up to several months ahead. An increase in long volatility
state signals a lower value of funding liquidity with an R2 close to 50%. Thus, the long-end
volatility factor can be viewed as a leading indicator for funding liquidity conditions.
15Fontaine and Garcia (2011) filter the funding liquidity factor using on-the-run and and off-the run coupon
bond yields. Specifically, their factor measures the value of funding liquidity, i.e. an increase in the liquidity
factor means an increase in the value of funding liquidity and thus tighter funding liquidity conditions. We
thank Jean-Sebastien Fontaine for sharing the data with us.
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[Figure 3.9 here.]
Second, the level of liquidity can be associated with the volatility through the (slow-moving)
arbitrage capital channel. If the arbitrage capital is abundant, it holds prices of Treasuries
tightly aligned even intraday, keeping their volatility low. The relationship between the
availability of arbitrage capital and liquidity in Treasury market has been studied by Hu, Pan,
and Wang (2013). Their noise illiquidity factor, which measures temporary price deviations
from the efficient yield represented by the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson model, is shown to track the
fluctuations in overall market liquidity.16 We relate the noise illiquidity measure to our three
volatility factors. Panel a of Table V reports the weekly regression results. Volatility factors
explain 25% of the variation in the noise illiquidity factor in our sample. All three factors are
significant, showing that illiquidity relates to the variation in the entire covariance matrix of
yields. This is intuitive as the illiquidity measure aggregates the deviations across the whole
curve and does not distinguish between the short- and long-end noise. Nevertheless, the
comparison of R2’s in the last row of panel a in Table V suggests that short-end volatility
factor V22 contributes most to the explained variation in illiquidity measure.
[Table V here.]
Similar to equation (3.21), we run the following lead-lag regression of noise illiquidity:
illiqt = δ0,i + δ1,iV22,t−i + εt. (3.22)
Panel b of Figure 3.9 plots the regression results. The results indicate a strong positive link
whereby the short-end volatility factor predicts the subsequent illiquidity up to ten months
ahead. High levels of the short-end volatility factor predict that the arbitrage capital will
be scarcer and the Treasury market less liquid.
Third, we explore the linkages between the volatility and liquidity through the collateral
channel. Large portion of outstanding Treasuries is used by investors as collateral in re-
purchases or derivative OTC transactions. In periods of large demand for liquid collateral,
16Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) define the noise illiquidity measure as the root mean squared yield pricing
error on a given day. Every day, they estimate a Nelson-Siegel-Svensson model using the CRSP Treasuries
dataset. Higher value of illiquidity signals the shortage of arbitrage capital which would otherwise align the
prices of individual bonds.
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market participants may choose to fail to deliver on their repo transaction.17 Because the
penalty for the failure is linked to the short term interest rate, such a situation occurs
especially when the interest rates are low.18 The variation in the volumes of repo failures
involving Treasury bonds as collateral should then be informative about the demand pressure
in the Treasury market. Given that such demand pressures tend to be short term, we would
expect the failures to be visible mainly in the short term volatility.19 We obtain weekly data
on the dollar value of failures in Treasuries from the New York Fed website and study how
they relate to the volatility factors.20 Although given the likely endogeneity between interest
rate volatility and fails, it may be more natural to regress volatility on fails, we reverse the
order and include the three volatility factors on the right hand side of the regression. Panel
b of Table V summarizes the regression output. As expected, failures to deliver have the
strongest link to the short volatility factor V22. Three volatility factors explain 31% of the
variation in failures.
In summary, the results in this section point to strong links between the Treasury volatility
and liquidity. The ability of volatility factors to predict the variation in funding liquidity
stresses that important information can be read directly from on-the-run yields. However,
while the volatility states aggregate information only from on-the-run Treasury yield curve,
this information is difficult to extract by observing yields at infrequent intervals.
IV.C. Volatility and macroeconomic uncertainty
This section asks how much of the variation in interest rate volatility is due to the changing
macro uncertainty. We relate the volatility factors to survey-based proxies for expectations
and uncertainties about selected macro variables.
17Since May 2009, when a special charge for the failure was introduced, failures to deliver decreased to
extremely low levels. See Garbade, Keane, Logan, Stokes, and Wolgemuth (2010) for more details.
18Failure to deliver can happen for other reasons such as mis-communication between the two counterpar-
ties. However, Fleming and Garbade (2005) argue that most of the failures are related to other factors.
19Alternatively, we could use the variation in haircuts applied to Treasury collateral to study the collateral
channel—an increase in Treasury volatility lead to an increase in haircuts applied to Treasury collateral
which trigger margin calls and thus decrease the liquidity in the market. Due to the lack of data on haircuts
we analyze only the failures to deliver.
20The New York FED publishes the dollar amounts of settlements failures for various types of bonds
(Treasury, agency, corporate bonds and MBS) on weekly basis. The data are available starting from July
1990.
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Our monthly survey data are spliced from two sources. To obtain forecasts of macro variables,
we use the BlueChip Economic Indicators (BCEI) survey and BlueChip Financial Forecasts
(BCFF). As evident in the transcripts of the FOMC meetings, these surveys are regularly
used by policymakers at the Fed to read market expectations. The online appendix provides
details about the survey data including their timing within a month. We use responses of
individual panelists to construct proxies for the consensus forecast and for the uncertainty.
Each month, the consensus is computed as the median survey reply. The uncertainty is
measured with the mean absolute deviation of individual forecasts.
The macro variables that we use represent three standard domains: (i) real activity is cap-
tured by real GDP growth (RGDP), industrial production (IP), unemployment (UNEMPL),
and housing starts (HOUST); (ii) the federal funds rate (FFR) describes the stance of the
monetary policy, and (iii) inflation is reflected through the CPI forecasts. The combination
of expectations and uncertainty proxies constructed from these measures turns out to be
highly informative about our filtered states. We are able to explain up to about 90% and
30% of variation in the yield curve and volatility factors, respectively.
Table VI presents the regressions of Xt, ft, Vt factors on consensus and uncertainty proxies.
21
The loadings on the yield curve factors confirms their distinct responses to the economic
environment. The long-term yield factor X1 is driven by the expectations about the inflation,
with one-year ahead inflation consensus forecast emerging as its key mover. The real part is
represented by the expectations about RGDP and UNEMPL both of which help explain the
variation in long term yields. The intermediate factor X2 is related to the expectations and
uncertainty about the future path of the the monetary policy. While the uncertainty about
industrial production increases intermediate yields, the uncertainty about monetary policy
and housing starts both decrease yields in this segment of the curve. Finally, in addition to
being almost completely explained by the expectations about monetary policy, the short-end
factor ft responds somewhat to the expected CPI inflation and the current stance of the real
activity (expectations about IP). Not surprisingly, monetary policy is an important driver
of the short and intermediate yields (factors X2 and ft) but its impact diminishes with the
state’s maturity, telling us how the monetary impulse is transmitted to the longer segments
of the curve. Monetary policy variable is not significant in the X1 regression; the long end of
the curve is almost entirely determined by the macroeconomic rather than monetary forces.
21To obtain the results presented in Table VI, we select the regressors based on their significance.
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[Table VI here.]
Volatility states reflect predominantly the uncertainty about the macroeconomic outlook.
Each of the two volatility factors V11 and V22 captures a distinct domain of uncertainty.
Indeed, variables inducing long- versus short-run volatility movements form essentially sep-
arate sets. The long-end volatility V11 is pronouncedly influenced by the uncertainty about
unemployment and housing starts. The short-end volatility V22 is most strongly linked to the
uncertainty about monetary policy (t-statistic of 4.37), and to a weaker but still significant
degree, to the uncertainty about inflation and industrial production. Notably, shocks to these
variables are almost contemporaneously observed and rather short-lived, thus providing a
contrast to more sticky metrics such as the real GDP.22
[Figure 3.10 here.]
To better understand the difference between the volatility states, in panels a through e of
Figure 3.10 we plot their impulse-responses to various sources of macro uncertainty. The
results are obtained on the pre-crisis sample 1992-2007 to avoid a large spike in volatility at
the time of the Lehman bankruptcy which could potentially drive the results. The respective
volatility responses differ in terms of magnitude and persistence as well as types of variables
which are important. Uncertainties about FFR and inflation have an effect on short volatility
which can last up to six months, but their impact on the long volatility remains negligible.
This pattern reverts for the real GDP uncertainty, whose role persists at the long end but
is only contemporaneously important at the short end. Interestingly, V11 has a significant
impact on V22, but not vice versa, as visible in panel f . The intuition for this result comes
with a simple example. Imagine a situation in which uncertainty about the GDP growth
picks up, and elevates V11. The same news likely spurs uncertainty about near-term activity
measures such as industrial production that affect V22 on the way. However, inverting the
scenario and recognizing a higher duration of the long-term volatility, we do not necessarily
expect a symmetric effect in the opposite direction to take place.
22Ranking inflation uncertainty as short-lived may be surprising. This can be partially explained by the
sample period we use (1992:01–2010:12). Looking at the term structure of inflation expectations provided
by BCFF surveys, we notice that while short-run forecasts (for the current quarter) are surprisingly volatile,
their volatility dies out very rapidly. Starting already from one-quarter-ahead, inflation expectations become
extremely smooth. In his speech on January 3, 2004 at the American Economic Association meetings, Mr.
Bernanke mentions this feature explicitly.
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We find that under our identification scheme,23 the covariance state V12 is positively linked to
the realized correlation of the long-to-medium part of the yield curve (see Figure 3.2, panel
c). Conditional on this observation, we can interpret its signs in survey regressions. V12
is associated with uncertainty measures about the unemployment, inflation, and monetary
policy. An increase in uncertainty about the unemployment and monetary policy implies
a decline in V12, and a lower correlation between the long and medium part of the yield
curve. V12 is also related to the expectations about the real GDP: An increase in growth
expectations lowers the correlations along the curve. Intuitively, the different segments of
the yield curve tend to move more independently when the curve changes shape. This, in
turn, usually occurs in times of increased uncertainty such as April–June 2001, which is one
of the two NBER-proclaimed recessions in our sample. V12 captures precisely those moves.
IV.D. Are volatility factors driving bond risk premia?
A growing literature explores the variation in bond risk premia focussing on so-called “hid-
den” factors that have a negligible effect on the cross section of yields but play an important
role in forecasting bond returns (Duffee, 2011). As we document above, the volatility factors
lend themselves as natural candidates to the interpretation as hidden states because they
are imperceptible from the cross section of yields. An important question is whether and
how yield volatility is reflected in bond risk premia, and whether it contributes to the bond
return predictability beyond other strong return forecasters. We run the following predictive
regression:
rx
(n)
t+1 = γ0 + γ1ĉf t + γ2V11t + γ3V22t + ε
(n)
t+1, (3.23)
where rx
(n)
t+1 denotes the one-year bond excess return for a bond with a n-year maturity and
ĉf denotes the return-forecasting factor proposed in Cieslak and Povala (2011). ĉf captures
the term premium that is most pronounced in the variation of long-term bonds.
[Table VII here.]
23Our latent states are subject to identification restrictions which preclude direct interpretation of factor
signs (except for V11 and V22, which are always positive). Recognizing this fact, we seek to establish factor
signs that give their natural interpretation in terms of observable quantities.
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Table VII reports the results of estimating equation (3.23). We also include separate results
using only ĉf and only V11 and V22 as return predictors. In the presence of the return-
forecasting factor, only the short-end volatility V22 adds independent explanatory power
about the variation in bond excess returns, and mostly so at short maturities. Its contribution
to the regression R2 is 6% for the excess return on a two-year bond with a significant t-
statistic of 2.84. Recall that it is the uncertainty about the near-term monetary policy what
drives the largest portion of the short-end volatility (last column of Table VI). In line with
our intuition, the volatility factor V22 loads positively on bond excess returns, meaning that
investors require higher returns when the monetary policy uncertainty and thus the short-end
volatility is high. One standard deviation increase in the short-end volatility is associated
with 0.3 standard deviations increase in two-year bonds excess return. This link between
volatility and bond risk premium advances our understanding of the nature and sources of
hidden factors in term premia.
IV.E. Volatility factors versus implied volatility measures
An established measure of volatility in Treasury market is the Merrill Option Volatility
Estimate (MOVE) index which is a yield curve weighted index of the normalized implied
volatility on one-month Treasury options.
A common feature of implied volatility measures such as CBOE VIX or MOVE is that they
are constructed from options on securities with a stream of cash flows. Hence, it is difficult
to separate the sources of volatility using these series. MOVE, for instance, is the weighted
average of implied volatilities from options on the Treasury coupon bonds with maturities
of two, five, ten and 30 years.24
To understand how MOVE relates to different factors in volatility, we run the following
regression at a weekly frequency:
MOVEt = α0 + α1V11,t + α2V12,t + α3V22,t + εt. (3.24)
Table VIII summarizes the results, and Figure 3.11 plots the MOVE index against the
regression fit.
24The maturities are weighted as follows: 20% two-year, 20% five-year, 40% ten-year and 20% 30-year
bond. These allocations are based on estimates of option trading volumes in each maturity segment.
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[Table VIII and Figure 3.11 here.]
With an R2 of 68%, three volatility factors explain a large part of the weekly variation in
MOVE. For comparison, two-year realized volatility and the VIX index explain 47% and 36%
of the variation in MOVE, respectively. To assess the relationship with the equity implied
volatility, we add the VIX index to the regression (last column in panel c of Table VIII).
All of the volatility factors contribute significantly to the explained variation in MOVE
and remain equally significant in the presence of VIX. Especially, the contribution of the
covolatility factor V21 to the explained variation in MOVE is substantial. The results of
regression (3.24) suggest that the realized and implied volatilities track each other closely
with the deviations being short-lived and small in magnitude. There is only one period of
prolonged divergence in 2006-2007—a period marked with extremely low volatility and high
liquidity.
V. Conclusions
We explain the drivers of the riskiness of the Treasury yield curve over time and across
maturities. We combine 19 years’ worth of tick-by-tick bond transaction data with a term
structure model to identify two distinct components of volatility and a factor capturing
the comovement of yields. The short-duration volatility is pronouncedly related to the
uncertainty about the monetary policy and demand for liquid collateral. The long-duration
volatility reflects the uncertainty about the real activity and funding liquidity conditions.
Throughout, we stress the importance of the model-based decomposition of Treasury volatil-
ity for studying its economic content. Its usefulness becomes particularly evident against
the backdrop of the low interest rate environment in which the different maturity segments
of the yield curve tend to move with an increasing autonomy.
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Figure 3.1: Yield and volatility curves
The figure plots the yield and volatility curves: unconditional mean for the whole sample 1992:01–2010:12,
and means conditional on the Fed’s tightening and easing cycles. The cycles are regarded as easing or
tightening if at least three subsequent moves in the federal funds rate target have been in the respective
direction. The realized volatility curves are computed from the weekly data and annualized (×52).
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of yields and volatilities
The figure plots the dynamics of weekly yields, realized volatilities and correlation over the 1992:01–2010:12
period. Yields include maturities of six months and two, five, and ten years. Realized volatilities are
constructed from the actively traded bonds of two, five and ten years to maturity.
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Figure 3.3: Factors in yield volatilities
The figure shows the principal component decomposition of the yield volatility curve. We use the
unconditional correlation matrix of realized weekly volatilities computed for two-, three-, five-, seven- and
ten-year zero bonds. Panel a plots the loadings of factors on volatilities. Panel b displays the percentage of
variance explained by each factor.
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Figure 3.4: Yield level versus yield volatility
The figure depicts the relationship between yield level and yield volatility for bonds with two-, five- and
ten-year maturity (based on daily data). In panels a–c, circles denote data points, and the lines represent
the fits of the nonparametric kernel regression together with the 99% confidence bound. Panel d shows the
level of the realized volatility conditional on the change in the Fed funds target rate (cut, no change, hike).
During our sample period 1992:02–2010:12 there were 33 rate cuts, 31 hikes, and 4639 days on which the
rate did not change. In panel d the dashed line represents conditional volatilities on the pre-crisis sample
1992:01–2007:12.
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Figure 3.5: In-sample fit to the second moment dynamics of yields
The figure plots the model-implied in-sample fit to the yield second moments. The level is defined as the
variance of the two-year yield. The slope is computed as the difference between the realized variance of the
ten- and the two-year yield. Finally, the covariance is between the five- and the ten-year yield. The sample
period is 1992:01 through 2010:12 with weekly sampling.
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Figure 3.6: Factor dynamics filtered from the model
The figure plots the model-implied factor dynamics extracted by the unscented Kalman filter under the
estimated parameters of the G3SV3 model. The left-hand panels present factors driving the yield curve. The
right-hand panels display factors generating time-variation in conditional second moments. For presentation,
the X states have been multiplied by −1. The sample period is 1992:01 through 2010:12 with weekly
sampling.
161
0 2 4 6 8 102
3
4
5
6
%
p
.a
.
Maturity
a1. Impact of X1
0 2 4 6 8 102
3
4
5
6
%
p
.a
.
Maturity
a2. Impact of X2
0 2 4 6 8 102
3
4
5
6
%
p
.a
.
Maturity
a3. Impact of ft
0 2 4 6 8 10
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
%
p
.a
.
Maturity
b1. Impact of V11
0 2 4 6 8 10
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
%
p
.a
.
Maturity
b2. Impact of V12
0 2 4 6 8 10
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
%
p
.a
.
Maturity
b3. Impact of V22
Figure 3.7: Factor shocks and yield curve responses
The graph presents the response of the yield curve to shocks in the state variables. The left-hand panels
(a1, a2, a3) display the effect of the yield curve factors Yt = (X1t, X2t, ft)
′, the panels on the right (b1, b2, b3)
display the effects of the volatility factors V¯t = (V11t, V12t, V22t)
′. In each subplot, the solid line shows
the yield curve generated by setting all state variables to their unconditional means. Circles indicate the
maturities used in estimation, i.e. six months, two, three, five, seven, and ten years. The dashed and dotted
lines are obtained by setting a given state variable to its tenth and 90th percentile, respectively, and holding
the remaining factors at their unconditional average. For presentation, factors X1, X2 have been multiplied
by −1 so that both correlate positively with yields. The sample period is 1992:01 through 2010:12 with
weekly sampling.
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Comparison of long and short volatility factors
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Figure 3.8: Short vs. long volatility factors and selected events
The figure plots the model-implied dynamics for volatility factors V11 and V22. We discuss them in Section
III.B. Shaded areas represent NBER-dated recessions. Vertical lines mark major economic or financial events
that moved Treasury volatility. The sample period is 1992:01 through 2010:12 with weekly sampling.
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Figure 3.9: Liquidity and volatility factors, lead and lag relationship
The figure plots the lead-lag relationship between volatility and liquidity. Positive lags mean that volatility
factors forecast liquidity. Panel a of the figure plots the R2’s, the regression coefficient δi,1 and the t-statistic
for the univariate regression of liquidity factor liqFGt on lagged long volatility state V11 using monthly data.
Sample period is 1992:01 through 2008:12 and is determined by the availability of the Fontaine-Garcia
liquidity factor. Panel b of the figure plots the R2’s, the regression coefficient δi,1 and the t-statistic for the
univariate regression of illiquidity factor iliqt on lagged short volatility state V22 using monthly data. To
obtain monthly data for the illiquidity factor, we take the average of daily data within the given month.
Sample period is 1992:01 through 2009:12 and is determined by the availability of the illiquidity factor. In
both panels, t-statistics are in parentheses and are computed using the Newey-West adjustment with 12 lags.
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Figure 3.10: Impulse-response functions of volatility factors to macroeconomic
uncertainty proxies
Panels a–e display the impulse-response functions of volatility factors to macroeconomic uncertainties
extracted from the surveys. Uncertainty is proxied with the mean absolute deviation of forecasts made
by individual panelists in the BlueChip survey. Panel f shows mutual responses of factors to each
other. The impulse responses are based on a VARMAX model with first order AR component, allowing
for contemporaneous and lagged effects of exogenous macro variables. The impulse responses exclude
insignificant exogenous regressors. All variables have been standardized; lags are in months.
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Figure 3.11: MOVE index and volatility factors
The figure plots the observed and fitted Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) index. The
fit is obtained from an OLS regression using three filtered volatility factors long, short volatility and the
covolatility factor, V11, V21, V22, respectively. Sample period is 1992:01 through 2010:12. The sampling
frequency is weekly.
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Table I: Descriptive statistics of weekly yields and realized volatilities
The table contains descriptive statistics of weekly yields (panel a) and realized yield volatilities (panel b)
based on the period 1992:01–2010:12. JB denotes the Jarque-Bera normality test (critical value 5.975). Panel
c shows unconditional correlations between yields and volatilities. Numbers in italics indicate correlations
which are not significant at the 1% level.
Panel a. Yields (% p.a.)
6M 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
Mean 3.44 3.98 4.24 4.63 4.90 5.18
Skew -0.42 -0.37 -0.36 -0.25 -0.09 0.13
Kurt 1.82 2.02 2.13 2.22 2.25 2.29
JB 87.66 63.38 53.24 35.88 25.06 23.99
Panel b. Realized yield volatilities (bps p.a.)
2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
Mean 113.69 121.06 120.42 115.42 110.81
Stdev 43.77 45.11 38.88 34.43 32.47
Skew 1.38 1.19 0.88 0.75 1.01
Kurt 6.22 5.16 3.87 3.43 4.58
JB 754.27 432.95 160.54 102.62 274.56
Panel c. Unconditional correlations of yields and realized volatilities
y6Mt y
2Y
t y
3Y
t y
5Y
t y
7Y
t y
10Y
t v
2Y
t v
3Y
t v
5Y
t v
7Y
t v
10Y
t
y6Mt 1.00
y2Yt 0.97 1.00
y3Yt 0.94 0.99 1.00
y5Yt 0.87 0.96 0.98 1.00
y7Yt 0.80 0.91 0.95 0.99 1.00
y10Yt 0.72 0.85 0.90 0.96 0.99 1.00
v2Yt -0.16 -0.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 1.00
v3Yt -0.22 -0.17 -0.14 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.96 1.00
v5Yt -0.33 -0.29 -0.26 -0.22 -0.18 -0.14 0.89 0.90 1.00
v7Yt -0.40 -0.34 -0.31 -0.26 -0.22 -0.17 0.80 0.83 0.97 1.00
v10Yt -0.37 -0.31 -0.27 -0.22 -0.17 -0.12 0.72 0.76 0.89 0.93 1.00
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Table II: Parameter estimates
This table reports parameter estimates for two models: “G3SV0” is the Gaussian three-factor model with
essentially affine market prices of risk; “G3SV3” denotes a joint model of yield and volatility curve with three
conditionally Gaussian factors and three volatility factors. “G3SV3 1992-2007” indicates the parameter
estimates obtained on the sample 1992:01–2007:12. The Gaussian model follows Duffee (2002) using the
normalization of Dai and Singleton (2000), which allows to treat γY as a free parameter vector. BHHH
standard errors are in parentheses. The last section of the table shows the log-likelihood values divided by
the number of observations T . For comparison, in models with stochastic volatility, we split the log-likelihood
values into the yield and the volatility components: Loglik yτt /T and Loglik v
τ
t /T . The last column reports
log-likelihood values obtained from parameter estimates on the 1992:01–2007:12 sample and applied to the
1992:01–2010:12 sample.
G3SV0 G3SV3 G3SV3 1992-2007
K11 -0.141 -0.020 -0.033
(0.091) (0.021) (0.008)
K21 -1.735 – –
(0.067) – –
K22 -0.558 -1.104 -1.947
(0.087) (0.143) (0.309)
K31 -1.919 -3.073 -2.768
(0.074) (0.191) (0.175)
K32 -0.889 -7.117 -7.668
(0.087) (0.437) (0.479)
K33 -0.001 -0.460 -0.498
(0.002) (0.010) (0.008)
σf – 0.006 0.006
– (7.62e-5) (7.05e-5)
k – 2.000 2.000
– (0.239) (1.067)
Q11 – 0.001 0.001
– (9.63e-5) (1.14e-4)
Q22 – 0.003 0.003
– (2.59e-4) (2.63e-4)
M11 – -0.042 -0.113
– (0.035) (0.038)
M21 – -0.205 -0.185
– (0.179) (0.177)
M22 – -0.599 -0.685
– (0.091) (0.127)
γ0 1.000 0.153 0.159
(1.550) (0.089) (0.026)
γ11 0.001 – –
(2.63e-4) – –
γ12 0.004 – –
(1.60e-4) – –
γ13 0.005 – –
(1.01e-4) – –
λ1X11 0.460 0.004 -0.018
(0.068) (0.021) (0.020)
λ1X22 0.222 -0.054 -0.703
(0.066) (0.144) (0.310)
σMY 1.58e-7 1.37e-7 7.84e-8
(2.16e-9) (1.75e-9) (1.40e-9)
Loglik yτt /T 40.632 40.744 40.191
Loglik vτt /T – 31.063 30.989
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Table III: Model fit
This table gives the in-sample fit for three model specifications presented in Table II. The performance of
our model (G3SV3) in matching yields is compared with the Gaussian setting (G3SV0). The column “G3SV3
1992-2007” reports the model fit for the period 1992–2010 using parameter estimated on the 1992:01–2007:12
sample. Additionally, we report its ability to match the volatility dynamics. In panels a1 and b1, we report
root mean squared error (RMSE) in bps per annum. The fit of volatilities is also stated as RMSE. To
obtain easily comparable numbers, we convert the covariance matrix of yields into covolatilities: Since the
slope and covariance can be negative, we take the square root of their absolute values. This serves as an
input for computing the RMSE for the term structure of volatilities. Panels a2 and b2 show the percentage
of variation in observed yields and volatilities explained by the respective model-implied quantities. The
numbers represent the R2’s from the regression of the observed variable on the fitted one.
G3SV0 G3SV3 G3SV3 1992-2007
Panel a. Term structure of yields
a1. RMSE in bps
6 month 2.09 2.02 1.63
2 year 3.70 3.04 3.28
3 year 2.59 2.63 2.80
5 year 3.89 3.50 3.50
7 year 2.56 2.27 2.13
10 year 3.65 3.34 3.46
a2. Explained variation (%)
6 months 99.99 99.99 99.99
2 year 99.97 99.97 99.98
3 year 99.99 99.98 99.98
5 year 99.94 99.95 99.95
7 year 99.97 99.97 99.98
10 year 99.93 99.93 99.93
Panel b. Interest rate volatilities
b1. RMSE in bps
v2Yt – 5.72 6.10
v10Yt − v
2Y
t – 5.22 6.09
v5Y,10Yt – 4.06 4.41
b2. Explained variation (%)
v2Yt – 98.25 97.99
v10Yt − v
2Y
t – 99.15 98.66
v5Y,10Yt – 98.33 98.00
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Table IV: Regressions of yield realized second moments on filtered states
This table reports the t-statistics and adjusted R2’s obtained by regressing the yield realized variances
(first five columns) and covariances (last three columns) on the latent factors extracted from our model,
i.e. f,X1, X2, V11, V12, V22. The sample covers the 1992:01–2010:12 period, with weekly sampling frequency.
t-statistics are corrected using the Newey-West adjustment with 12 lags.
RV & RCov 2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y (5Y,2Y) (10Y,2Y) (10Y,5Y)
const. 3.69 2.37 0.56 1.71 1.45 3.25 2.80 0.49
X1 1.07 -1.93 0.94 -1.11 1.48 0.16 -0.89 -2.91
X2 -0.34 1.03 0.34 1.81 -0.00 0.54 -2.15 0.75
f 4.25 1.26 1.22 0.97 4.07 3.03 1.66 -2.91
V11 8.10 3.93 13.50 16.68 28.86 16.79 13.00 30.10
V21 34.84 7.79 21.62 31.51 39.83 36.60 30.18 89.30
V22 109.50 54.06 29.97 31.84 25.80 66.90 31.48 69.57
R¯2 0.99 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.98
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Table V: Interest rate volatility and liquidity
Panel a reports the regression results of noise illiquidity measure of Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) on volatility
factors V11, V21, V22. The weekly data for illiquidity measure are obtained by taking the average of daily data
within the week. Panel b reports the regression results of weekly settlement failures in Treasury bonds on
volatility factors. All variables are standardized. t-statistics are in parentheses and are computed using the
Newey-West adjustment with 12 lags.
Panel a. Noise illiquidity measure
illiqt = a0 + a1V11t + a2V21t + a3V22t + εt
V11 0.21 0.10 0.66
( 2.72) ( 0.90) ( 2.09)
V21 – 0.24 0.30
(–) ( 1.74) ( 2.97)
V22 – – 0.71
(–) (–) ( 2.24)
R¯2 0.05 0.09 0.25
Panel b. Failure to deliver
failst = a0 + a1V11t + a2V21t + a3V22t + εt
V11 0.12 -0.13 0.35
( 1.27) (-0.65) ( 1.33)
V21 – 0.49 0.55
(–) ( 1.83) ( 2.22)
V22 – – 0.60
(–) (–) ( 2.53)
R¯2 0.01 0.19 0.31
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Table VI: Regressions of filtered states on macroeconomic surveys
This table reports regressions of the model-implied factors on macroeconomic surveys. Monthly factors are
obtained by averaging the weekly numbers returned from the estimation. We splice monthly data from
two surveys: BCFF and BCEI compiled over the period 1992:01–2010:12. This amounts to 228 monthly
observations. The following variables are used: real GDP (RGDP), unemployment (UNEMPL), housing
starts (HOUST), federal funds rate (FFR), industrial production (IP), consumer price index (CPI). RGDP
and FFR forecasts are obtained from BCFF, while the remaining variables are from BCEI. E(·) denotes
the consensus, defined as a median forecast; σ(·) proxies for the uncertainty, and is computed as the mean
absolute deviation of individual forecasts. Standard errors are corrected using Newey-West adjustment with
four lags and are reported in parentheses. Both the latent factors and the survey data are standardized in
order to make the regression coefficients directly comparable. The table contains only significant variables.
For the ease of interpretation, X1 and X2 have been multiplied by −1, so that they have a positive correlation
with the two-year yield and ten-year yield, respectively.
Regressor X1 X2 f V11 V12 V22
E(RGDP) 0.124 – – – -0.402 –
(0.054) – – – (0.068) –
σ(RGDP) – – – – – –
– – – – – –
E(UNEMPL ) 0.156 – – – – –
(0.051) – – – – –
σ(UNEMPL) – – – 0.251 -0.387 –
– – – (0.095) (0.094) –
E(HOUST) – – – – – –
– – – – – –
σ(HOUST) – -0.190 – -0.181 – –
– (0.068) – (0.088) – –
E(FFR) – 0.765 0.950 -0.318 – –
– (0.088) (0.018) (0.121) – –
σ(FFR) – -0.141 – – -0.261 0.354
– (0.064) – – (0.081) (0.081)
E(IP) – – 0.044 – – –
– – (0.020) – – –
σ(IP) – 0.253 – – – 0.207
– (0.068) – – – (0.100)
E(CPI) 0.888 – 0.074 – – –
(0.055) – (0.017) – – –
σ(CPI) – – – – 0.194 0.263
– – – – (0.089) (0.158)
R¯2 0.73 0.62 0.98 0.16 0.26 0.20
VIII. Appendix
VIII.A. Data description
This section gives a brief description of the high-frequency Treasury data, our zero curve construc-
tion methodology, and macroeconomic surveys.
The US Treasury market is open around the clock, but the trading volumes and volatility are
concentrated during the New York trading hours. Roughly 95% of trading occurs between 7:30AM
and 5:00PM EST (see also Fleming, 1997). This interval covers all major macroeconomic and
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Table VII: Predictability of bond excess returns and volatility
The table reports the results obtained from the predictive regression given in equation (3.23). Panel a reports
the restricted regression with only ĉf t as predictor. Panel b reports the regression result when two volatility
factors are used as regressors, finally panel c uses ĉf t, V11 and V22 as return predictors. ∆R
2 V11 denotes
the increase in R2’s obtained by including V11 next to ĉf t in the regression, ∆R
2 V22 denotes the marginal
increase in R2’s by including V22 next to ĉf t. The data are sampled monthly and the sample period is
1992:01–2010:12. In parentheses, we report t-statistics obtained by a Newey-West adjustment with 12 lags.
Panel a. rx
(n)
t+1 = γ0 + γ1ĉf t + ε
(n)
t+1
rx(2) rx(3) rx(5) rx(7) rx(10)
ĉf 0.43 0.49 0.58 0.65 0.69
( 3.17) ( 3.59) ( 4.71) ( 5.76) ( 6.36)
R¯2 0.18 0.23 0.34 0.43 0.47
Panel b. rx
(n)
t+1 = γ0 + γ2V11t + γ3V22t + ε
(n)
t+1
rx(2) rx(3) rx(5) rx(7) rx(10)
V11 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.11
( 0.90) ( 1.03) ( 1.32) ( 1.35) ( 0.92)
V22 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.16 0.18
( 2.78) ( 2.35) ( 2.10) ( 1.60) ( 1.79)
R¯2 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.06
Panel c. rx
(n)
t+1 = γ0 + γ1ĉf t + γ2V11t + γ3V22t + ε
(n)
t+1
rx(2) rx(3) rx(5) rx(7) rx(10)
ĉf 0.39 0.46 0.56 0.64 0.69
( 3.13) ( 3.59) ( 4.84) ( 5.96) ( 6.78)
V11 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.09
( 0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.21) (-0.78)
V22 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.20 0.22
( 2.84) ( 2.37) ( 2.12) ( 1.70) ( 1.86)
R¯2 0.27 0.30 0.40 0.46 0.50
∆R¯2 V11 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
∆R¯2 V22 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03
monetary policy announcements, which are commonly scheduled either for 9:00AM EST or 2:15PM
EST. We consider this time span as a trading day. Around US bank holidays, there are trading
days with a very low level of trading activity. In such cases, we follow the approach of Andersen
and Benzoni (2010) and delete days with no trading for more than three hours.
We choose the ten-minute sampling frequency so that it strikes the balance between the non-
synchronicity in trading and the efficiency of the realized volatility estimators (Zhang, Mykland,
and Ait-Sahalia, 2005). The microstructure noise does not appear to be an issue in our data,
as indicated by the volatility signature plots and very low autocorrelation of equally spaced yield
changes, see Figure 3.12.
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Table VIII: Option implied versus spot yield volatility
The table reports the regression results of MOVE index on volatility factors V11, V21 and V22 using weekly
data. Weekly MOVE index is obtained by taking the average of daily data within given week. All variables
are standardized. T-statistics are in parentheses and are computed using the Newey-West adjustment with
12 lags.
MOV Et = a0 + a1V11t + a2V21t + a3V22t + a4V IXt + εt
V11 0.34 0.07 0.92 0.79
( 3.70) ( 0.76) ( 6.01) ( 6.82)
V21 – 0.52 0.62 0.52
(–) ( 5.99) (16.11) (10.22)
V22 – – 1.08 0.91
(–) (–) ( 7.92) ( 9.39)
VIX – – – 0.23
(–) (–) (–) ( 3.77)
R¯2 0.11 0.32 0.68 0.72
The liquidity in the secondary bond market is concentrated in two-, three-, five- and ten-year
securities (see also Fleming and Mizrach, 2009, Table 1). We assume that the dynamics of this
most liquid segment spans the information content of the whole curve. Since any method for
bootstrapping the zero curve is precise for maturities close to the observed yields, for subsequent
covolatility analysis we select yields which are closest to the observed coupon bond maturities.
GovPX and BrokerTec
Table IX reports some basic statistics on the Treasury bond transaction data in the period 1992:01
through 2010:12. For the GovPX period (1992:01–2000:12), we report the average number of quotes
per trading day and for the BrokerTec period (2001:01–2010:12) we report the average number of
transactions per trading day. The number of Treasury bonds and bills totals to 1148 in our sample
period. These were transacted or quoted more than 49.3 million times in the on-the-run secondary
market.
Testing for microstructure noise
To avoid potential bias in the estimates of the realized volatility using high-frequency data, we apply
several tests for the presence of noise caused by the market microstructure effects. In a first step,
we compute the first order autocorrelation in high-frequency price returns. Table X reports the
first order autocorrelation of equally-spaced ten-minute yield changes in the US Treasury zero curve
in the period 1992:01–2007:12. The autocorrelation is statistically significant for the maturities of
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Table IX: Average number of quotes/trades per day in the GovPX and
BrokerTec databases
Bond maturity GovPX period BrokerTec period
3M 374 –
6M 352 –
2Y 2170 1414
3Y 1385 1017
5Y 3128 2801
7Y 637 1500
10Y 2649 2659
30Y 793 1114
three, five and ten years. However, the magnitude of all autocorrelations is very small, which makes
them economically insignificant.
Table X: Autocorrelation of high-frequency yield changes
2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
Autocorrelation 0.0039 0.0154 -0.0064 -0.0040 -0.0175
p-value (0.0648) (0.0001) (0.0025) (0.0589) (0.0001)
In a second step, we use the volatility signature plots displaying the average realized volatility
against the sampling frequency (Figure 3.12). In the presence of microstructure noise, the average
realized volatility increases with the sampling frequency. The reason is the dominance of noise at
the very high-frequency sampling (see e.g., Bandi and Russell, 2008). None of the above diagnostics
suggests that the microstructure noise present in our data is large and could overwhelm our results.
Realized covariance matrix estimation
This section discusses the robustness and efficiency of the realized second moment estimator
proposed in the paper that are critical for our results. In the paper, we use the outer product
estimator given by:
RCov(t, t+ 1;N) =
∑
i=1,...,N
(
yt+ i
N
− yt+ i−1
N
)(
yt+ i
N
− yt+ i−1
N
)′
. (3.25)
In case of asynchronous trading, the realized covariance matrix estimator defined in Eq. (3.25) can
be biased toward zero (see e.g. Hayashi and Yoshida, 2005; Audrino and Corsi, 2007). The bias is
to a large extent generated by the interpolation of non-synchronously traded assets, and its severity
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Figure 3.12: Volatility signature plot
We plot the average weekly realized volatility (RV) against the sampling frequency for the whole sample
1992:01–2007:12. We consider five maturities in the zero coupon curve: two, three, five, seven, and ten years.
depends on the difference in liquidity of the assets considered.25 Hayashi and Yoshida (2005, HY)
propose a covariance estimator which corrects for the bias in (3.25). The estimator sums up all
cross-products of returns which have an overlap in their time spans, and thus no data is thrown
away. The covariance of two bond yields reads:
RCovHYi,j (t, t+ h;Ni, Nj) =
Ni∑
k=1
Nj∑
l=1
(
yti+ khNi
− y
ti+
(k−1)h
Ni
)(
ytj+ lhNj
− y
tj+
(l−1)h
Nj
)
I (τi ∩ τj 6= 0)(3.26)
where τi and τj denote the interval of the return on the first and second bond, respectively.
To verify the robustness of our realized covariance estimator (3.25), we implement the HY approach
for the realized covariance of ten- and five-year bond. Both estimators deliver very similar results
in terms of magnitude and covariance dynamics. They are highly correlated (90%) and the t-test
for the difference in means does not reject the null that µouter = µHY (p-val = 0.57).
There at least two reasons why we stick to the simple outer-product realized covariance estimator
(3.25). For one, estimators of Hayashi and Yoshida (2005), Audrino and Corsi (2007) are not directly
applicable in our case because for the construction of the zero curve we require a synchronized set
of yield changes. More importantly, on-the-run Treasury bonds are largely homogenous in terms of
25Audrino and Corsi (2008) offer a thorough discussion of the bias in realized covariance.
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Table XI: Correlation of zero coupon yields with CMT and GSW yields
2Y 3Y 5Y 7Y 10Y
Corr CMT 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.996 0.997
Corr GSW 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.997
liquidity, which is well proxied by the average number of quotes/trades per day reported in Table
IX of Appendix VIII.A.
Extracting zero coupon yield curve from high-frequency data
We fit the discount curve using smoothing splines. One of the important steps in the procedure is
to select the appropriate number of knot points. We make the number of knot points dependent on
the number of available bonds and locate them at the bond maturities. In our setting, the number
of knot points varies between three and six. The fact that we consider only one specific part of
the zero coupon yield curve allows us to use constant roughness penalty as in Fisher, Nychka,
and Zervos (1994) for estimating the whole curve. Waggoner (1997) proposes a varying roughness
penalty for the smoothing splines procedure with a low penalty at the short end and a high penalty
at the very long end of the curve. In the period 2001:01–2010:12, the intraday quotes on Treasury
bills are not available from the BrokerTec database. In order to anchor the very short end for the
smoothing splines procedure, we include the daily data on the three-month Treasury bill obtained
from the FRED database at the FRB St. Louis. Before using the constructed zero curve for the
realized volatility estimation, we compare our zero coupon yields with the daily Constant Maturity
Treasury rates (CMT) from the Fed, as well as with zero yields compiled by Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and
Wright (2006) (GSW). Our daily yields are almost perfectly correlated with the CMTs as well as
with the GSW yields. Table XI summarizes the results.
Survey data
BlueChip Financial Forecasts. BlueChip Financial Forecasts (BCFF) survey contains monthly fore-
cast of yields, inflation and GDP growth given by approximately 45 leading financial institutions.
The BCFF is published on the first day of each month, but the survey itself is conducted over a
two-day period, usually between the 23rd and 27th of each month. The exception is the survey for
the January issue which generally takes place between the 17th and 20th of December. The precise
dates as to when the survey was conducted are not published. The BCFF provides forecasts of
constant maturity yields across several maturities: three and six months, one, two, five, ten, and 30
years. The short end of the term structure is additionally covered with the forecasts of the Fed funds
rate, prime bank rate and three-month LIBOR rate. The forecasts are quarterly averages of interest
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rates for the current quarter, the next quarter out to five quarters ahead. The figures are expressed
as percent per annum. In addition, panelist provide forecasts for macroeconomic quantities: real
GDP, GDP price index and Consumer Price Index (CPI). The numbers are seasonally adjusted
quarter-on-quarter changes.
BlueChip Economic Indicators. The BlueChip Economic Indicators (BCEI) survey contains in-
dividual and consensus forecasts of about 50 professional economists from leading financial and
advisory institutions. The survey is compiled on a monthly basis, and contains predictions of key
financial and macroeconomic indicators, e.g. real and nominal GDP, GDP deflator, CPI, three-
month T-bill rate, industrial production, unemployment, housing starts. The survey is conducted
over two days, generally beginning on the first business day of each month. The newsletter is
typically finished on the third day following completion of the survey and published on the tenth of
a month. Every month, panelists provide two types of forecasts: (i) average figure for the current
calendar year and (ii) average figure for the next calendar year. For instance, in January 2001
the survey contains forecasts for 2001 and 2002. In February 2001, the forecast horizon shrinks to
11 months for the current year, and to 23 months for the next year, and so on. The diminishing
forecast horizon implies that the cross-sectional uncertainty measures computed from the individual
responses display a visible seasonal pattern. To gauge uncertainty, every month we use the mean
absolute deviation of individual forecasts. To remove the problem of seasonality, we adjust the series
with a X-12 ARIMA filter. Consensus forecast is defined as the median of individual forecasts in a
given month.
VIII.B. Model solution
We provide solutions for the general version of the model, which incorporates both correlation
between the dW and dZ shocks and a general form of the market prices of risk. Based on arguments
presented in the body of the paper, we analyze a restricted version of the model, in which the
correlation parameter is set to zero and only dZ shocks are priced.
Dependence between X and V factors
In the general case, Xt and Vt can be correlated, i.e.:
dZX = dWρ+
√
1− ρ′ρ dB (3.27)
= dWρ+ ρ˜dB, (3.28)
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where dB is a (2×1)-vector of Brownian motions which is independent from dW , and ρ is a (2×1)-
vector such that ρ ∈ [−1, 1] and ρ′ρ < 1 (e.g., da Fonseca, Grasselli, and Tebaldi, 2007; Buraschi,
Porchia, and Trojani, 2010). We use short notation ρ˜ :=
√
1− ρ′ρ.
General form of the market prices of risk
Let us write the shocks to Y under the physical dynamics as (for brevity we omit the superscript
P):
dZ =
 dZX
dZf
 =
 dWρ+ ρ˜dB
dZf
 =
 dWρ
01×2
+
 ρ˜I2×2 02×1
01×2 11×1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
 dB
dZf

︸ ︷︷ ︸
dZ˜
=
 dWρ
01×2
+RdZ˜,
(3.29)
where
R =
 ρ˜I2×2 02×1
01×2 11×1
 , dZ˜ =
 dB
dZf
 . (3.30)
The change of drift is specified as:
dZ˜ = dZ˜Q − ΛY,tdt (3.31)
dW = dWQ − ΛV,tdt (3.32)
ΛY,t = Σ
−1
Y (Vt)
(
λ0Y + λ
1
Y Yt
)
(3.33)
ΛV,t =
(√
Vt
)−1
Λ0V +
√
VtΛ
1
V , (3.34)
where λ0Y and λ
1
Y are a (n+1)-vector and (n+1)×(n+1) matrix of parameters, and Λ0V and Λ1V are
n×n constant matrices. To exclude arbitrage, the market price of risk requires that the parameter
matrix Q be invertible, so that Vt stays in the positive-definite domain. This specification implies
the risk-neutral dynamics of Yt given by:
dYt =
µY −
 Λ0V ρ
0
−Rλ0Y
+ (KY −Rλ1Y )Yt −
 VtΛ1V ρ
0
 dt+ΣY (Vt) dZQt . (3.35)
Let:
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µQY = µY −
 Λ0V ρ
0
−Rλ0Y (3.36)
KQY = KY −Rλ1Y . (3.37)
The dynamics of Vt is given as:
dVt =
[(
ΩΩ′ − Λ0VQ−Q′Λ0′V
)
+
(
M −Q′Λ1′V
)
Vt + Vt
(
M ′ − Λ1VQ
)]
dt+
√
VtdW
Q
t Q+Q
′dWQ′t
√
Vt.
(3.38)
Let
ΩQΩQ′ = ΩΩ′ − Λ0VQ−Q′Λ0′V = (k − 2v)Q′Q (3.39)
MQ =M −Q′Λ1′V , (3.40)
where, to preserve the same distribution under P and Q, we assume Λ0V = vQ
′ for a scalar v such
that (k − 2v) > n− 1.
Solution for bond prices
Since both components of the state vector, i.e. Yt, Vt, are affine, bond prices are of the form:
F (Yt, Vt; t, τ) = exp
{
A (τ) +B (τ)′ Yt + Tr [C (τ)Vt]
}
. (3.41)
By discounted Feynman-Kac theorem, the drift of dF equals rF, thus:
L{Y,V }F +
∂F
∂t
= rF, (3.42)
where L{Y,V } is the joint infinitesimal generator of the couple {Yt, Vt} under the risk neutral
measure. We have:
L{Y,V }F = (LY + LV + LY,V )F (3.43)
LY F = ∂F
∂Y ′
µQY +KQY Y −
 VtΛ1V ρ
0
+ 1
2
Tr
[
∂F
∂Y ∂Y ′
ΣY (V ) Σ
′
Y (V )
]
(3.44)
LV F = Tr
[(
ΩQΩQ′ +MQV + VMQ′
)
RF + 2VRQ′QRF
]
(3.45)
LY,V F = 2Tr
[(
RQ′ρ ∂
∂X ′
)
FV
]
. (3.46)
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R is a matrix differential operator: Rij :=
(
∂
∂Vij
)
. Substituting derivatives of (3.41) into (3.42)
gives:
B′τ
(
µQY +KQY Y
)
− Tr (Λ1V ρB′X,τV )+ 12Tr (BX,τB′X,τV )+ 12B2f,τσ2f (3.47)
+ Tr
(
ΩQΩQ′Cτ
)
+ Tr
[(
CτM
Q +MQ′Cτ + 2CτQ
′QCτ
)
V
]
(3.48)
+ Tr
[(
CτQ
′ρB′X,τ +BX,τρ
′QCτ
)
V
]
(3.49)
=
∂Aτ
∂τ
+
∂Bτ
∂τ
′
Y + Tr
(
∂Cτ
∂τ
V
)
+ γ0 + γ
′
Y Y (3.50)
By matching coefficients, we obtain the system of equations:
∂A
∂τ
= B′τµ
Q
Y +
1
2
B2f,τσ
2
f + Tr
(
ΩQΩQ′Cτ
)− γ0 (3.51)
∂B
∂τ
= KQ′Bτ − γY (3.52)
∂C
∂τ
=
1
2
BX,τB
′
X,τ + Cτ
(
MQ +Q′ρB′X,τ
)
+
(
MQ′ +BX,τρ
′Q
)
Cτ + 2CτQ
′QCτ − Λ1V ρB′X,τ
(3.53)
To obtain the solution provided in the text, set ρ = 02×1, Λ
0
V = 02×2 and Λ
1
V = 02×2.
Instantaneous volatility of yields
The instantaneous volatility of yields is given as:
1
dt
〈dyτ1t , dyτ2t 〉 =
1
τ1τ2
Tr
[
Bf,τ2Bf,τ1σ
2
f +
(
BX,τ1B
′
X,τ2 + 2Cτ2Q
′ρB′X,τ1 + 2Cτ1Q
′ρB′X,τ2 + 4Cτ1Q
′QCτ2
)
Vt
]
.
(3.54)
Proof. The only term which requires clarification is B′τ1dYt×Tr [Cτ2dVt] = B′X,τ1dXt×Tr [Cτ2dVt]
B′X,τ1dXt × Tr [Cτ2dVt] = B′X,τ1
√
V dZX × Tr
[
Cτ2
(√
V dWQ+Q′dW ′
√
V
)]
= B′X,τ1
√
V (dWρ+ ρ˜dB)× 2Tr
(
QCτ2
√
V dW
)
= 2Tr
(
Cτ2Q
′ρB′X,τ1V
)
Where we use the following fact:
Tr
[
C
(√
V dWQ+Q′dW ′
√
V
)]
= 2Tr
(
QC
√
V dW
)
. (3.55)
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Conditional covariance of X and V
We consider the conditional covariance matrix of X and V
d
〈
Xt,1
Xt,2
ft
 ,

Vt,11
Vt,12
Vt,22

〉
=

d (X1, V11) d (X1, V12) d (X1, V22)
d (X2, V11) d (X2, V12) d (X2, V22)
d (f, V11) d (f, V12) d (f, V22)
 (3.56)
The elements of the covariance matrix are given by:
d 〈Xk, Vij〉 = ρ′ (Q:,jVik +Q:,iVjk) , (3.57)
where Q:,j denotes the j-th column of matrix Q.
Proof. The expression follows by simple algebra:
1
dt
d 〈Vij , Xk〉 =
[
e′i
(√
V dWQ
)
ej + e
′
i
(
Q′dW ′
√
V
)
ej
] (
e′k
√
V dWρ
)
= Tr
(
eje
′
i
√
V dWQ
)
× Tr
(
ρe′k
√
V dW
)
+ Tr
(
eje
′
iQ
′dW ′
√
V
)
× Tr
(
ρe′k
√
V dW
)
= vec
(√
V eie
′
jQ
′
)′
vec
(√
V ekρ
′
)
+ vec
(√
V eje
′
iQ
′
)′
vec
(√
V ekρ
′
)
= Tr
(
Qeje
′
iV ekρ
′
)
+ Tr
(
Qeie
′
jV ekρ
′
)
= ρ′ (Q:,jVik +Q:,iVjk) , (3.58)
where ei is the i-th column of the identity matrix.
Discrete approximation to the unconditional covariance matrix of X and V
We can use the discretized dynamics of X and V to compute the unconditional covariance matrix:
Xt+∆t = µ¯X,∆t +ΦX,∆tXt +
√
Vt∆t (Ut+∆tρ+ ρ˜bt+∆t) (3.59)
Vt+∆t = kµ¯V,∆t +ΦV,∆tVtΦ
′
V,∆t +
√
Vt∆tUt+∆tQ+Q
′U ′t+∆t
√
Vt∆t, (3.60)
where Ut is a 2 × 2 matrix of Gaussian shocks, and bt is a 2-vector of Gaussian shocks. The
covariance between X and V is computed as :
Cov [X, vec(V )] = E
[
Xvec (V )′
]− E (X)E [vec (V )′] . (3.61)
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The element E
[
Xvec (V )′
]
reads:
vecE
[
X (vecV )′
]
= [In3 − (ΦV ⊗ ΦV )⊗ ΦX ]−1 (vecA+ vecB) , (3.62)
where A is given as:
A = µ¯Xvec (kµ¯V )
′ + µ¯Xvec
[
ΦVE (Vt) Φ
′
V
]
+ΦXE(Xt)vec(kµ¯V )
′, (3.63)
and the elemtent (k, ij) of matrix B, associated with the covariance of Xk and Vij has the form:
Bk,ij = ρ
′ (Q:,jVik +Q:,iVjk)∆t, (3.64)
where B =
 B1,11 B1,12 B1,21 B1,22
B2,11 B2,12 B2,21 B2,22
 . Note that the second and third columns of B are
identical.
VIII.C. Moments of the state variables
This section derives moments of the state variables necessary for the implementation of the un-
scented Kalman filter.
Moments of the Vt process
The first conditional moment of the volatility process Vt is given as:
Et (Vt+∆t) = kµ¯V,∆t +ΦV,∆tVtΦ
′
V,∆t, (3.65)
where
ΦV,∆t = e
M∆t (3.66)
µ¯V,∆t =
∫ ∆t
0
eM∆tQ′QeM
′∆tds = −1
2
Cˆ12(∆t)Cˆ
′
11 (∆t) , (3.67)
with  Cˆ11(∆t) Cˆ12(∆t)
Cˆ21(∆t) Cˆ22(∆t)
 = exp
∆t
 M −2Q′Q
0 −M ′
 .
See Van Loan (1978) for the derivation of the above expression. Assuming stationarity (i.e. negative
eigenvalues of M), the unconditional first moment of Vt follows as:
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lim
∆t→∞
vecEt (Vt+∆t) = kvec (µ¯V,∞) = −k [(I ⊗M) + (M ⊗ I)]−1 vec(Q′Q). (3.68)
The conditional and unconditional covariance matrix of Vt reads:
Covt [vec (Vt+∆t)] = (In2 +Kn,n)
[
ΦV,∆tVtΦ
′
V,∆t ⊗ µ¯V,∆t + k (µ¯V,∆t ⊗ µ¯V,∆t) + µ¯V,∆t ⊗ ΦV,∆tVtΦ′V,∆t
]
.
(3.69)
lim
∆t→∞
Covt [vec (Vt+∆t)] = (In2 +Kn,n) k (µ¯V,∞ ⊗ µ¯V,∞) . (3.70)
Kn,n is the commutation matrix with the property that Kn,nvec(A) = vec(A
′). These moments are
derived in Buraschi, Cieslak, and Trojani (2008) and thus are stated without a proof.
Gourieroux, Jasiak, and Sufana (2009b) show that when ΩΩ′ = kQ′Q, k integer, the dynamics of
Vt can be represented as the sum of outer products of k independent Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes
with a zero long-run mean:
Vt =
k∑
i=1
vitv
i′
t (3.71)
vit+∆t = ΦV,∆tv
i
t + ǫ
i
t+∆t, ǫ
i
t ∼ N(0, µ¯V,∆t). (3.72)
Taking the outer-product implies that the exact discretization of Vt has the form:
Vt+∆t = kµ¯V,∆t +ΦV,∆tVtΦ
′
V,∆t + u
V
t+∆t, (3.73)
where the shock uVt+∆t is a heteroskedastic martingale difference sequence.
Moments of the Yt dynamics
We assume that the dimension of Xt is n = 2 and ft is a scalar process. Let Yt = (X
′
t, ft)
′:
dYt = (µY +KY Yt) dt+Σ(Vt) dZt. (3.74)
It is straightforward to show that the conditional and unconditional first moment of Yt has the
form:
Et (Yt+∆t) =
(
eKY∆t − I)K−1Y µY + eKY∆tYt (3.75)
lim
∆t→∞
Et (Yt+∆t) = −K−1Y µY , (3.76)
where KY is assumed to be lower triangular with negative eigenvalues.
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To compute the conditional covariance of Yt, let VY (t, T ) := Covt (YT ) . Following Fisher and Gilles
(1996), the application of Ito’s lemma to Yˆ (t, T ) := Et (YT ) reveals that:
dYˆ (t, T ) = σˆY (t, T ) dZt, (3.77)
where σˆY (t, T ) := ΦY (t, T ) Σ (Vt) , with
ΦY (t, T ) = e
KY (T−t) (3.78)
and
ΣY (Vt) =
 √Vt 0
0 σ2f
 . (3.79)
Then, integrating dYˆ (t, T ) yields:
YT = YˆT,T = Yˆt,T +
∫ T
s=t
σˆY (s, T ) dZs. (3.80)
Therefore, we have:
VY (t, T ) = Covt
[∫ T
s=t
σˆY (s, T )dZ
Y
s
]
= Et
[∫ T
s=t
σˆY (s, T )σˆY (s, T )
′ds
]
(3.81)
=
∫ T
s=t
ΦY (s, T )Et
 Vs 0
0 σ2f
Φ′Y (s, T )ds. (3.82)
Note that since KY is lower triangular, ΦY (t, T ) = eKY (T−t) is also lower triangular, and we have:
ΦY (t, T ) =
 ΦX (t, T ) 0
ΦXf (t, T ) Φf (t, T )
 . (3.83)
Let us for convenience define two matrices:
M1Y (t, T ) =

ΦX(t, T )⊗ ΦX(t, T )
ΦX(t, T )⊗ ΦfX(t, T )
ΦfX(t, T )⊗ ΦX(t, T )
ΦfX(t, T )⊗ ΦfX(t, T )
 and M0Y =
 08×1
Φ2f (t, T )σ
2
f
 . (3.84)
With help of simple matrix algebra applied to (3.99), the conditional covariance of Yt has the
(vectorized) form
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vecVY (t, T ) =
∫ T
s=t
M1Y (s, T ) [ΦV (s, T )⊗ ΦV (s, T )] ds× vec (Vt) (3.85)
+
∫ T
s=t
kM1Y vec [µ¯V (t, s)] ds+
∫ T
s=t
M0Y (s, T )ds. (3.86)
The unconditional covariance of Y is given as:
lim
T→∞
vecVY (t, T ) = lim
T→∞
∫ T
s=t
kM1Y (s, T )vec [µ¯V (t, s)] ds+
∫ T
s=t
M0Y (s, T )ds. (3.87)
This expression exists if the mean reversion matrices M and KY are negative definite.
The expressions for the conditional mean (3.75) and covariance (3.86) give rise to an exact dis-
cretization of the process Yt.
Remark 1. In order to avoid the numerical integration, we can resort to a discrete-time approxi-
mation of the unconditional covariance matrix of Y factors. To this end, we discretize the dynamics
dYt = (µY +KY Yt) dt+ΣY (Vt) dZt (3.88)
as
Yt+∆t = µ¯Y,∆t +ΦY,∆tYt +ΣY (Vt)
√
∆tεt+∆t, (3.89)
where µ¯Y,∆t =
(
eKY∆t − I)K−1Y µY . The second moment of the discretized dynamics is straightfor-
ward to obtain as:
vecE
(
Y Y ′
)
= (I − ΦY,∆t ⊗ ΦY,∆t)−1×
×vec{µ¯Y,∆tµ¯′Y,∆t + µ¯Y,∆tE (Y ′)Φ′Y,∆t +ΦY,∆tE (Y ) µ¯′Y,∆t + E [ΣY (Vt) ΣY (Vt)′]∆t}
(3.90)
vec [V ar (Y )] = vecE
(
Y Y ′
)− vecE (Y ) [vecE (Y )]′ .
We check that for the weekly discretization step ∆t = 152 this approximation works well, and
implies a significant reduction of the computational time.
VIII.D. Model estimation
Discretization and vectorization of the state space
This section collects the details about the vectorization of transition dynamics for Yt and Vt.
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Parameters for discretized transition dynamics of Yt are given by:
µ¯Y,∆t =
(
eKY∆t − I)K−1Y µY (3.91)
ΦY,∆t = e
KY∆t. (3.92)
Parameter matrices ΦV,∆t and µ¯V,∆t for discretized transition dynamics of Vt are given by:
µ¯V,∆t =
∫ ∆t
0
ΦV,sQ
′QΦ′V,sds (3.93)
ΦV,∆t = e
M∆t, (3.94)
The closed form solution for the integral µ¯V,∆t is given by
∫ ∆t
0 ΦV,sQ
′QΦ′V,sds = −Cˆ12(∆t)Cˆ ′11(∆t),
where  Cˆ11(∆t) Cˆ12(∆t)
Cˆ21(∆t) Cˆ22(∆t)
 = exp
∆t
 M −Q′Q
0 −M ′
 .
See Van Loan (1978) for the proof.
We recast the discretized covariance matrix dynamics Vt in a vector form:
vec(Vt+∆t) = kvec(µ¯V,∆t) + (ΦV,∆t ⊗ ΦV,∆t)vec(Vt) + vec(uVt+∆t). (3.95)
Since the process Vt lives in the space of symmetric matrices, its lower triangular part preserves all
information. Let us for convenience define two linear transformations of some symmetric matrix
A: (i) an elimination matrix: Envec(A) = vech(A), where vech(·) denotes half-vectorization, (ii)
a duplication matrix: Dnvech(A) = vec(A). Using half-vectorization, we define V¯t := vech(Vt) =
Envec(Vt), which contains n¯ = n(n+ 1)/2 unique elements of Vt:
V¯t+∆t = kEnvec(µ¯V,∆t) + En(ΦV,∆t ⊗ ΦV,∆t)DnV¯t + Envec(uVt+∆t). (3.96)
Collecting all elements, we can redefine the state as: St = (Y
′
t , V¯
′
t )
′, whose transition is described
by the conditional mean:
Et (St+∆t) =
 (eKY∆t − I)K−1Y µY + eKY∆tYt
kEnvec(µ¯V,∆t) + En(ΦV,∆t ⊗ ΦV,∆t)DnV¯t
 , (3.97)
and the conditional covariance of the form:
Covt (St+∆t) =
 Covt(Yt+∆t) 0n×n¯
0n¯×n Covt
(
V¯t+∆t
)
 . (3.98)
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The block diagonal structure in the last expression follows from our assumption that shocks in Yt
be independent of shocks in Vt. The respective blocks are given as:
Covt(Yt+∆t) = ΣY (Vt)ΣY (Vt)
′∆t (3.99)
Covt
(
V¯t+∆t
)
= EnCovt (Vt+∆t) E ′n
= En (In2 +Kn,n)
[
ΦV,∆tVtΦ
′
V,∆t ⊗ µ¯V,∆t + k (µ¯V,∆t ⊗ µ¯V,∆t) + µ¯V,∆t ⊗ ΦV,∆tVtΦ′V,∆t
] E ′n,
(3.100)
where Kn,n denotes a commutation matrix (see e.g., Magnus and Neudecker, 1979). Buraschi,
Cieslak, and Trojani (2008) provide the derivation of the last expression.
Econometric identification
This section details our econometric identification procedure and parameter restrictions. To ensure
econometric identification, we consider invariant model transformations of the type Y˜t = v + LYt
and V˜t = LVtL
′, for a scalar v and an invertible matrix L. Such transformations result in the
equivalence of the state variables, the short rate and thus yields (Dai and Singleton, 2000). If
allowed, they can invalidate the results of an estimation.
To prevent the invariance, we adopt several normalizations for the physical dynamics of the process
Yt: (i) Setting µY = 0 allows to treat γ0 as a free parameter. (ii) Restricting γf = 1 makes σf
identified. (iii) Since both KX and Vt determine interactions between the elements of Xt, they
are not separately identifiable. We set KX to a diagonal matrix, and allow correlations of the Xt
factors to be generated solely by Vt. By the same token, the last row of matrix KY , i.e. (KfX ,Kf )
is left unrestricted, as ft does not interact with Xt via the diffusion term.
The identification of volatility factors Vt is ensured with three restrictions: (i)M is lower triangular
and (ii) Q is diagonal with positive elements. (iii) The diagonal elements of Q are uniquely
determined by setting γX = 1n×1, where 1n×1 is a vector of ones. These normalizations protect
Vt against affine transformations and orthonormal rotations of Brownian motions. Finally, to
guarantee the stationarity of the state, we require that the mean reversion matrices KY and M be
negative definite. Due to the lower triangular structure of both, this is equivalent to restricting the
diagonal elements of each matrix to be negative.
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Implementation of the filter
This section summarizes the algorithm for the unscented Kalman filtering. We recast the transition
and measurement equations above into one state space. The compound transition equation is given
by:
St+∆t = A+BSt + εt+∆t, (3.101)
and the compound measurement equation is given by:
mt = h(St; Θ) + ϑt. (3.102)
St = (Y
′
t , V¯
′
t )
′ and A are (n+ n¯+ 1)× 1-dimensional vectors, A is given by:
A =
 (ΦY,∆t − I)K−1Y µY
k · Envec(µ¯V,∆t)
 . (3.103)
B is a block-diagonal matrix of the form:
B =
 ΦY,∆t 0n×n¯
0n¯×n En(ΦV,∆t ⊗ ΦV,∆t)Dn
 . (3.104)
The vector shocks is of the form:
εt+∆t =
 uYt+∆t
Envec(uVt+∆t)
 , (3.105)
and its covariance matrix is given by a block-diagonal matrix:
Covt(εt+∆t) =
 Covt(Yt+∆t) 0n×n¯
0n¯×n Covt(V¯t+∆t)
 . (3.106)
mt is a vector of observed yields and volatility measures given by mt = (y
τ
t , v
τi,τj
t )
′. Model implied
yields and volatilities are affine in the state vector. Function h(·) translates the state variables to
model implied yields and volatilities:
h(St; Θ) =
 f(St; Θ)
g(Vt; Θ)
 . (3.107)
The vector of measurement errors:
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ϑt =
 √Ryeyt√
Rve
v
t
 (3.108)
is Gaussian with the covariance matrix, for six yields and three volatility measurements, is given
by:
Cov(ϑt) =
 σ2yI6 06×3
03×6 diag(σ
2
i,v)i=1,2,3
 . (3.109)
The core of UKF is the unscented transformation which approximates a distribution of a nonlinear
transformation of any random variable by a set of sample points. In the UKF framework, we apply
the unscented transformation recursively to B and h(·).
We define LS := n+ n¯+ 1. Assume that we know the mean S¯ and the covariance PS of St at each
point in time t. We form a matrix S of 2LS + 1 sigma vectors:
S0 = S¯ (3.110)
Si = S¯ +
(√
(LS + λ)PS
)
i
, i = 1, ..., LS (3.111)
Si = S¯ −
(√
(LS + λ)PS
)
i−LS
, i = LS + 1, ..., 2LS , (3.112)
where λ = α2(LS − κ) − LS is a scaling parameter governing the spread of sigma points around
the mean and
(√
(LS + λ)PS
)
i
is the i-th column of matrix PS . Sigma points S are propagated
through function h(·) to get M. The first two moments of mt are approximated by:
m¯ ≈
2LS∑
i=0
Wµi Mi (3.113)
PS ≈
2LS∑
i=0
W σi (Mi − m¯)(Mi − m¯)′, (3.114)
where Wµ and W σ denote weights for the mean and the covariance matrix, respectively and are
defined as:
Wµ0 =
λ
LS + λ
(3.115)
W σ0 =
λ
LS + λ
+ 1− α2 + β, i = 1, ..., LS (3.116)
Wµi =W
σ
i =
λ
2(LS + λ)
, i = LS + 1, ..., 2LS . (3.117)
Parameters α and β, mainly determine higher moments of the distribution.
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The UKF Algorithm
1. Initialize at unconditional moments:26
Sˆ0 = E[S0] (3.118)
PS0 = E[(S0 − Sˆ0)(S0 − Sˆ0)′] (3.119)
for k ∈ 1, ...,∞:
2. Compute the sigma points:
Sk−1 =
[
Sˆk−1 Sˆk−1 +
√
(LS + λ)PS,k−1 Sˆk−1 −
√
(LS + λ)PS,k−1
]
(3.120)
3. Time update:
Sak|k−1 = B(Sk−1) (3.121)
Sˆ−k =
2LS∑
i=0
Wµi Sak|k−1 (3.122)
P−Sk =
2LS∑
i=0
W σi (Saik|k−1 − Sˆ−k )(Saik|k−1 − Sˆ−k )′ + Covt(εt+∆t) (3.123)
4. Augment sigma points:
Sk|k−1 =
[
Sak|k−1 Sa0k|k−1 +
√
(LS + λ)Covt(εt+∆t) Sa0k|k−1 −
√
(LS + λ)Covt(εt+∆t)
]
(3.124)
Mk|k−1 = h(Sk|k−1) (3.125)
mˆ−k =
2LS∑
i=1
W σi Mi,k|k−1 (3.126)
5. Measurement equations update:
26We borrow the algorithm from Wan and van der Merwe (2001).
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P−mk =
2LS∑
i=0
W σi (Mik|k−1 − mˆ−k )(Mik|k−1 − mˆ−k )′ + Covt(ϑt+∆t) (3.127)
PSkmk =
2LS∑
i=0
W σi (Sik|k−1 − Sˆ−k )(Mik|k−1 − mˆ−k )′ (3.128)
Kk = PSkmkP−1mk (3.129)
Fˆk = Fˆ
−
k +Kk(mk − mˆ−k ) (3.130)
Pk = P
−
k −KkP−mkK′k. (3.131)
Pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation
Collecting all measurements in vector mt+1, let mˆ
−
t+1 and Pˆ
−
m,t+1 denote the time-t forecasts of the
time-(t + 1) values of the measurement series and of their conditional covariance, respectively, as
returned by the filter (for convenience 1 means one week). By normality of measurement errors,
we can compute the quasi-log likelihood value for each time point in our sample:
lt+1(Θ) = −1
2
ln |P−m,t+1| −
1
2
(
mˆ−t+1 −mt+1
)′ (
P−m,t+1
)−1 (
mˆ−t+1 −mt+1
)
, (3.132)
and obtain parameter estimates by maximizing the criterion:
Θˆ := argmin
Θ
L (Θ, {mt}Tt=1) with L (Θ, {mt}Tt=1) = T−1∑
t=0
lt+1 (Θ) . (3.133)
with T = 1003 weeks. The initial log-likelihood is evaluated at the unconditional moments of the
state vector (see Section VIII.C for the expressions).
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